there are not sufficient workers in the United States to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. This exclusionary section also applies to special immigrants defined in section 101 (a) (27) (A) (other than specified relatives of United States citizens or of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence). This provision is applicable to immigrants who seek entrance in the United States for the primary purpose of gainful employment.1

The amended section 212 (a) (14) represents a substantial departure from previously existing law. Previously the provisions of section 212 (a) (14) operated only when the Secretary of Labor invoked them by certification which had the effect of excluding any intending immigrants, within the scope of the certification, who would likely displace a qualified American worker, or whose employment in the United States would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers similarly employed in the United States. This procedure was reversed under the amended Act. The responsibility was placed upon the intending immigrant to obtain the Secretary of Labor's clearance prior to issuance of a visa.2

The finding of inadmissibility of this applicant is based primarily upon her statement of March 21, 1966. It is noted that this statement did not advise the applicant of the provisions of section 212(a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Act of October 3, 1965. It is apparent to us that the applicant has been straight-forward and truthful in her answers and has not attempted to be evasive or dissembling. The statement appears to offer only a meager basis for exclusion because it is apparent in the statement that the applicant demurred when asked whether her main objective in entering the United States was for the purpose of obtaining employment as a secretary when she explained that she did not know that it was really so because she still wanted to take some evening classes. The applicant is the daughter of wealthy parents and does not require employment. She has expressed her intention of continuing her studies in a college and her father has stated he is well able to support her and that he does not desire that she work.

It is understood, of course, that anyone who obtains a college education in the United States will eventually obtain employment whether in this country or in her native country because of her

1

Committee Print, Summary of Public Law 89-236, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Pg. 5.

2 House Report No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Pg. 14.

higher qualifications. This intent of employment in futuro under the circumstances of this case is not a violation of section 212(a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We find that the evidence on the basis of the facts in the case does not support inadmissibility and that the applicant has borne the burden of establishing her right to enter the United States under the visa she presents. The appeal will be sustained.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be sustained and the applicant be admitted to the United States.

MATTER OF WATSON

In Section 248 Proceedings

A-14789392

Decided by Regional Commissioner June 14, 1966

A temporary visitor's application for change of nonimmigrant classification to student pursuant to section 248 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is denied for failure to establish he would be able to support himself during the period of his stay in the United States while pursuing a full course of study, and his appeal from such denial decision is dismissed and request for oral argument thereon denied in the absence of any specified reasons for the appeal (8 CFR 103.3(b)).

This case has come before us on appeal from the decision of the District Director who denied an application for change of nonimmigrant status from visitor to student under section 248 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The District Director denied this application on May 16, 1966 finding that the applicant would not be able to support himself during the period of stay in the United States while pursuing a full course of study. A review of the record reveals that the District Director's reasons for denying this application were valid and his decision was proper.

Counsel for the applicant has submitted a timely appeal from the District Director's decision and has requested oral argument. A brief was not filed with the appeal and no reasons for the appeal were given in the Notice of Appeal to the Regional Commissioner. 8 CFR 103.3(b) provides that the officer to whom an appeal is taken may deny oral argument and dismiss any appeal when the party concerned fails to specify the reasons for his appeal. It should be noted that this statement is contained in the instructions which appear on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal to the Regional Commissioner which was submitted by the attorney.

Under the provisions of 8 CFR 103.3 (b) the request for oral argument will be denied and the appeal dismissed in the absence of any stated reasons for the appeal.

It is ordered that the request for oral argument be denied and the appeal be and hereby is dismissed.

MATTER OF MIETUS

In Deportation Proceedings

A-14019286

Decided by Board June 16, 1966

Respondent's deportability under clause (2) of section 241(c), Immigration and Nationality Act, is established since he has failed and refused to fulfill his marital agreement which is deemed to have been made for the purpose of procuring entry as an immigrant where he married his United States citizen spouse by civil ceremony in Poland in 1963, a religious ceremony, being then precluded by the recent death of her father, to be performed after entry; for some time before his proposal and marriage he had been registered with the U.S. consul for an immigrant visa, during which period, as well as at the time of his arrival in this country in April 1964, the quota tó which he was chargeable was oversubscribed; on the same day of the marriage, his wife traveled to Warsaw for the purpose of petitioning to accord him nonquota status; he has never lived with his wife; and he stated in 1965 he was not willing to marry his wife in a religious ceremony and that he was not willing to live with her without a church wedding.

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241 (c) [8 U.S.C. 1251(c)]-Failed or refused to fulfill marital agreement made to procure entry as immigrant.

This case is before us on the appeal of the Service from a decision of a special inquiry officer terminating the proceeding.

The respondent is a 25-year-old married male, native and citizen of Poland, who entered the United States on April 10, 1964 at which time he was admitted as a nonquota immigrant. He had secured nonquota status on the basis of his marriage to a United States citizen on November 6, 1963 in Poland. The Service takes the position that the respondent's marital agreement with his wife, Helen Mietus, was made for the purpose of procuring his entry as an immigrant and that the respondent failed and refused to fulfill the marital agreement. The special inquiry officer concluded that the charge stated in the order to show cause was not sustained and terminated the proceeding. The sole issue is whether this action was correct.

Before discussing the evidence, we consider a comment necessary concerning the burden of proof in cases under section 241 (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, particularly since certain statements relating to the matter in the special inquiry officer's decision and in the trial attorney's brief appear to be ambiguous and inaccurate. We discussed this burden of proof in Matter of M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 601, 606 (1957), and held that, under clause (1) of Section 241 (c), the Government must prove alienage and that there exists the contemplated relation, in point of time, concerning marriage, entry and annulment, and thereafter the burden is on the alien to establish that the marriage was not contracted for the purpose of evading any provisions of the immigration laws; that this is because the alien is required to show that he comes within the statutory exemption; and that under clause (2) the Government has the usual burden of establishing deportability. Since this deportation proceeding is based on the second clause of section 241 (c), we hold that the Government has the burden of establishing deportability by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in accordance with the requirements of section 242(b) (4).

We have carefully reviewed the entire record. The only evidence is the respondent's statement of May 4, 1965 (Ex. 2) and his testimony and that of his wife at the hearing. Certain facts are not in dispute. The respondent's wife was born in Poland on March 31, 1939 and acquired United States citizenship through her parents. She first came to the United States in February 1961 and returned to Poland in August 1963 because of the illness of her mother. Her father had died in May 1963. She had known the respondent since childhood and part of the time they were in the same classes in school. On her return to Poland in August 1963, she saw the respondent frequently since she was friendly with his sister. Near the end of October, he proposed marriage. They were unable to have a religious marriage ceremony because of the recent death of her father but it was agreed that such a ceremony would be performed after he arrived in the United States, and they were married in Poland in a civil ceremony on November 6, 1963. On the evening of the same day, the respondent's wife took the train for Warsaw to make out an application for him [presumably a visa petition] at the American Embassy (Tr. pp. 52-53). During a short trip thereafter, they had sexual intercourse on one occasion. The respondent's wife left Poland on November 12, 1963 for the United States, and the respondent arrived in this country on April 10, 1964. The respondent's wife and other relatives met the respondent at the airport upon his arrival and he spent that night at her apartment. On the following