have to deal with facts as we know them, and not merely rumors and speculation.

Now, as I say, these things may all come about and we may find ourselves again with the Soviet Union toe to toe, but we ought to know what we have in our hands before we bring the United States, and ask our allies to come with us, to the brink again.

I am quite obviously hopeful that it [communism in Cuba] can be eliminated, but we have to wait and see what happens. There are a lot of unpleasant situations in the world today. China is one. It's unfortunate that communism was permitted to come into Cuba. It has been a problem in the last 5 years. We don't know what's going to happen internally. There's no obviously easy solution as to how the Communist movement will be removed. One way, of course, would be by the Cubans themselves, though that's very difficult, given the police setup. The other way would be by external action. But that's war and we should not regard that as a cheap or easy way to accomplish what we wish.

We live with a lot of dangerous situations all over the world. Berlin is one. There are many others. And we live with a good deal of hazard all around the world and have for 15 years. I cannot set down any time in which I can clearly see the end to the Castro regime. I believe it's going to come, but I couldn't possibly give a time limit. I think that those who do, sometimes mislead. I remember a good deal of talk in the early fifties about liberation, how Eastern Europe was going to be liberated. And then we had Hungary, and Poland, and East Germany, and no action was taken.

The reason the action wasn't taken was because they felt strongly that if they did take action it would bring on another war. So it's quite easy to discuss these things and say one thing or another ought to be done. But when they start talking about how, and when, they start talking about Americans invading Cuba and killing thousands of Cubans and Americans. With all the hazards around the world, that's a very serious decision, and I notice that that's not approached directly by a good many who have discussed the problem.

I think we ought to keep a sense of proportion about the size of the force we're talking about. We are talking about four groups, 1100 to 1200 men each. Those are the organized military units. That's about 6,000 men. Obviously, those forces cannot be used to invade another country. They may be used to maintain some sort of control within Cuba, but obviously are not a force that can be used externally. And in addition, Cuba cannot possibly-it lacks any amphibious equipment, and quite obviously our power in that area is overwhelming.

I think the big dangers to Latin America, if I may say so, are the very difficult, and in some cases desperate, conditions in the countries themselves, unrelated to Cuba. Illiteracy, or bad housing, or maldistribution of wealth, or political or social instability-these are all problems we find, a diminishing exchange, balance of payments dif

ficulty, drop in the price of their raw materials upon which their income depends. These are all problems that I think are staggering, to which we ought to be devoting our attention.

Now, I think Castro has been discredited in the past months substantially, as everyone of our surveys in USIA show. One of the reasons has been the missile business and also the presence of Russian forces which, in a sense, seem to be police units. So that what I think we should concern ourselves with, quite obviously, is Cuba, but Cuba as a center of propaganda and possibly subversion, the training of agents these are the things which we must watch about Cuba. But in the larger sense, it is the desperate and in some cases internal problems in Latin America, themselves unrelated to Fidel Castro whose image is greatly tarnished over a year ago, which caused me the concern and why I regard Latin America as the most critical area in the world today and why I would hope that Western Europe and the United States would not be so preoccupied with our disputes, which historically may not seem justified, when we have a very, very critical problem which should concern us both in Latin America.

I have read a statement of Mr. Khrushchev's that these [Soviet] forces would be removed in due course or due time.42 The time was not stated and, therefore, we're trying to get a more satisfactory definition.

The range of the missiles on the Komar, the 12 Komars, is, I believe, 18 miles. So we would not regard that as a weapon which would be used in an attack on the United States. If there is going to be that kind of an attack on the United States, then you're going to have an attack from places other than Cuba, and you're going to have them with much larger weapons than a Komar torpedo boat can carry. Then you are talking about the willingness of the Soviet Union to begin a major war. Now if the Soviet Union is prepared to begin a major war, which will result in hundreds of millions of casualties by the time it is finished, then, of course, we all face a situation which is extremely grave.

I do not believe that that's what the Soviet Union wants, because I think they have other interests. I think they wish to seize power, but I don't think they wish to do so by a war. I therefore doubt if a Komar torpedo boat is going to attack the United States very soon. Now, it's possible-it's possible everything is possible. And after our experience last fall, we operate on the assumption while hoping for the best, we expect the worst. It's very possible that the worst will come and we should prepare for it. That's why we continue our daily surveillance. It is possible, conceivable.

We cannot prove that there is not a missile in a cave or that the Soviet Union isn't going to ship next week. We prepare for that. But we will find them when they do and when they do, the Soviet Union

"See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 461–463.

and Cuba and the United States must all be aware that this will produce the greatest crisis which the world has faced in its history. So I think that the Soviet Union will proceed with caution and care, and I think we should.

III-19

TECHNICAL ADVISORY STUDY BY THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS FOR SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES, THE FLOW OF SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA, AND THE UTILIZATION OF CUBA AS A BASE FOR TRAINING IN SUBVERSIVE TECHNIQUES, Submitted to the Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, February 8, 1963 (Excerpt) 43

VI. FINAL CONSIDERATION

Since the time of its Initial General Report," the Committee has observed that the establishment of a beachhead on American territory, achieved by the communist offensive, "poses a threat of the utmost gravity to the security of the Hemisphere." The events that have taken place since that time, particularly the military strengthening of Cuba by the Soviet Union, by greatly increasing the capacity of the Cuban government to send arms into neighboring countries and to intensify other subversive activities, render the threat to hemispheric security much more serious, a threat that assumes an urgent character with respect to the security of the countries of the Caribbean region. This has become evident, sometimes in a dramatic manner, in the recent wave of terrorism, sabotage, and other subversive activities that Castro-communism has unleashed in some of the Latin American countries.

