a thousand human respects; which are so many retractations of our morning intention, and therefore destroy it entirely.-L'esprit de Christianisme, pp. 95, 96.

V. In order that some given act be virtuous, theologians commonly require that its virtuousness be directly intended; though such intention of course need be no more than "virtual.” Dr. Walsh says (n. 397) that this proposition is maintained by all theologians except a very few (paucissimos); and its truth is most manifest on grounds of reason. Take an illustration. I am very desirous (for some special purpose) of conciliating the favour of my rich neighbour A. B. Among other things which I do to please him, I repay him a small sum he had lent me; and I make him a present of some picture, to which he took a fancy when he was paying me a visit. My one motive for both these acts is precisely the same-viz., my desire to be in his good books. Suppose it were said that-whereas the second of these two acts may be indifferent-the first at all events is virtuous under the head of justice, because the repayment of a debt is an act of that virtue: every one would see that such a statement is the climax of absurdity.

On the other hand (as Dr. Walsh proceeds to point out) it is by no means requisite-in order to the virtuousness of an actthat its virtuousness be at the moment the absolute end of my action. Suppose I give alms to the deserving poor, in order that I may gain a heavenly reward. Here the virtuousness of almsgiving is directly intended; for it is that very virtuousness, which is my means towards my retribution: yet this virtuousness is (by hypothesis) desired only as a means, and not as the absolute end of my action. Most persons will at once admit, that such an act is a truly virtuous act of almsgiving. On the other hand suppose I give alms, merely in order that my outward act may become known and help me to a seat in Parliamentit would be (as we have said) the climax of absurdity to allege that my act of almsgiving is virtuous as such.

There is one class of actions however, which claims further attention. Suppose I do some act entirely for the sake of pleasurableness; but, before doing it, I carefully ponder whether the act be a morally lawful one, being resolved otherwise to abstain therefrom. Dr. Walsh (n. 623) refers to this case, and quotes Viva on it; but we do not think that Viva quite does justice to such an act as he supposes. He holds that such an act is neither virtuous nor sinful, but indifferent. We think he would have been much nearer the truth, had he said that it is virtuous. But the true account of the matter (we think) is as follows. In this, as in so many other cases, the will's movement may be decomposed into two simultaneous acts. One of

these acts is; "I would not do what I am doing, were it opposed to morality" and this is obviously most virtuous. As to the other act-the mere pursuit of pleasurableness-under such circumstances, we submit, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, but indifferent.

This will be our appropriate place for considering the second tenet, concerning the matutinal oblation of my day's acts, to which we have already referred. According to the first tenet on this subject the tenet which we have already criticizedthis obligation secures the result, that my morning intention shall really motive all my subsequent acts of the day, one by one, which are not actually evil in object or circumstances. This is to be sure a most singular notion; but some persons seem to hold another, indefinitely more amazing. They seem to hold, that even though the morning intention do not in fact motive these acts, nevertheless it makes them intrinsically virtuous. This allegation seems to us so transparently unreasonable, that we feel a real perplexity in divining, how any one even of the most ordinary thoughtfulness can have dreamed of accepting it. We quite understand that God, by His free appointment, may bestow gifts upon a human being, in consideration of what is not virtuous in him at all; as, e.g., in an infant's reception of Baptism, or the Martyrdom of the Holy Innocents. And we understand the doctrine, held (we fancy) by many Protestants, that some act, not intrinsically virtuous, is often extrinsically acceptable to God. But we really do not see how it is less than a contradiction in terms to say, that a given act is made intrinsically virtuous, by a certain circumstance which is no intrinsic part of it whatever. Yesterday afternoon I elicited a certain act; and this afternoon I elicit another, which is precisely similar to yesterday's in every single intrinsic circumstance without exception. Yet the act of yesterday afternoon forsooth was virtuous, whereas the act of this afternoon is otherwise; because yesterday morning I made an oblation of my day's acts, and this morning I made no such oblation. You may as well say that my evening cup of tea is sweet, because I put a lump of sugar into the cup which I drank at breakfast. Lugo gives expression to this self-evident principle, by taking the particular case of temperance at meals. You and I are both at dinner; our will is directed (suppose) in precisely the same way to precisely the same ends; and our external acts also are precisely similar. Yet it shall be judged that you are eating virtuously and I otherwise, because in the morning you referred your acts to God and I did not. No doubt your morning's oblation may have given you great assistance in making your present act intrinsically virtuous, by facilitating your present

