failed to declare to customs authorities a camera presented to him by his brother while he was visiting in Poland. He paid a £30 fine and had his gift camera confiscated. This is the only conviction appearing in the record and appellant has credibly testified this is the only act he has ever committed which would constitute visa ineligibility.

Because of the nature of the crime and the fact that it is an isolated blemish on the appellant's record, the Officer in charge has conceded that appellant's admission would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety or security. The denying order acknowledges the legal validity of appellant's marriage to his spouse, and that she has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. The stability and durability of the marriage are not questioned. The denying decision then is based solely on a finding that appellant's exclusion will not necessarily result in extreme hardship to his United States resident spouse. The finding is premised on the argument that his spouse's United States residence is artificially contrived; that she had, before she herself went to the United States, full knowledge of his excludability and had been warned it might not be waived; that she can very well return to England and join her husband, and therefore his exclusion does not impose the degree of hardship upon her contemplated in the statute.

The record shows it is true she was aware of the conviction at the time it took place in 1963, that she and her husband applied for a visa at the same time in 1965, and that she was made aware at that time of the reason his visa was refused. The United States Consul carried out his obligation in telling the appellant of the provisions of section 212 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, at the same time warning him that the adjudication of applications made under this provision is a discretionary matter administered under the authority of the Attorney General. Mrs. Peczkowski was told by the consul that although he had no legal basis to deny her visa or that of her daughter, there was no alternative but to refuse her husband's. It was made clear to her that her husband might not be able to join her in the United States and she was required to sign a consular affidavit acknowledging her awareness of that possibility, and stating that she assumed full responsibility for any physical hardship or mental distress which the separation might cause appellant, herself or other members of the family. She signed the affidavit, proceeded with her own application, and emigrated to the United States.

The waiver of excludability which appellant seeks cannot be granted pursuant to section 212 (h), as amended, unless he establishes

satisfactorily that his exclusion would result in "extreme hardship" to his lawfully resident spouse or stepchild. In Matter of W-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1, the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that "extreme hardship" means "more than the existence of mere hardship caused by family separation."

It is true that appellant's wife and stepchild have boldly risked the possibility that he might not be found eligible for a visa after they emigrated from England. The disappointment and emotional hardship which the wife would apparently experience as a consequence of the denial of this application are the ordinary hardships of family separation and do not constitute "extreme hardship" within the Board's ruling in Matter of W-, supra. If these were the only elements of hardship present, it follows that the application could not be approved. However, while these additional hardships may be of her own making, it has been established that appellant's wife has found it necessary to make her temporary home with relatives, that she has been forced to entrust the care of her child to such relatives while she is required to work full-time to support herself and eight-year-old daughter. The spouse and child could ill afford the cost of their transportation to the United States, which would have been wasted, and the cost of their return transportation to England to rejoin appellant, if this application were to be denied. Under the circumstances, it is concluded that the appellant's exclusion would result in "extreme hardship" to his spouse and stepchild, lawful permanent residents of the United States.

If the appellant's spouse were a United States citizen or an alien with long legal residence in the United States no question would have arisen; the otherwise overwhelmingly favorable factors would have led to granting the application. The question to be decided here is whether the short term of residence in the United States of appellant's spouse, or the fact that she obtained her visa knowing that her husband might not obtain his, have any bearing on the degree of hardship now suffered by appellant's spouse due to his exclusion.

The statute is quite clear, and neither the law, regulations, interpretations nor precedent decisions establish a criterion as to how long a legal resident relative must have resided in the United States before the ineligible relative can qualify for waiver. In this case it is clearly established that (1) appellant is ineligible for a visa under section 212 (a) (9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and he has applied for waiver under section 212 (h) of the Act; (2) his spouse is an alien legally admitted to the United States for permanent residence; (3) his admission would not be contrary to

the national welfare, safety or security of the United States; and (4) his exclusion would result in extreme hardship to his lawfully resident spouse.

The appeal will be sustained.

ORDER: It is ordered that the application of Romuald Leszek PECZKOWSKI for waiver of excludability under section 212 (a) (9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act be and is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the authority contained in section 212 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, PROVIDED that such waiver shall apply only to the grounds for exclusion referred to herein.

MATTER OF GEE

In Deportation Proceedings

A-13705060

Decided by Board May 31, 1966

The requirement of section 244 (b), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, of a minimum period of 24 months in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the United States is satisfied by an applicant for suspension of deportation who served in an active-duty status in the Army following induction on February 3, 1956 until discharged January 31, 1958, and whose military record, by direction of the Secretary of War, was subsequently corrected to reflect continuous active duty until February 2, 1958. CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable at time of entry-no immigrant visa.

DISCUSSION AS TO DEPORTABILITY: The respondent, a native and citizen of China has been found deportable under the provisions of section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)) as an alien who at the time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry, to wit, an alien immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired immigration visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card or other valid entry document and not exempted from the possession thereof by the said Act or regulation made thereunder pursuant to section 212(a)(20) of the said Act. An order entered by the special inquiry officer on January 11, 1966 suspends the respondent's deportation under the provisions of section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, (8 U.S.C. 1254 (a) (1)). The case has been certified to the Board of Immigration Appeals for final decision because it is one of first impression wherein the Department of the Army has corrected a military record of service thereby enabling the respondent to avoid the seven years of continuous physical presence in the United States for the period preceding the date of his appli

cation for suspension of deportation as provided in section 244 (a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254(a) (1)).

The respondent was admitted to the United States at Honolulu, Hawaii on October 13, 1952. He was admitted to the United States upon a false claim of citizenship. He has lived in the United States continuously since his entry with an exception of a trip to Formosa from June 14, 1960 to September 9, 1960. He last entered in September of 1960 to resume his residence in the United States but did not possess an immigration visa. The evidence affirmatively establishes the respondent's deportability as charged in the order to show cause.

DISCUSSION AS TO ELIGIBILITY FOR SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION: The respondent was married in Formosa on August 18, 1960. Upon his return to the United States he executed a visa petition on behalf of his wife in which he falsely swore that he was a citizen of the United States. The respondent's wife was admitted to the United States on February 22, 1961. They were divorced on March 2, 1965 and he testified that he does not know her present whereabouts, but believes that she is now in Formosa. The respondent traveled to Formosa on a United States passport which he obtained by falsely swearing that he was a United States citizen.

The character investigation conducted by the Immigration Service reveals nothing adverse to the respondent. The record contains affidavits of two citizens of the United States who have known the respondent since 1952 attesting to his good moral character. Local police and Federal records do not disclose anything adverse to the respondent.

The respondent is employed in a laundry and earns $75 a week. He has assets totaling some $5,000. He supports his mother who resides in Hong Kong. His father is deceased. The respondent served honorably in the United States Army from February 3, 1956 until midnight of February 2, 1958 at which time he was relieved from active duty and transferred to the United States Army Reserve to complete his reserve obligation.

The respondent maintains that his deportation would result in a hardship to him because he came to this country when he was 18 years of age and has spent most of his adult life in the United States. He alleges that it would be very difficult for him to obtain a job outside of this country and that he has become accustomed to the way of life here. The special inquiry officer concludes that the respondent's deportation would in fact result in extreme hardship to him and we affirm.

Section 244 (a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act pro