find another. A month after securing a housekeeper, she applied for admission to take employment with either her former employer or another individual, both having solicited her services. The question then arose as to whether she was still a commuter. Making a general review of the commuter situation, the Board citing Matter of D-C-, supra, pointed out (at pp. 212-3) that there is a tolling of the six-month period during the disablement of a commuter who had not lost his job. The Board distinguished the cases before it from Matter of L-, supra, by pointing out that I had not lost his job and the aliens had. However, the Board did not treat the aliens as disabled commuters but in each case ordered the aliens excluded on the ground that they had lost commuter status because they had been unemployed for more than six months.

We answer in the affirmative the question as to whether the illness of the applicant's child should excuse her absence from the United States. In the one case discussing the situation it is shown that the illness of a child is an important factor. In Matter of McM-, supra, the applicant who had given birth in December but had not applied for admission until the following May was ordered admitted as a commuter, although absent more than six months, on the finding that she had "been receiving medical attention for herself and child" and that her absence was "due to her illness and the care of her injant child." (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed it is clear here that the long and dangerous illnesses of the applicant's child, her duty, and her natural affection created a situation which has effectively incapacitated her for employment as would have either a broken member in her own body or the carrying of the child in pregnancy (see Mendelsohn v. Dulles, 207 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 598). The applicant should therefore be considered as though she were an alien incapacitated by her own illness.

We have seen that the rule as to the disabled commuter is that intention governs to the same extent it does in the case of a domiciled, alien (Matter of F- footnote at pp. 526-7, 3 I. & N. Dec.). Since the test for the domiciled alien is whether he intended to abandon domicile, the test for the employed commuter who becomes disabled is whether he intended to abandon his employment.

Applicant's admission should be ordered. Within a short time after the disabling circumstances which prevented her from continuing her employment were removed, she resumed employment in the United States. She now desires to enter to continue with her employment.

ORDER: It is ordered that the admission of the applicant as a commuter be authorized.

MATTER OF STRIPPA

In Visa Petition Proceedings

A-14739108

Decided by Regional Commissioner June 2, 1966

Petition to accord preference classification under section 203(a)(3), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by P.L. 89-236, as a teacher, is denied since beneficiary, who lacks the requisite high education (having the equivalent of high school graduation in the United States) and has had no actual experience as a teacher, can not be regarded as a member of the teaching profession within the contemplation of that section.

This matter is before the Regional Commissioner on appeal from the denial of the visa petition to accord the beneficiary third preference quota classification as a member of the professions.

The alien is an unmarried Italian citizen, born January 31, 1947, at Guglionesi, Campobasso, Italy. Evidence has been presented that she attended the State School for Teachers at Guglionesi and was granted a diploma in 1965. Form ES-575 "Application for Alien Employment Certification", which accompanied the petition, reflects that the beneficiary attended the State School for Teachers for four years; that she is seeking a teaching position; that she has not been employed in the field since receiving her diploma.

After reviewing the alien's educational documents, the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., advised that she has the equivalent of high school graduation in the United States with preparation for teaching in Italian elementary grades (first five years). The District Director thereupon denied the visa petition on the ground the beneficiary is not qualified for third preference quota classification as a teacher.

It has been asserted on appeal that the alien is entitled to third preference status as a member of the teaching profession inasmuch as the law does not specify any minimum educational standard as a prerequisite to qualification; that physicians, surgeons, lawyers and members of other professions who are educated abroad are not expected to meet United States criteria as a condition precedent to the grant of third preference classification.

Section 203 (a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, provides for the issuance of visas to "qualified immigrants who are members of the professions, or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States." Section 101(a)(32) of the statute further states: "The term 'profession' shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries.” In considering the various categories of professions enumerated in section 101 (a) (32) of the Act, we have consulted the Department of Labor's "Occupational Outlook Handbook" and "Dictionary of Occupational Titles." It has been found that a bachelor's degree is generally the minimum educational requirement for entrance into these professional fields and, in some instances, either an advanced graduate degree or significant experience is also necessary. Cognizance is also taken of the fact that an individual may be accorded recognition as a member of a particular profession where he may lack the requisite high education but has had special training and extensive practical experience in such work.

