III-14

"THE NEXT STAGE IS TO FIND WAYS AND MEANS OF REDUCING THE CONTINUED SOVIET PRESENCE [IN CUBA] AND THE CONTINUED PROPAGANDA AND OTHER THREATS TO THIS HEMISPHERE": Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked on the NBC Radio and Television Program "Meet the Press," January 27, 1963 (Excerpts) 33

The Soviet military aid program and buildup in Cuba started last July. That reached a crescendo, of course, with the missiles and the bombers which were dealt with in October and early November. There remains a substantial Soviet military presence in Cuba.

As the President indicated in his November 20 press conference,35 there had been some indication from the Soviet Union that those forces that were there for the servicing and protection of those missiles would be removed in due course.

We have seen some outtraffic of Soviet military personnel in recent weeks, but we are very much interested in the continuation of that outtraffic.

There are in Cuba at the present time, for example, four relatively small Soviet combat groups, heavily armed, whose presence there is, I think, a matter of some real concern. But the underlying factor is that this hemisphere, including the United States, does not look upon a Soviet military presence in Cuba as a normal condition. It must be our policy, as indicated at Punta del Este in January 36 that the penetration of this hemisphere by a Marxist-Leninist regime, backed from the outside, is unacceptable in the hemisphere so that as a matter of policy we must, I think, anticipate that these forces would be removed and that Cuba someday will rejoin the hemisphere as a loyal part of it.

While the missiles were going out, we said relatively little about the bombers, as you will recall. When the missiles got out we gave a lot of attention to the bombers, and they were removed.

Now this Soviet military installation there the surface-to-air missiles, the antiair missiles-these combat forces are a matter of concern, and, as I have indicated, we have had some indication from the Soviet Union that these forces, at least portions of them, will be removed in due course.

So long as there is a Soviet military presence in Cuba then this is an abnormal situation which will have to be a matter of great concern to the hemisphere and to the United States.

"Department of State press release No. 55, Jan. 28, 1963 (text as printed in

the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1963, pp. 244–250).

24

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 399 et seq. 35 See ibid., pp. 461-463.

38 Ibid., pp. 318 et seq.

Doc. III-14

The critical stage was reached when there were in Cuba massive offensive capabilities represented by these missiles and bombers. That we have gotten over, so far as we can tell.

The next stage is to find ways and means of reducing the continued Soviet presence and the continued propaganda and other threats to this hemisphere.

III-15

UNITED STATES WARNING TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES OF PRIME MINISTER CASTRO'S "DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE HEMISPHERE": Note From the Representative of the United States (Morrison) to the Chairman of the Special Committee To Consider Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Lavalle), January 30, 1963 (Excerpts) 37

On January 16, 1963, Prime Minister Fidel Castro in a speech at the closing session of the Congress of Women of the Americas made a major policy statement, further defining the Cuban Government's position of encouragement and support for armed insurrection in other countries of the hemisphere. The statement constitutes a declaration of war against the hemisphere. Given in the context of the present dispute between Moscow and Peiping over the strategy and tactics which international communism should follow in its pursuit of world domination, the statement has added significance since Castro clearly advocates the path of violence. There follows the text of the principal sections of what he had to say on this subject.38

In the opinion of the United States Government the repeated emphasis placed by high officials of the Castro regime on violence to over

37 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1963, pp. 263–264. Concerning the resolutions adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 320-336. The Special Committee To Make Recommendations Regarding Compliance With Resolution VIII was established on Feb. 14, 1962 (OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/C-sa-433(1)). As a result of a suggestion made in the Final Communiqué of the Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Washington, Oct. 2-3, 1962 (see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 391-393), the Committee was expanded on Oct. 9, 1962, and entrusted with the study of paragraph 1 of the operative portions of Resolution II as well (OAS doc. Ser.G/III/C-sa-461 (5) ). On Oct. 24, 1962, the Committee To Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII was entrusted with an urgent study "of the transfer of funds to the American republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques, presenting to the Council the pertinent reports and recommendations. In carrying out this task the Committee could make use of the advice of the Special Consultative Committee on Security. . . ." (OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/C-sa-464 (2)). See post, doc. III-19.

38

Supra; a tape recording of Prime Minister Castro's speech was also included in this note.

throw established governments, coupled with recent outcroppings of sabotage, terrorism and other forms of subversive activity in several American Republics makes it increasingly important that the governments and the appropriate organs of the OAS redouble their vigilance against Castro-communist subversion. Likewise it becomes of major importance that the member governments develop their capacity of counteracting this threat through individual and cooperative measures. Because of the importance of the subject matter, I am again taking the liberty of sending a copy of this note to the Chairman of the Council of the Organization with the request that he make it available to the members of the Council.

III-16

UNITED STATES DECISION NOT TO SHIP UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT-FINANCED CARGOES FROM THE UNITED STATES ON FOREIGN-FLAG VESSELS ENGAGED IN TRADE WITH CUBA: Announcement Issued by the White House, February 6, 1963 39

III-17

"I BELIEVE BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ALL [OFFENSIVE] WEAPONS SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ISLAND AND NONE HAVE BEEN REINTRODUCED": Statement Made by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) at a "Special Cuba Briefing" Conducted by the Department of Defense, February 6, 1963 (Excerpts)1o

. . . In recent days questions have been raised in the press and elsewhere regarding the presence of offensive weapons systems in Cuba. I believe beyond any reasonable doubt that all such weapons systems have been removed from the island and none have been reintroduced. It is our purpose to show you this afternoon the evidence on which we base that conclusion.

