E. The "Food for Peace" and Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance (Public Law 480) Programs XI-21 THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED: Public Law 480, 83d Congress, Approved July 10, 1954, as Amended Through Public Law 88-205, Approved December 16, 1963 1 1 'Text in Legislation on Foreign Relations, With Explanatory Notes, March 1964 (Committee print of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 175–191. Part XII THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED AID PROGRAMS A. The Foreign Assistance Program XII-1 THE CLAY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE SCOPE AND DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: Report to the President (Kennedy) From the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March 20, 1963 (Excerpt) 1 III. FINDINGS The conclusions of our examination embrace the nature of U.S. interests and programs in various areas of the world, general matters concerning the free world development assistance effort, and aspects of U.S. programs deserving special comment. We will consider them in that order. The Border Areas In examining our national interest in foreign military and economic assistance, the direct relationship to free world security is most evident in the defensive strengths of those nations which, in their contiguity to the Communist bloc, occupy the frontier of freedom. Many of these countries are our allies, and some belong to alliances with which we are associated. Several of these nations are carrying defense burdens far beyond their internal economic capacities. These countries are now receiving the major portion of U.S. foreign assistance but are also providing more than two million armed men ready, for the most part, 1 The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States From the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March 20,1963 (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 7-22. For the establishment of the Clay committee, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1481. for any emergency. While their armies are to some extent static unless general war develops, they add materially to free world strength so long as conventional military forces are required. Indeed, it might be better to reduce the resources of our own defense budget rather than to discontinue the support which makes their contribution possible. This does not mean that the military assistance program in this area does not need present and continuing review. We are convinced that in several of these countries, indigenous forces are larger than required for their immediate mission of defense and not large enough to assume other missions. There, phased reductions of a very substantial order appear practical, after further careful examination, without unduly sacrificing immediate effectiveness. This would not only lessen the cost of military assistance but reduce related supporting economic assistance as well. Moreover, the amount of economic support for these military programs could be further reduced in at least one instance if long-delayed internal financial reforms were undertaken. There are a few other border countries whose military forces presently are of value largely for internal security purposes. Even though they belong to alliances with which we are associated, we believe the present level of support to these forces, particularly with sophisticated weapons, cannot be considered as essential to the security of the free world. In these countries, which have substantial resources of their own, significant reductions of military and economic assistance are in order. In addition there are other countries in this border area, particularly in southeastern and western Asia, to which we provide economic assistance and, in some cases, military equipment, though they are neither allies nor members of alliances with which we are associated. We believe most of this military assistance is not essential to our own or free world security, and we cannot recommend continued supply of this equipment. Also, economic assistance provided to some of these countries on the basis of past agreements is beyond that necessary for our interests. While firm commitments to these countries should be honored, economic aid should be phased down in some cases and phased out in others. In our consideration of border countries, we have not attempted to analyze the substantial cost of our efforts in Laos 2 and Vietnam,3 since the nature of present U.S. commitments there precludes useful examination by this Committee. While we recognize that the foreign aid program must be flexible in view of rapid changes in today's world, it was not designed for combat zones; we suggest consideration be given to making provision for such areas other than in our foreign aid program. In any review of front line countries, special attention must be given to India, even though it is not an ally. We have provided economic assistance to India for some time, most of it as part of a multilateral undertaking which obtains aid from other sources. Recently, we have 2 See ante, docs. IX-69-79. agreed to extend military assistance on a parity with similar aid from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries. The importance of this program frequently has been misunderstood in view of past expressions of Indian foreign policy and certain aspects of its internal philosophy. India has recently proved, however, that it is determined to maintain its independence from Communist domination. Together with our ally, Pakistan, it is the only area of South Asia able to offset the Red Chinese colossus. Unless their freedom and economic growth continue, there can never be a balance of power in Asia and our own involvement in this area could