a. surveillance by each country of its own coastal area, and interception of suspicious craft within its territorial waters; and

b. cooperation of the Central American States, Panama and the United States to carry out such surveillance and interception, upon the request of any of the governments concerned.

RESOLUTION VII

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

AGREES

To recommend to the Governments of Central America and Panama the establishment, as soon as possible, of an organization in each State, with the sole purpose of counteracting Communist subversion in the Central America-Panama area. This organization will be staffed by specialized personnel to whom privileges will be extended for travel in the above-mentioned area. These organizations will be primarily responsible for:

a) detecting, controlling and counteracting actions and objectives of the members, instrumentalities, sympathizers and collaborators of the Communist Party; and

b) lending mutual support to each other and constantly exchanging information regarding movements of persons or groups, propaganda, funds and arms for Communist subversive purposes.

RESOLUTION VIII

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

AGREES

1. To recommend that their Governments:

a) hold periodic meetings of representatives of Isthmian countries and the United States to review progress made and problems remaining in the control of movements of persons, arms, funds and propaganda, for subversive Communist purposes;

b) hold bilateral discussions among the signatory countries regarding requirements for technical, materiel assistance and training support; and

c) furnish information on a continuing basis to the Council of the Organization of American States on Communist subversive activities. in their respective countries.

2. To inform the Organization of American States of the agreements taken at the present meeting requesting of that Organization and the Member Governments the indispensable backing and support required to achieve their effective implementation, thereby strengthening the inter-American system.

CUBA

III-10

SOVIET-UNITED STATES AGREEMENT TO RELIEVE THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL OF FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE "THREAT TO PEACE... IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA": Joint Letter From the U.S. Representative at the U.N. (Stevenson) and the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (Kuznetsov) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), January 7, 1963 22

On behalf of the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.23

While it has not been possible for our Governments to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connexion with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.

The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connexion with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war.

III-11

CUBAN CONDITIONS FOR "AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT CAPABLE OF GUARANTEEING PERMANENT PEACE IN THE CARIBBEAN": Letter From the Cuban Representative at the U.N. (Lechuga) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), January 7, 1963 (Excerpts) 24

On the instructions of my Government I have the honour to send you, with the request that they be forwarded to the President of the Security Council, copies of the letter which Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, sent to you on 28 October 1962 25 and of the statement issued on 25 November 1962 by the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary

"U.N. doc. S/5227 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 28, 1963, p. 153). Mr. Kuznetsov was Chairman Khrushchev's special representative sent to negotiate the unsettled problems related to the Cuban missile crisis at the United Nations.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 313 et seq. "U.N. doc. S/5228. In his Jan. 9, 1963, reply to this letter (U.N. doc. S/5231), the Secretary-General took "note of the position of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba" and expressed his "confidence that all Governments concerned will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the Caribbean in any way."

25 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448.

Organizations and the Council of Ministers," so that they may be included in the Security Council's documentation on the Caribbean crisis.

At the same time I should be grateful if you would request the President of the Security Council to give instructions for these documents to be circulated to Member States and if you would also arrange for the text of this letter to be circulated to all States Members of the United Nations.

As you know, the negotiations initiated with your generous assistance have not led to an effective agreement capable of guaranteeing permanent peace in the Caribbean and eliminating the existing tensions.

The Revolutionary Government of Cuba considers that the basic reason why these negotiations have not led to agreements acceptable to Cuba is that the Government of the United States, far from having renounced its aggressive and interventionist policy towards the Republic of Cuba, has maintained the position based on force which it took up in flagrant violation of the rules of international law.

The Cuban Government has stated-and it wishes to reiterate this condition on this occasion-that it cannot regard any agreement as effective unless it takes into consideration the five points or measures put forward as minimum guarantees for peace in the Caribbean by our Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, in his statement of 28 October 1962, which is attached."

These Cuban requests are based on elementary principles of international law. They are not irrational demands, and Cuba considers that no one in the United Nations could validly object to them without disregarding the very foundations of the world Organization. The Cuban Government therefore considers that the United States Government's mere promise not to invade Cuba, which, moreover, has never been given formal shape, would not be any safeguard for our country and would not guarantee peace in the Caribbean.

We wish to draw attention to the fact that the United States Government... refuses to even give an assurance that it will not again violate the United Nations Charter by invading the Republic of Cuba, on the pretext that our country has not agreed to international inspection, as has been publicly stated repeatedly throughout this whole affair.

The Government of Cuba, moreover, categorically rejects the statement by the United States Government in which it reserves the right to use other means of inspection and verification on its own account. For a Power to officially announce its decision to inspect the territory of another Member State is truly alarming and amounts to a challenge to the United Nations. It implies an intolerable violation of national sovereignty, which Cuba denounces.

The Revolutionary Government of Cuba has already said that it would be ready to agree to the establishment of a system of multiple verification in the countries of the Caribbean region, including the corresponding parts of the United States, under which the extent of countries' compliance with their undertakings could be verified, provided that the United States, for its part, would agree to the adoption of the five measures or points requested by the Cuban Government.

