if he elicits such an act while he possesses full proximate power to suspect its being mortally sinful.

Or let us exhibit our doctrine in the concrete. No one (as has been so repeatedly pressed in this article) can possibly offend God, except for the sake of this or that pleasure; and every one therefore who commits mortal sin, is ipso facto preferring some pleasure to God. At this moment I am gravely calumniating an acquaintance, in order to gratify my vain-glory by being more highly thought of than he is. Here are two concomitant mortal sins; related to each other, as respectively the "commanding" and "commanded" act ["actus imperans: ""actus imperatus"]. The "commanding" act is my mortal sin of vainglory; the "commanded" act is my mortal sin of calumny. But how comes the former to be a mortal sin? There is no sin whatever in my mere desire of being highly thought of by my fellow-men. True; but that desire is "gravely inordinate""a mortal sin of vain-glory "—if it be such, as to command what is objectively a mortal sin, rather than lose the pleasure at which it aims.* But now observe. I may, the next minute, altogether forget the particular man whom I have been calumniating; and the "commanded" mortal sin may thus come to an end. But this is no reason in the world why my "commanding" mortal sin-my sin of vain-glory-should change its character. If it were mortal sin before-and if there be no change in its intrinsic qualities-it continues to be mortal sin now. Wherein does its mortally sinful character consist? In this: that by force of my present act, I should on occasion gravely offend God, rather than lose the pleasure at which I am aiming;

"If love of riches so increase that they may be preferred to charity ;in such sense that, for the love of riches, a man fear not to act in opposition to the love of God and his neighbour;-in this case avarice will be a mortal sin. But if the inordination of the man's love [for riches] stop within this limit; in such sense that, although he loves riches too much, nevertheless he do not prefer the love of them to the love of God, so that he do not will for their sake, to do anything against God and his neighbour-such avarice is a venial sin."S. THOMAS, 2 2a q. cxviii. a. 4.

66

Inordination of fear is sometimes a mortal sin, sometimes a venial. For if any one is so disposed that-on account of that fear whereby he shrinks from danger of death or from some other temporal evil-he would do something prohibited or omit something commanded in the Divine Law -such fear will be a mortal sin."-Ib. q. cxxv. a. 3.

"If the inordination of concupiscence in gluttony imply aversion from a man's Ultimate End," accipiatur secundum aversionem à Fine Ultimo," so gluttony will be a mortal sin. Which happens, when a man cleaves to the pleasurableness of gluttony as to an end, on account of which he despises God: being prepared to violate the Precepts of God, in order to obtain such gratifications."—Ib. q. cxlviii. a. 2.

F. Ballerini says (on Gury, vol. i. n. 178) that S. Thomas's "Secunda Secundæ "" ought never to be out of the Confessor's hands."

or (in other words) that, by eliciting my present act of vainglory, I appreciatively prefer to God the being highly thought of by my feliow-men.

Here then we are able to explain what we mean, by "inordinate" desire of pleasurableness. The particular given actwherein I desire the pleasure which ensues from good opinion of my fellow-men-may be of three different characters, which it is extremely important mutually to distinguish. It may (1) be such, that by force of such act-I would rather gravely offend God, than lose the pleasure in question: in which case the act is "gravely inordinate," and (at least materially) a mortal sin. Or it may be (2) such that-by force of such act-I would rather offend God venially (though not gravely) rather than lose the pleasure in which case the act is "venially inordinate" and "venially sinful." Or, lastly-however strong my act of desire may be yet it may not be such that, by force of it I would offend God in any way rather than lose the pleasure. In this latter case, the act is not "inordinate" at all; not properly called "vain-glory" at all; nor (as we should say) possessing any element whatever of sin.*

It will be remembered also, that that "gravely inordinate" act, which is materially a mortal sin, is not one formally, unless the agent possesses full proximate power of suspecting this fact.