In the matter at hand, we find that the beneficiary is a high school graduate who has had no actual experience as a teacher. Under the circumstances, she cannot be regarded as a member of the teaching profession within the contemplation of section 203 (a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We have also considered the alien's eligibility for quota status under section 203 (a)(6) of the Act which provides for the issuance of visas to "qualified immigrants who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists in the United States." In order to establish eligibility for sixth preference classification it is necessary that the person desiring and intending to employ the beneficiary file a petition in her behalf under section 204 of the Act and that the petition be supported by a Department of Labor certification pursuant to section 212 (a) (14) of the Act to establish that there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available to perform such labor. In the instant case, the visa petition has not been filed by the alien's prospective employer and, further, the required labor certification has not been furnished. Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and same is hereby dismissed.

MATTER OF REDEKOP-REMPENING

In Exclusion Proceedings

A-14659217

Decided by Board June 3, 1966

A 22-year-old, single, applicant for admission for permanent residence, who intends to continue her studies in a college and who is the daughter of wealthy parents who do not desire that she work and have taken steps to insure her against the necessity of working, does not come within the proscription of section 212 (a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by P.L. 89-236, and is admissible to the United States without a certification from the Secretary of Labor, notwithstanding any intent of employment in futuro upon eventual completion of her college education. EXCLUDABLE: Act of 1952-Section 212 (a) (14) [8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(14) ]—Alien seeking to enter the United States to perform labor-without Secretary of Labor certification.

The case comes forward on appeal from the order of the special inquiry officer dated April 6, 1966 finding the applicant excludable on the grounds stated in the caption and certifying his decision to the Board.

The applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, 22 years old, female, single, applied for entry into the United States on March 18, 1966, presenting an immigrant visa issued at the American Consulate, Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico. The visa application shows her occupation to be that of secretary. In Item 34 of the visa application regarding exemption from ineligibility to receive a visa and exclusion under an unspecified section of the Immigration and Nationality Act there is a statement that the item is "not applicable -no intention to work." The visa itself has typed on the face thereof that section 212 (a) (14) is not applicable.

In connection with her application for admission to the United States, a sworn statement was taken from the applicant by an immigrant inspector on March 21, 1966. Both of her parents are citizens and residents of Mexico. The applicant appears to have entered the United States on October 1965 to receive a medical checkup from a

doctor in Phoenix, Arizona and then changed her status to that of a student about two weeks after her date of entry on October 11, 1965 to attend the Gregg Business College in Phoenix, Arizona. She stated that she had received offers of jobs but that she had sufficient funds to support herself, her father having deposited $5,000 in the bank for her in El Paso and she had a $300 deposit in Phoenix. When questioned as to whether her main objective in entering the United States at this time was for the purpose of obtaining employment as a secretary or in a business, she replied that she did not know if it really was because she still wanted to take some evening classes.

At the hearing the applicant was questioned further regarding her background and her intention in coming to the United States. She had graduated from high school in Buhler, Kansas and then returned to Mexico and was employed as a secretary by her father until October 1965. She stated that she loved accounting and enrolled in the Gregg School when she came here to visit a doctor, changing her status to that of a student, and that she intends to go to the University of Arizona at Phoenix, Arizona. The applicant stated that her main purpose in coming to the United States is to study, that she does not need to work because her parents are wealthy and her father has taken steps to insure her against the necessity of working. She stated that she probably would get a better job because of her superior qualifications after she obtained a degree from college. The applicant expressed some confusion regarding the sworn statement of March 21, 1966 explaining that the immigrant inspector's questioning conveyed to her the thought that she had to have a job to enter the United States.

The applicant's father also appeared as a witness. He is a person of considerable wealth and means in Mexico, and there is no need for his daughter to obtain employment because he is fully able to support her while she is in the United States. The father testified that in addition to 500,000 pesos in Mexico which is on deposit to her account and from which she draws interest, the applicant has assets consisting of three lots in Cuauhtemoc, Mexico, 1,600 square meters in each lot; one cattle ranch of 990 hectares equivalent to about 2,400 acres and the $5,000 on deposit and a checking account in the United States.

Section 212(a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Act of October 3, 1965, excludes aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that