Without wishing to detract importance from the measures that have been recommended during the course of this study, the Committee believes that present circumstances demand that such measures be supplemented with others of greater scope. The degree of development attained by the political-military apparatus that has been established in Cuba is rendering the system of security against subversion increasingly inadequate and ineffective, based solely on the isolated measures that each country might adopt. Holding this conviction, the Committee has wished to assume responsibility for expressing it, in view of the present state of events, in order that the American governments may effectively confront the subversive action of Castro-communism.

45

Under these circumstances, the Committee believes that the situation justifies consideration by the American governments in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. In the opinion of the Committee, recent events, particularly the repeated statements by the principal Cuban leaders of their intention to subvert the American governments by violence, constitute a situation of such gravity and urgency that it can be adequately and effectively dealt with only by adopting the measures provided for in the Treaty.

43 OAS doc. OEA/Ser.L/X/II.3. The recommendations contained in the final report submitted to the Council of the OAS on June 4, 1963, by the Special Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII were almost identical with those made in this study. See post, doc. III-29.

"Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 361–366. 45 Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 789-796.

48

In this respect, it is also pertinent to recall the urgent recommendation made by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation to the governments of the member states "to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance." To this effect, the Committee believes that because of the increasing gravity of the subversive threat posed by Castro-communism, recourse to such measures of individual and collective self-defense as are considered necessary to remove it, may not be postponed.

III-20

"CUBA WILL NOT BECOME A BASE FOR OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE HEMISPHERE FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IT WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PLAY THAT ROLE": Address by the Secretary of State (Rusk) Before a Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Los Angeles, Calif., February 13, 1963 *

III-21

47

STEPS BEING TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS TO MEET THE COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE OFFENSIVE IN THE HEMISPHERE: Statement Made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) Before the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 18, 1963 (Excerpts)48

In the face of the Communist subversive offensive in the hemisphere, there arises the question of what the U.S. and the other American Republics are doing to meet it. Success in combating this offensive will, of course, depend greatly on the will and ability of all the American governments to act and to coordinate their efforts with each other. It is important to keep in mind that what we are concerned with are problems and situations which exist in 19 independent, sovereign nations, as properly jealous of their independence as we are. Although we are interdependent and allied by geography, common origins, and the regional security system of the OAS [Organization of American States], we are all also firmly committed in inter-American treaties to the principle of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs.

45 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 320-331. 67 For text of address, see ante, doc. I-3.

"Text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 18, 1963, pp. 404412. The first part of this statement, primarily concerned with the development and changing tactics of Communism in Latin America, appeared in the Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 11, 1963, pp. 347-356.

Indeed, the violation of this principle by the Soviet and Castrodirected Communists creates the problem we are talking about.

From this it is evident that, so far as the U.S. is concerned, neither the problem nor the remedies are entirely within our control. It means that the steps the U.S. takes must be in full agreement, free cooperation, and partnership with our Latin American allies. While promoting increasing cooperation, the U.S., in all its efforts, continues to respect the principle of sovereign independence. We cannot and will not ourselves, in combating violation of this principle by others, destroy the very principle we are trying to preserve.

We are channeling our direct attack on the problem of Communist subversion in two directions. One is to isolate Cuba from the hemisphere and discredit the image of the Cuban revolution in the hemisphere. The other is to improve the internal security capabilities of the countries concerned.

Even more important over the long term will be the achievement of our goals under the Alliance for Progress, a partnership of 20 countries of the inter-American system.

A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in implementing programs designed to assist the governments of Latin America to deal with this insidious threat. Their individual activities are carried on as a part of an integrated U.S. effort to strengthen country internal security capabilities and to promote sound political, economic, and social structures through democratic processes. Each of the representatives of the other agencies at this hearing will be able to furnish you in more detail information about their efforts and the achievement of these objectives.

Coordination of all of these activities takes place in the weekly meetings of the Latin American Policy Committee. In these meetings, senior policy officials of all the concerned agencies meet with me to discuss their programs on the basis of prepared staff papers. We examine in some detail the activities of each of the agencies in the area at each weekly meeting and agree on programs for periods in the future ranging from 6 months to a number of years, depending on our ability to foresee what is needed.

If the conclusions of the Latin American Policy Committee are such as to require higher level decisions, they are promptly submitted to higher authority for review and approval, including, where appropriate, the President.

These policy and program decisions are then carried out as an integrated effort by the country team in the field and by day-to-day dialog between the country desk officers of the various agencies here in Washington.

Between meetings there is, of course, continuing and frequent informal contact at all levels between the concerned agencies.

While subversion has been, as we have seen, a long-term effort, its strength is unquestionably affected by the position, prestige, and stability of Castro and his regime in Cuba. We have had a considerable measure of success from our efforts to isolate Cuba and discredit the Castro government. In this regard, the missile crisis proved to be of