In the early part of our article we referred with entire assent to Dr. Walsh's argument in favour of the doctrine here assumed, that an act may be directed to pleasurableness as to its absolute end, yet without inordination. But there are two condemned propositions, often cited against this doctrine, which we ought expressly to notice. They are the 8th and 9th condemned by Innocent XI. (Denz, nn. 1025, 6): "Comedere et bibere." &c., "Opus conjugii," &c." On the former of these, we need do no more than refer to Dr. Walsh's remarks from n. 638 to n. 641; with which we unreservedly concur. On the latter, what we would say is substantially what Viva says: The constitution of lapsed human nature being what it is there is one most definitely marked out class of pleasurable ends, which tend to exercise so special and abnormal influence over a man's will, that his pursuit of them will quite infallibly be "inordinate" (in our sense of that term) unless it be kept in check by being subordinated to some virtuous end. Now it is obvious that those who (like ourselves) affirm this, may utterly repudiate the proposition condemned by Innocent XI.; and yet entirely hold that general doctrine concerning indifferent acts, which we have exhibited in our text. It may be well to add, that F. Ballerini (on Gury, vol. ii. n. 908) has some valuable remarks concerning the virtuous ends which may be pursued in that particular class of acts to which we refer.

Another theological remark. The distinction which we have made, between the "inordinate" and "non-inordinate" pursuit of a pleasurabie end, is closely connected (if indeed it be not identical) with the recognized theological distinction, between pleasure being sought as the "finis positivè ultimus" and "negativè ultimus" respectively. (See Dr. Walsh, n. 479; and Ballerini on Gury, vol. i. n. 28.)

In our view, it is almost impossible to exaggerate the momentousness of this whole doctrine, for the true moral appreciation, whether of those outside the Church, or of obdurate sinners within her pale. To avoid prolixity, however, we will only consider it in detail, as applicable to the obdurate Catholic whom we were just now describing. He has sank into so abject and degraded a moral condition, that he appreciatively prefers pretty nearly every passing pleasure to God. There is hardly any gratification, at all to his taste, from which he would abstain, rather than gravely offend God. In other words-as the day proceeds-almost every act which he elicits is gravely inordinate and mortally sinful.

The only question to be further raised concerning him is, whether these repeated gravely inordinate adhesions to pleasure are in general formally, no less than materially, mortal; or, in other words, whether he have full proximate power of suspecting their true character. And of this as a general fact there can (we conceive) be no fair doubt. We are throughout supposing him not to have abandoned the Faith. It is plain that a Catholic, who for years has absented himself from the Confessional-who is living in what he fully knows to be the persistent and unrelenting violation of God's Laws-has an abiding sense all day long, how degraded and detestable is his mode of acting. He feels all day long that he "is drinking in sin like water;" though he would of course be unable to express in theological terms his protracted course of evil. *

Some of our readers may be disposed at first sight to regard this view of things as startling and paradoxical, because of the large number of instants during which it accounts such men to

It might be thought at first sight, that there is some similarity between the doctrine which we have submitted in the text concerning obdurate sinners, and that advocated by Pascal in his " Fourth Provincial Letter." But in truth the full doctrine which we would defend is the very extreme contrary to Pascal's. The direct theme of his Fourth Letter-as laid down in the title is " Actual Grace;" and he reproaches the Jesuits for maintaining, that "God gives man actual graces under every successive temptation." For our own part-not only we cleave most firmly to the doctrine here denounced by Pascal-but we are disposed to go further. We are strongly disposed to accept the Fifteenth Canon of the Council of Sens; and to affirm, that" not even a moment passes" while a man is sui compos "in which God does not stand at the door" of his heart, "and knock" by His supernatural grace.