The Cuban Government regrets the fact that the negotiations carried out with the agreement of the Security Council, which you yourself nobly and impartially set in motion, have not led to a satisfactory conclusion capable of guaranteeing peace in this hemisphere and thus throughout the world.

The recent history of this crisis, we repeat, gives palpable proof that the responsibility for this failure and for the maintenance of the tensions which dramatically aroused the fears of all mankind not long ago lies exclusively with the United States Government.

III-12

"I AM ALSO CONFIDENT THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN": Letter From the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant) to the U.S. Representative at the U.N. (Stevenson), January 8, 1963 28

I have received the letter of 7 January signed by you and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" in which you have informed me that "while it has not been possible for our Governments to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connexion with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time".

The letter has been issued as a Security Council document. I am also drawing the attention of the President of the Security Council to this letter, in order that he may inform the other members of the Council.

I share the hope expressed by your Governments that "the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connexion with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war". I am also confident that all Governments concerned will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the Caribbean area in any way.

30

I also take this opportunity to thank you and your Government for the appreciation expressed in the letter in regard to such assistance as I may have been able to render.

III-13

"LET THE IMPERIALIST THEORETICIANS PREACH CONFORMISM. LET THE REVOLUTIONARY THEORETICIANS PREACH REVOLUTION WITHOUT FEAR": Address by the Prime Minister of Cuba (Castro) at the Closing Session of the Congress of Women of the Americas, Habana, January 16, 1963 (Excerpts)31

We must think about how to change that situation [i.e. social and economic conditions in Latin America]. There are persons who are experts on figures, but what is needed are experts on changing the situation, experts on leading peoples on revolutions. That is the art of the revolutionaries, the art that must be learned and developed. How to bring the masses to the struggle?

It is the masses who make history, but for them to make history, the masses must be taken to the battle. That is the duty of leaders and the revolutionary organizations: to make the masses march, to launch the masses into battle. That is what they did in Algeria. And that is what the patriots are doing in South Vietnam. They have sent the masses into battle with correct methods, correct tactics, and they have brought the greatest amount of the masses into the battle.

That is what we did. The four, five, six, or seven of us who one day were

"U.N. doc. S/5229, Jan. 9, 1963. A similar letter was sent by the SecretaryGeneral to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (U.Ñ. doc. S/5230).

29 Ante, doc. III-10.

30 Ibid.

"Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1963, pp. 263–264.

separated did not conquer power. It was the movement of the masses that the struggle against the tyranny unleashed, which culminated in the victory of the people. . . . Those are the historic truths. And we believe that we at least have the right to speak about our historic truths without some long-distance theoreticians telling us what happened here without having ever come here. One does not have to whisper about those things, nor must one say them in low tones. They must be said in a loud voice so that they will be heard, really heard.

And let the peoples hear them, because those false interpretations of history tend to create that conformism that also suits imperialism; it tends to create that resignation and reformism and that policy of waiting for the Greek calends to make revolutions. Those false interpretations of history do not conform with the situation of the majority of the Latin American countries, where objective conditions exist-and the imperialists have clearly seen that objective conditions do exist-but where subjective conditions are missing. Those subjective conditions must be created, and they are created by historic truth, not by falsification of history.

Those subjective conditions are not created by saying that there was a peaceful transition in Cuba. (One of the delegates shouts something about cowards— Ed.) It is not a matter of cowards, but of confused, of mistaken views. We do not deny the possibility of peaceful transition, but we are still awaiting the first case. But we do not deny it, because we are not dogmatists, and we understand the ceaseless change of historic conditions and circumstances.

We do not deny it but we do say that there was no peaceful transition; and we do protest against an attempt to use the case of Cuba to confuse the revolutionaries of other countries where the objective conditions for the revolution exist and where they can do the same thing Cuba did. It is logical that imperialist theoreticians try to prevent revolutions, the imperialists slander the Cuban revolution, sow lies, say the worst horrors, create fear of revolutions among the people. But let no one from a revolutionary position attempt to create conformism or fear of revolutions. That is absurd. Let the imperialist theoreticians preach conformism. Let the revolutionary theoreticians preach revolution without fear.

32

That is what we think. That was what we said in the Declaration of Havana, which, in some fraternal countries, received from some revolutionary organizations the honors of a desk drawer when it should have received the just publicity it deserved. It would be like locking up everything you have discussed here. Of course, if we do not want the masses to learn about it, we must put it in a drawer. But if we tell the masses what the situation is, they must also be told what the road is. We must bring them to the struggle, because that road is much easier in many Latin American countries than it was in Cuba. I want to make it clear, so that the theoreticians will not get angry, that we are not making an irresponsible generalization. I want to make it clear that we know that each country has its specific conditions, and that is why we do not generalize. But we say the majority. We know there are exceptions. We know there are countries in which those objective conditions do not exist. But they exist in the majority of the Latin American countries. That is our opinion. To say it here is a duty, because we hope that in 40 years we will not meet as today-the granddaughters of our federated women with your granddaughtersto discuss the same problems.

"See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 279, footnote 33.