be indefinite and infinitely more costly. Thus, we believe that in the interest of our own and free world security, economic and military assistance to India, as well as to Pakistan, must continue under present circumstances. However, it would be difficult to justify continued economic assistance at present rates unless other free world countries continue and extend their support on terms comparable to our own. We cannot leave this area of the world without special reference also to Indonesia. Because of its population, resources and geographic position, it is of special concern to the free world. However, we do not see how external assistance can be granted to this nation by free world countries unless it puts its internal house in order, provides fair treatment to foreign creditors and enterprises, and refrains from international adventures. If it follows this path, as we hope it will, it deserves the support of free world aid sources. On the western end of the bloc periphery, Greece and Turkey are moving toward increased security and well-being. Both of these important nations, however, are still in need of military assistance and economic support, and Turkey will require both forms of assistance for some time to come. We believe that other NATO members should increase their contributions to these countries to the point where they bear a proportionate share of the burden and that the proportion of our own assistance should be reduced accordingly. Elsewhere in Europe, there is no apparent need for further military or economic assistance other than for the fulfillment of existing commitments. Africa As we consider the African nations, immediate security interests are less evident than in countries adjacent to the Communist bloc. The U.S. does have a stake in helping to create a climate of stability and growth in freedom, however, and the Communists have already displayed their interest and subversive potential in this area. Also, the new countries of Africa in most cases have maintained close ties with the former metropoles without impairment of their full independence, and the latter in turn have displayed considerable willingness to help meet the assistance needs of these young nations. The Committee regards Africa as an area where the Western European countries should logically bear most of the necessary aid burden. In fact, this 'See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1018-1019. See ibid, pp. 1015–1027. is proving to be the case. Almost all nations formerly under French aegis are now receiving heavy French assistance, largely in grants. We welcome this present arrangement, based on past relationship, and trust it will continue. Similarly, the new nations formerly under British rule should look largely to the United Kingdom for economic assistance, and we hope that this experienced nation will continue to provide it. The new Overseas Development Fund of the European Economic Community also should prove a major source of help. It can always be said that in fragile, new, developing countries, the United States must provide aid lest they accept it from Communist nations with resulting political penetration and eventual subversion. We cannot accept this view. We believe these new countries value their independence and do not wish to acquire a new master in place of the old one; there already have been instances on the continent to corroborate this belief. While our aid programs in this area are generally new, experience has shown they tend to increase. In the light of its other responsibilities, the United States cannot undertake to support all of the African countries, especially when their ties with other free world nations are largely elsewhere. In the northern and northeastern area of the African continent, with the exception of surplus agricultural commodities, most of our assistance has gone to countries in which we have military bases. In general, future economic aid to countries in this area should either be curtailed as existing commitments are fulfilled or substantially reduced, except for technical assistance the primary present need-and PL 480 shipments of agricultural commodities. Beyond this, further direct aid should be limited to loans for particular projects with economic justification and on terms appropriate to the financial abilities of the countries concerned. Elsewhere in Africa, our economic assistance programs should be similarly limited. We should fulfill specific programs in Nigeria and Tanganyika to which we are committed, as with Tunisia in North Africa. As these commitments are completed, further U.S. aid should be confined to participation in multilaterally-supported programs. 8 With regard generally to U.S. military assistance to African countries, we must bear in mind that the chief burden of helping these nations to enhance their internal security capabilities again falls logically on the former metropoles, with which most of these countries have retained police and military relationships. In some cases, smallscale and supplementary U.S. training programs and internal security assistance may be justified, and limited activity in a few countries where we maintain bases is in order. Small programs and missions should "Established by the "Accord interne relatif au financement et à la gestion des aides de la Communauté" signed at Yaoundé, Cameroon, by representatives of the member states of the EEC, meeting in the Council, entered into force June 1, 1964; text in the Journal officiel des Communautés européennes, 7e année, No. 93, June 11, 1964, pp. 1493/64-1497/64. See post, docs. XII-6 and 16. 8 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1606–1608; ibid., 1961, pp. 1264-1266 and 1298–1302; ibid., 1962, pp. 1452-1457, 1490-1497, and post, docs. XII-6 and 16. |