at New York, New York between September 15, 1965 and December 7, 1965. The respondent and counsel admitted the truth of the factual allegations set forth in the order to show cause.

The respondent was married to one Edith Garces, a citizen of the United States, at New York, New York on February 24, 1960, approximately two weeks after his admission thereto as a nonimmigrant visitor. A visa petition to accord the respondent nonquota status, executed and filed on his behalf by Edith Garces, was approved by the Service on May 20, 1960 and his application for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act was granted on June 23, 1960. The facts detailing the respondent's becoming the subject of rescission proceedings pursuant to section 246 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the ground that the marriage contracted between him and the aforementioned Edith Garces on February 24, 1960 had been entered into solely for the purpose of obtaining nonquota status under the Immigration and Nationality Laws and not as a bona fide relationship followed by the special inquiry officer's order dated May 3, 1965 directing that the adjustment of the respondent's status to that of a lawful permanent resident under section 246 of the Immigration and Nationality Act be rescinded have been fully and adequately covered by the special inquiry officer and this Board in prior determinations.

When this case first came before this Board on August 20, 1965, we dismissed the appeal from the order entered by the special inquiry officer on May 3, 1965 directing that pursuant to section 246 of the Immigration and Nationality Act the adjustment of status granted to the alien on June 23, 1960 to that of a permanent resident as provided under Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act be rescinded. Thereafter, the respondent by motion requested rehearing, reargument and reconsideration of our decision of August 20, 1965. The Board denied the motion for rehearing, reargument and reconsideration and the reasons therefor are clearly set forth in our decision of November 1, 1965. A further recital of the remaining facts in this case is not deemed necessary inasmuch as they have been fully and adequately covered by the special inquiry officer and this Board in prior determinations. The points raised by counsel on appeal have been fully and adequately disposed of by this Board in its respective decisions of August 20 and November 1, 1965.

On examination of the record we find the respondent accepted unauthorized gainful employment with the Richfield Construction Corporation as a laborer on or about April 25, 1960. The respondent's employer certified in a communication dated April 25, 1960

that the respondent had secured a Social Security number and was employed by them as a construction laborer at a salary of $2.80 per hour. The employer stated the respondent would work a minimum of 40 hours per week and that his employment was not of a temporary nature. The term "business" as used in section 101 (a) (15) (B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act means legitimate activities of a commercial or professional character (41.25 (b), 22 CFR). The term "business" as used in section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act does not include local employment or labor for hire. As previously noted, the respondent and counsel admitted the truth of the factual allegations set forth in the order to show cause. On the basis of the evidence present in this record, he is subject to deportation under the provisions of section 241 (a) (9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in that, after admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15) of the Act, he failed to comply with the conditions of such status.

The record shows the respondent was married to one Rosenda Cheures, a citizen of the United States, on June 12, 1965. The respondent's testimony indicates that his wife is pregnant and expects to be delivered of their citizen child within the next several months. It does not appear that the respondent's immigrant status can be adjusted under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act inasmuch as section 4(c) of Public Law 89-236, approved 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, which amends section 204 (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act among other things states that no petition shall be approved if the alien has previously been accorded a nonquota or preference status as the spouse of a citizen of the United States ***, by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. While we are aware of the appealing factors present in this case, we must, on the basis of the evidence present in this record, affirm the decision of the special inquiry officer inasmuch as the respondent has been accorded the only discretionary relief available to him at the present time. Accordingly, the following order I will be entered.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

Petition by United States citizen, pursuant to section 204(a), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, to accord "immediate relative" status under section 201(b) of the Act to his wife, the beneficiary, upon the basis of their marriage in 1964 is denied because a valid marriage for immigration purposes does not exist at the present time as the marriage has not been consummated, the parties are not now living together and have never lived together in a husband and wife relationship.

The case comes forward on appeal from the order of the District Director, Boston District, dated January 21, 1966, denying the visa petition for the reason that the petitioner's marriage to the beneficiary is not considered a bona fide marriage within the meaning of section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, pursuant to section 204 (a) of the same Act.

The petitioner, a native of Greece and a naturalized citizen of the United States, 62 years old, male, filed a visa petition on August 28, 1964, seeking nonquota status under the Immigration and Nationality Act, (now immediate relative status under the provisions of section 201 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, by the Act of October 3, 1965). The beneficiary is a native and citizen of Greece, 38 years old, female. The parties were married on June 22, 1964, at Nashua, New Hampshire.

The notice of denial by the District Director, Boston District, is accompanied by a memorandum. The evidence discloses a curious marital situation. The petitioner testified that he was introduced to the beneficiary through correspondence by a priest; that he first met her two or three months before their marriage; and met her two or three times before they were married on June 22, 1964. Both parties agree that they have never slept together and have never had marital relations. The evidence further establishes that the petitioner and the beneficiary have never lived together as husband and wife

in a common apartment although they visited each other in homes in Bronx, New York; Nashua, New Hampshire; and Bedford, Massachusetts. The beneficiary gave birth to a child on July 9, 1965, and both parties agree that the petitioner is not the father of the child. The petitioner is unwilling to assume the responsibility for the beneficiary's child, but is willing to provide a home for her if she will join him without the child. The petitioner refused to marry the beneficiary in a religious ceremony after she became pregnant, since he well knew the child was not his. The beneficiary states that the petitioner will marry her religiously when her father takes the child to Greece. Additional evidence in the file indicates that the beneficiary still has the care and custody of the child and that the parties are not living together.

The burden of establishing eligibility for a benefit sought under the immigration laws rests upon the petitioner. As indicated above, the parties have never lived together; no religious ceremony has been performed; the marriage has never been consummated; and the beneficiary has given birth to an illegitimate child. Where no bona fide husband-wife relationship is intended, the marriage is deemed invalid for immigration purposes regardless of whether it would be considered valid under the domestic law of the jurisdiction where performed.1

In view of all the circumstances of the case, upon the present record we cannot find that a bona fide husband and wife relationship for immigration purposes exists at the present time. It is concluded that the petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing a bona fide husband and wife relationship. The appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

MATTER OF BILBAO-BASTIDA

In Deportation Proceedings

A-11343968

Decided by Board May 18, 1966

Since a permanent resident alien who, while visiting in Mexico in July 1961 made a two-week visit to Cuba reentering the United States through Mexico upon presentation only of his alien registration receipt card, was excludable under section 212(a)(20), Immigration and Nationality Act, at the time of such reentry because under the regulation then in effect (8 CFR 211.1(b) (1)) an alien registration receipt card was not a valid document for reentry when presented by one who had been in Cuba, he is deportable under section 241(a)(1) of the Act.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Immigrant needing valid entry document and not having one (section 212(a) (20)).

This is an appeal from the order of the special inquiry officer finding respondent deportable upon the ground stated above and granting him voluntary departure. The appeal will be dismissed. The facts and law have been discussed in detail by the special inquiry officer. Briefly, respondent, a 31-year-old married male alien, a native and citizen of Spain, was admitted to the United States for permanent residence in 1959. While in Mexico on a visit in July 1961, he made a two-week visit to Cuba; he came back to Mexico and from there reentered the United States as a returning resident by showing his alien registration receipt card. The Service contends the card was not a valid entry document. The special inquiry officer sustained the contention. He found that the regulation (8 CFR 211.1(b) (1)), in effect when the respondent entered the United States, provided that an alien registration receipt card was not a valid document for reentry when presented by one who had been in Cuba. He ruled that the respondent had needed a valid immigrant visa when he reentered from Mexico and since he had none he was deportable as charged.