more satisfactory basis for our knowledge than that which Nature has given us?

M. I, at any rate, cannot conceive such. I do not see how even the Almighty himself could-without making us different beings from what we are— give us higher or more satisfactory certainty than He has given us. For suppose He had provided some external criterion of certainty, indefinitely more perfect than anything we know or can conceive, it is nevertheless plain that we could only make use of it through a subjective knowledge that it had this character. Moreover, the mind would have to be certain as to the very existence of the supposed criterion, and it could only know this through the evidence of it in the mind itself. It is plain, then, that nothing external-no common consent of mankind, common sense or testimony-could ever supply the place of an ultimate criterion of knowledge, since our own mind must be the judge as to the existence and value of any such criteria. The principle of evidence, then, is one which is really ultimate, and must be accepted under pain of complete intellectual paralysis. It is incapable of demonstration, since it depends on nothing else. It is constantly assumed unconsciously, and is acted on confidently by everyone who reasons. We conform to it without thinking about it, but if we reflect on it we see three good reasons for assenting to it :-(1) The spontaneous and natural tendency of all men constantly to conform to it; (2) the destruction of all our knowledge, and the impossibility of thinking logically at all if we do not admit the legitimacy of the criterion; and (3) the fact that by admitting it, we have a foundation

for all science, and an orderly universe of external existences-harmonising with each other and with our perceptions and thoughts-takes the place of a chaos. By accepting it we can advance in science and successfully predict.

F. In asserting this combined objective and subjective evidence as the ultimate criterion of truth, do you make it the only criterion? You just now spoke somewhat slightingly of common sense' and 'human testimony,' and certainly nothing can well be more senseless or mendacious than some assertions in defence of which they are cited. The senses, you will not deny, often seem to deceive us, and our reasonings are again and again mistaken. So even if I admit, as I suppose I must, your criterion of truth-simple evidence-it seems, nevertheless, that we have small chance of avoiding error considering our constant exposure to it from so many sources. M. What is that newsboy crying? Death of the Prince Imperial !' I hope we have false testimony here at any rate.

Let us get a paper.

F. It is told circumstantially enough. I do not think it can be a fabrication. I fear it is true.

M. If all the papers continue to affirm it and to give further and further details for a whole week without anyone contradicting their assertions, you will not then hesitate to believe it?

F. Of course not. I shall feel certain about it.
M. Absolutely certain?

F. Well, as practically certain as one is about most things. Of course, it is just possible that elaborate falsification or mystification might have been contrived.

M. Agreed. But you cannot so doubt the existence of Port Natal, nor that the Crimean War -where your father lost his life, and appointed your present guardian-really took place. As to these things, can you not admit that you have absolute certainty-that you do not entertain any kind of real doubt or suspicion about them?

F. Yes, I own I am certain about these things. I only wish the guardian business was less certain!

M. You see those girls coming home from their archery meeting. Would you believe that every one of them had to-day shot without taking aim, and yet hit the very middle of the bull's-eye? Would anybody amongst the people about us believe that an arrow flew into the bull's-eye of itself, without having been shot by anyone? If I had a quantity of printers' type here, and threw it on the ground, would you or anyone about us fail to be certain that the letters would not so fall as to form a set of verses? Ask either of those two fishermen whether the sun will for certain soon set, or whether it may not begin to go up again, or whether we may not this year have winter before Michaelmas Day, and not after. They will, of course, think you are chaffing them; but if you convince them that you are not, they will think you insane. insane. If pressed to say why they are so certain about such things, they will be pretty sure to say that to doubt them would be against

'common sense.'

F. But for all these confident beliefs of theirs

there are very good reasons. There is the theory of probabilities, the principle of causality, the laws and conditions of the sun and planets, etc.; so that

these popular beliefs in fact rest upon a good philosophical foundation.

M. Yes! but they do not know that foundation nor could they adduce those reasons. It is just that very power of judging philosophically, but without philosophical consciousness, which constitutes 'common sense.'

F. It seems to me a curious, vague sort of term, used to denote an ill-defined faculty which may be adduced to support any credulous belief.

M. We have already seen that if once the reality of our perception of objective truths be conceded, these generally received expressions acquire great value on account of the superior clearness and distinctness of direct thought-such as that to which these common-sense judgments owe their originover reflex thought, and I confess the term 'common sense' seems to me a well devised one. It may well be called 'sense,' because reflection, reasoning, and conscious combinations, are excluded from its use, and because, in an act of common sense, the mind submits to a law of its nature, as it does in experiencing a sensation. It is called 'common' because it is not 'individual,' but is the same in a multitude of minds. No one says that an individual subjective phenomenon (that is, the mere fancy of any individual) is opposed to common sense. I were to say I saw a man walking without a head, people would say I was deluded, but not that my having the fancy was opposed to common sense. They would, however, quickly cry out that the existence of such a man without a head was against all

common sense.

If

F. But you will surely admit that appeals to common sense are dangerous appeals and may lead to very unsatisfactory conclusions.

M. Most certainly I admit it; and the appeal is only to be made under certain conditions. I for one would not admit that a decision of common sense was certainly true unless (1) the decision was one which is practically irresistible, so that we cannot by the aid of reflection resist or avoid it; (2) unless it was a truth as to which all ordinary men would agree; (3) unless it would stand any test of reason; (4) unless the subject was within the reach of uneducated minds and such as plain men might judge of, and (5) lastly, unless as a general rule it had to do with something of real importance to the conduct of life. I should certainly never think of appealing to its verdict in any merely speculative or altogether unpractical question. With these precautions I think we may regard 'common sense' as one means of certainty, and in what you have admitted as to your certainty about the existence of Port Natal, it is clear that you admit the validity of human testimony as a cause of absolute certainty also; for you certainly only know it by such testimony.

F. How would you then arrange all these various grounds and motives of certainty?

M. I would say that there is but one ultimate criterion of certainty, namely, self evidence, or simple evidence, but that there are various grounds, causes, or motives of certainty, namely, (1) self-consciousness, which tells us our present state of being; (2) the senses; (3) memory; (4) intellectual intuition.

F