reference of that act to a good end. But the act is intrinsically affected by what is intrinsic, not by what is extrinsic. And so Lugo points out; assuming the theological principle, that no act is meritorious which is not intrinsically virtuous.

"He who

in the morning refers all his acts to God-if afterwards, when he is at dinner, is in just the same state of mind as though he had not elicited that matutinal intention, and if his action of eating does not arise from that matutinal intention or from some other good and virtuous one—that man no more merits through his present act, than he would if he had never formed such preceding intention if at all." ("De Penitentiâ,” d. 7, n. 39.) Sporer states the same proposition very earnestly and emphatically; adding, that such is the common doctrine of theologians. He does not mention indeed so much as one on the opposite side. ("De Actibus," n. 22.)

On this profoundly practical doctrine, we cannot better conclude our remarks than by citing the noble passage from Aguirre, with which Dr. Walsh concludes his volume (nn. 690-692.) It refers however-as our readers will observe-not to a virtuous intention generally, but to that particular virtuous intention which motives an act of sovereign love.

Wherefore before all things I admonish-and entreat all theologians to inculcate and preach as a most wholesome doctrine-that each man endeavour, with the whole earnestness and fervour of his mind, to practise continuously and assiduously (so far as this fragile and mortal life permits) the exercise of referring explicitly himself and all his thoughts, affections, words, and works to God, loved for His own sake. For he should not be content if once or [even] at various times in the day he do this; but he ought frequently to insert [explicitly into his daily life] that sacrifice of mind, which is far more acceptable to God than all other homages in the matter of the moral virtues.

VI. Passing now to another matter how are we to measure the degree of virtuousness or sinfulness, in virtuous and sinful acts respectively? It is evident that this consideration must proceed, in the two respective cases, on principles fundamentally different for in a virtuous act its virtuousness must of necessity be directly intended; whereas in a sinful act its sinfulness cannot by possibility be intended at all as an absolute end. We will take the two classes therefore separately.

As to virtuous acts—it is held (we suppose) by all theologians that, cæteris paribus, an act is more virtuous, in proportion as it is directed to virtuousness with greater vigour and efficacity.*

*We find it somewhat hard to find out in what sense theologians use the word "intensio." Do they use it to express " vigour," efficacity"? or do they rather use it to express "effort"? The two ideas are very

We have said "cæteris paribus," because one kind of virtuousness may be higher than another. A comparatively remiss act, e.g., of sovereign love (being really such) may be more virtuous than a far more vigorous act of some particular virtue; of justice, or temperance, or beneficence.

As regards the degree of evil in evil acts-we incline to think that theologians have given far too little methodical attention to the subject. For ourselves, we submit that any given act is more morally evil, in proportion as its pursuit of pleasurableness is more inordinate; more morally unprincipled, if we may so speak; in proportion as the act is more widely removed from subjection to God's Will and the Rule of Morals; in proportion as the transgressions of God's Law are more grievous, which such an act would (on occasion) command. In proportion as this is the case, its agent is said to "place his ultimate end in creatures" more unreservedly and more sinfully. However, to set forth in detail-still more to defend-what we have stated, would carry us a great deal too far.*