We need hardly say, that the Council of Sens was not Ecumenical; but Suarez speaks of its decrees as possessing very great authority. Of course this is not the place for a theological discussion concerning the frequency of Actual Grace. But our readers will observe the close connection of our theological doctrine, with the doctrine which we have defended in the text, on the constant urgency of man's Moral Voice in the natural order.

be formally committing mortal sin. But to our mind, it is precisely on this ground that any other view ought rather to be considered startling and paradoxical; as we pointed out a page or two back. The unrepentant novice in sin (before his conscience became obdurate) was most indubitably committing mortal sin during pretty nearly the whole of his waking life. It would surely be startling and paradoxical indeed, if his acts ceased to be mortally sinful, merely because (through a course of unscrupulous indulgence) he has come to treat his indifference to God's Commandments as a simple matter of course.

This doctrine of "grave inordination" is (as we just now said) entirely applicable to solving the other difficulties we have mentioned; to appreciating the sins of pride and worldliness so widely found among non-Catholic Theists; to appreciating the various sins of fanaticism and self-deception; and, lastly, to appreciating also the moral position of Antitheistic infidels. It would occupy however, considerable space duly to develop and apply the doctrine for this purpose; and we must therefore abandon all attempt at doing so. In regard indeed to the last-named class, a certain theological point needs to be considered: because it may be suggested that-since mortal sin derives its characteristic malignity from its being an offence against God—those who deny His Existence cannot possibly commit it. This whole matter however has been amply discussed by theologians, since a certain proposition was condemned concerning "Philosophical Sin." For our own part therefore we will but briefly express our own adhesion to those theologians-of whom Viva may be taken as a representative instance-who hold, that the recognition of acts as being intrinsically wicked, is ipso facto a recognition of them as being offences against the paramount claims of God as rightful Supreme Legislator; and that this recognition suffices for their mortally sinful character.

Otherwise what we have generally to say about these Antitheists is this. We assume the truth of our own doctrine, as exhibited in the preceding pages. But if this doctrine be trueif God have really granted to all men a self-intimate sense of Free Will-if He have really endowed them with an ineffaceable intuition of right and wrong—if He is constantly pleading within them in favour of virtue He has, by so acting, invested them with a truly awful moral responsibility. And it is perfectly absurd to suppose, that a set of rebels can evade that responsibility, by the easy process of shutting their eyes to manifest facts. It will fall within the scope of the article which we propose for next January, to show in detail the monstrous inconsistency which exists between the doctrine which these unhappy men theoretically profess, and that which they practically imply

in their whole habitual unstudied language concerning human action.

In concluding our lengthy discussion, we must once more say how entirely we submit all that we have suggested to the judgment of theologians. We indulge the hope however, that-even where we may have unwarily fallen into error-we shall nevertheless have done good service, by obtaining for some of the points we have raised more prominent and scientific consideration, than (we think) they have hitherto received.

And there is a further matter concerning Free Will, on which a word must be added. One principal argument of Determinists is, that the Free Will doctrine would on one hand make psychological science impossible; while on the other hand it would derange the whole practical machinery of life, by proclaiming the inability to predict future human actions. Now it might be thought that what we have now been urging on the extent of Free Will, must strengthen the Determinist objection. But facts are not so at all. The chief passages in which we replied to it appeared in April, 1867, pp. 288-290; and in April, 1874, pp. 353-4. And if our readers will kindly refer to those pages, they will see that our answer is as simply applicable in defence of our own present thesis, as in defence of any more limited Libertarian theory which can possibly be devised.

Here at length we bid farewell (for a considerable time at least) to the Free Will controversy. We hope to have a paper ready for next January, on "Agnosticism as such." And we hope to begin it by a few pages-mainly taken from Ollé Laprune's invaluable work on "Moral Certitude"-in which we shall consider what are those principles of investigation, which lead to the establishment of certain knowledge on those all-important religious truths, which are within the sphere of human reason.

W. G. WARD.

ART. III. THE REORGANIZATION OF OUR ARMY.

N°

O one gifted with the ordinary amount of observation, and who has watched for a series of years the course of public events in England, can come to any other conclusion than that in the matter of administrative reforms we are the most injudicious of civilized nations. No amount of abuses, and no quantity of exposures respecting abuses, seem to have any influence on the public mind for a long series of years. Things are allowed to go their own way, no matter how much evil they