Since July 1, over 400 reconnaissance flights have been flown over the island of Cuba by U.S. military aircraft. These reconnaissance flights provided the essential basis for the national decisions taken with respect to Cuba in October. They provided the basis for the military preparations necessary to support those decisions. They provided the evidence we were able to present the world to document the basis and the rationale of our action.

The reconnaissance flights recorded the removal of the offensive weapons systems from Cuba, and they continued to provide the founda

White House press release dated Feb. 6, 1963; the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 283.

* Department of Defense press release, Feb. 6, 1963. The briefing was held at the Department of State auditorium and was broadcast over nationwide television.

tion for our conclusion that such weapons systems have not been reintroduced into the island.

[A photographic review of the introduction of Soviet military personnel and equipment into Cuba followed.]

In summary, then, ladies and gentlemen, we have recorded the entry of Soviet offensive weapons systems into Cuba and we have recorded their removal. In addition we have reported the introduction into Cuba of a substantial quantity of Soviet Military personnel and Soviet Military equipment, defensive arms. Soviet military personnel on the island, including technicians, increased, we believe, to a total of approximately 22,000 by roughly the 1st of November. That total, as Mr. Hughes reported to you, has been reduced by the disembarkation, removal of about 5,000 men from Cuba and their shipment to the Soviet Union, leaving a total of about 17,000 Soviet military personnel including technicians in Cuba today.

Included in that total of 17,000 are four Soviet combat forces, each force approximating 1,000 to 1,250 men in strength, roughly 5,000 men in total for the four forces, each force being the equivalent approximately of one of our reinforced battalions.

Recently, our reconnaissance has revealed that certain equipment of these Soviet combat forces, namely that associated with the tactical rocket units, has also started to be moved out of the island back to the Soviet Union.

The United States maintains a continuing and an effective high altitude surveillance program covering the island of Cuba. Photographic coverage of the entire territory of Cuba is obtained at least once a week. That coverage provides surveillance of key areas, port areas, airfields, naval bases, cruise missile sites, Soviet ground force garrisons, and certain of the navy logistical centers.

In addition to this weekly island-wide coverage, individual high altitude flights for more detailed coverage of specific objectives are scheduled whenever receipt of intelligence indicates the need for such additional reconnaissance.

Low level reconnaissance aircraft are kept on a 24-hour alert basis for use whenever required. And supplementing this program, the reconnaissance aircraft of the United States Navy continue to photograph all Soviet shipping arriving or departing from Cuba.

The Soviet Union did attempt to establish clandestinely a major offensive weapons base in this hemisphere. The United States was able to deter this effort, and the United States is now monitoring the remaining Soviet personnel and equipment in Cuba through reconnaissance activities of the type which we have described to you today.

III-18

“I THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL PROCEED WITH CAUTION AND CARE, AND I THINK WE SHOULD": Replies Made by the President (Kennedy) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, February 7, 1963 (Excerpts)11

we've been carrying out a good many policies in the last 4 months, since October. We were able to effect the withdrawal of the missiles. We were able to effect the withdrawal of the planes. There has been a reduction of 4,500 in the number of personnel. That was done by the United States being willing to move through a very dangerous period and [without] the loss of an American soldier.

The continued presence of Soviet military personnel is of concern to us. I think the actions the United States has taken over the last 4 months indicate that we do not view the threat lightly.

Now I cannot carry out the policy of the United States Government on the question if obviously there were offensive missiles found in Cuba contrary to Mr. Khrushchev's pledge. It would raise the greatest risks, much greater, in my opinion than we faced in October, and we faced great risks in October. But to take the United States into that path, to persuade our allies to come with us, to hazard our allies as well as the security of the free world, as well as the peace of the free world, we have to move with hard intelligence. We have to know what we're talking about. We cannot base the issue of war and peace on a rumor or report, which is not substantiated, or which some member of Congress refuses to tell us where he heard it.

This issue involves very definitely war and peace. And when you talk about the presence of offensive weapons there, if they are there, I think the Soviet Union is aware and Cuba is aware that we would be back where we were in October but in a far more concentrated way. Now, if you're talking about that, and talking about the kinds of actions which would come from that, it seems to me we ought to know what we are talking about. Now it may be that there are hidden away some missiles. Nobody can prove, in the finite sense, that they're not there, or they might be brought in. But they're going to have to be erected, and we continue complete surveillance. They have to be moved. They have to be put onto pads. They have to be prepared to fire. And quite obviously, if the Soviet Union did that, it would indicate that they were prepared to take the chance of another great encounter between us, with all the dangers.

Now, they had these missiles on the pads and they withdrew them, so the United States is not powerless in the area of Cuba, but I do think we should keep our heads and attempt to use the best information we have. . . . we're taking the greatest pains to try to be accurate, but we

"The replies printed here are taken from pp. 149-155 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963.