But, at last is it true, that all acts are either virtuous or the reverse? In other words, are there, or are there not, individual acts, which are neither morally good nor bad, but "indifferent "? This is the famous controversy between Thomists and Scotists, which Dr. Walsh (nn. 588-673) treats with quite singular completeness and candour; insomuch that his whole discussion presents (to our mind) one of the most profoundly interesting studies we ever fell in with. He has established (we think) quite triumphantly, that acts may be directed to pleasurableness as to their absolute end, without being on that account sinful. We will briefly express our own opinion on the whole matter, by submitting, (1) that very many acts are directed to pleasurableness as to their absolute end, yet without any vestige or shadow of

distinct. Consider, e.g., a blow, possessing some certain fixed degree of intrinsic force or efficacity; just sufficient (let us say) to overcome a certain definite obstacle. A very strong man will deal forth such a blow without any "effort or trouble whatever. A weaker man must put forth some exertion for the purpose. A still weaker must exert his whole strength. A child, even if he does exert his whole strength, finds himself unable to accomplish it. In like manner two different acts, elicited by two different persons, may be directed to some given virtuous end with approximately equal" firmness," "tenacity," "vigour," "efficacity;" and yet one may cost the agent quite immeasurably more "effort" than the other. Is it "vigour" "efficacity"- -or on the other hand "effort"which theologians call "intensio "We incline to think that commonly -yet not quite universally-they use the word in this latter sense. But we should be very glad of light on the subject from some competent quarter.

Something more, however, is said on the subject towards the end of our article.

inordination; and (2) that though such acts are commonly not virtuous, there is no ground whatever for accounting them sinful.*

VII. Here, in order to prevent possible confusion of thought, it will be better to recapitulate four propositions, among those which we have been advocating in the course of our article.

(1) By the very constitution of man's nature, every act of the human will is by absolute necessity, during its whole continuance, intrinsically directed (whether explicitly or virtually) to virtuousness, or to pleasurableness, or to some intermixture of the two, as to its absolute end. But it may pursue of course intermediate ends, as "useful" towards those ends which are absolute.

(2) No act is virtuous unless it directly aims at virtuousness as such; and of course therefore it remains virtuous, only so long

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We cannot, however, follow Dr. Walsh in his view (nn. 674-688) of S. Thomas's doctrine on this subject. He considers S. Thomas to teach (see n. 675) that acts may be actually virtuous and referable to God, which are not directed to virtuousness as such. For our own part we altogether agree with F. Murphy of Carlow College-who contributes to the Irish Ecclesiastical Record of Dec. 16, 1880, a very appreciative review of Dr. Walsh's volume--that the latter writer "has not established his view of S. Thomas's teaching." 'In nearly every one of the passages cited," adds F. Murphy, or in the immediate context, S. Thomas most distinctly mentions ends which every Thomist would denominate good." This remark does not indeed apply to all the passages cited by Dr. Walsh in n. 683, note, where the Angelic Doctor describes virtue as consisting in a mean. But as regards all these passages, without exception, we submit that S. Thomas is quite manifestly supposing throughout a real aim at virtuousness on the agent's part. I am desiring to pursue the course of virtue; and I inquire therefore (in this or that individual case) what is the true mean wherein virtue consists." For ourselveswith very great deference to Dr. Walsh-the only passages which we can consider to need any special attention, are the two from the "De Malo," cited in nn. 686, 687. On these passages we would submit the following reply to Dr. Walsh's argument.

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F. Mazzella has considered them (along with several others from S. Thomas) in his important volume "De Virtutibus Infusis," n. 1350; and he by no means understands them as Dr. Walsh does. According to Dr. Walsh, S. Thomas teaches in them (1) that an act, not directed to virtuousness as such, may nevertheless be free from inordination and referable to God; then (2) that such an act, if elicited by one in habitual grace, is meritorious of supernatural reward. According to F. Mazzella-what S. Thomas teaches is, that an act (otherwise faultless) -which is directed indeed to impersonal virtuousness (bonum honestum) as its end, but which is neither explicitly nor virtually referred to God -that such an act (if elicited by one in a state of grace) is meritorious of supernatural reward. Now this latter doctrine may or may not be theologically true; it may or may not be S. Thomas's ordinary doctrine; but at all events it is fundamentally different from that which Dr. Walsh ascribes to the Angelic Doctor, and is entirely unexceptionable so far as regards any ground of natural reason. And we submit that, without travelling one step beyond the two articles to which Dr. Walsh refers,