We have indicated above that counsel contended that, prior to the interrogation on November 13, 1963, the respondent should have been advised that she had a right to counsel and the right to remain. silent. 8 CFR 246.1 contains a specific provision that the notice of intention to rescind shall inform the respondent that he [she] may be represented by counsel. The District Director's letter of December 21, 1964 (Ex. 1) did inform her concerning such representation. However, there was no requirement that she be specifically advised to that effect prior to the preliminary investigation on November 13, 1963 nor that she be informed that she could refuse to answer any questions. Nevertheless, she was advised that the statement was to be made freely and voluntarily which was at least some indication to her that she was not required to make any statement. We dismiss these contentions of counsel in accordance with our decisions in Maiter of F, 4 I. & N. Dec. 475 (1951); Matter of P-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 306 (1953); and Matter of Pang, supra. In addition, rules of evidence applicable in judicial proceedings need not be strictly followed in an immigration hearing. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923); United States ex rel. Impastato v. O'Rourke, 211 F.2d 609 (8th Cir., 1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 827. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the special inquiry officer was correct in admitting the respondent's testimony of November 13, 1963 in evidence.

Counsel has also contended that the "confession", if admissible, was not corroborated and was insufficient evidence, therefore, upon which to base the decision. In this connection, he has stated that in criminal cases the Government must introduce substantial evidence to establish the trustworthiness of the confession. However, this is not a criminal proceeding and it is well settled that an alien's own admissions are sufficient to support a deportation order. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra; Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir., 1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 914. Similarly, we hold that the respondent's testimony of November 13, 1963 is a sufficient basis for rescinding the adjustment of status.

We have carefully considered the remaining contentions of counsel. These are without merit and do not require specific discussion. When the respondent filed her application for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255 on April 5, 1960, she stated that she had resided at 736 West 173rd Street, New York, New York, since January 1960. She filed her petition for naturalization on June 7, 1963 under 8 U.S.C. 1430 (a) which required her to establish that during the preceding three years she had been living in marital union with

her citizen spouse. On the date the petition for naturalization was filed, she testified before the naturalization examiner that she was residing at 1 West 72nd Street, her place of employment; that she also maintained a residence at 736 West 173rd Street with her husband; and that there was no marital rift between them. It seems to be conceded that Michael Argyros had lived at 736 West 173rd Street prior to the marriage and continuously until 1964; that the respondent never lived at that address; and that, from the time of her arrival in 1959 until some time subsequent to June 7, 1963, she had lived at 1 West 72nd Street. In view of these false statements, which were obviously made for the purpose of concealing the fact that she and Michael Argyros were not living together, we do not consider the respondent a credible witness. It is our opinion that the respondent's admissions against interest in her testimony of November 13, 1963 constitute the true version of the facts and that her testimony at the hearing, insofar as it was to the contrary, must be rejected as self-serving statements which were untrue.

8 U.S.C. 1256 provides for the rescission of the adjustment of immigration status if "it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the person was not in fact eligible for such adjustment of status, ***" One of the requirements for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255 is that an immigrant visa must be immediately available. The respondent was classified as nonquota and was able to secure adjustment of her immigration status only by reason of her marriage. Otherwise, she would have been chargeable to the quota of Greece which was greatly oversubscribed on May 17, 1960 when her application for adjustment of status was granted.

On November 13, 1963, the respondent testified (Tr. pp. 156–174) to the effect that she met Michael Argyros through a Mr. Regas; that she agreed to pay Michael Argyros $500 if he would marry her; that she secured the money from her employer out of wages due her; that she gave the money to Mr. Regas who was to pay it to Michael Argyros; that she married Michael Argyros solely in order that she might remain in the United States; that she had no intention of living with him in a marital relationship; and that they never had sexual intercourse. Regas was questioned by investigators of the Service on November 13, 1963 (Ex. 21) and denied his involvement, stating that he knew nothing about the payment of $500 and did not see the respondent between the time of his first meeting with her in December 1959 and November 1960. On the basis of the respondent's own testimony, we believe the Service has

established that the respondent was not eligible for the adjustment of status granted to her on May 17, 1960.

In addition to the respondent's testimony, the following factors are pertinent. At the time of the marriage on January 25, 1960, the respondent was 29 years old and her husband was 60. George Spyropoulos, who was a witness at the marriage, testified (Tr. pp. 18–20) that $500 was paid to Michael Argyros as the inducement for marrying the respondent; that the money was paid in his presence by the respondent's "boy friend", a Mr. Regas; and that Michael Argyros informed him after the marriage that he had married the respondent only so that she could remain in the United States.

Michael Argyros executed an affidavit (Ex. 8) before an investigator of the Service on October 3, 1963 in which he stated that Regas introduced him to the respondent; that the respondent agreed to pay him (Argyros) $500 for marrying her; that she stated that they would not live together and that in a few months she would see a lawyer about obtaining a divorce; and that he (Argyros) was paid $500 by Regas which the latter had received from the respondent. The respondent was served with notice of this proceeding on February 2, 1965, and Argyros could not be presented as a witness since he had died on December 22, 1964. Although we held admissible in evidence ex parte affidavits of persons who died prior to the deportation hearing in Matter of J-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 496, 499 (1955), we have not relied on the affidavit of Michael Argyros in this proceeding.

During the oral argument, a contention was advanced by counsel for the Service that the respondent's statement of November 13, 1963 (Ex. 16) was taken in connection with the petition for naturalization which she had filed; that the proper procedure for the respondent's counsel would have been to take action in the naturalization court to quash the statement if he believed that there was a lack of due process; and that the question could not be raised collaterally in this rescission proceeding. Thereafter, both parties submitted briefs on this point. At the time of the interrogation on November 13, 1963, the respondent was advised that the proposed sworn statement related to her "presence in the United States" and nothing was said about her petition for naturalization (Tr. p. 139). In any event, we are not convinced that it would have been proper to dismiss the objections of the respondent's counsel on the technical ground suggested by the Service. We need not reach a definite conclusion concerning the matter since we have held above that the

respondent's testimony of November 13, 1963 was properly received in evidence.

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent's marriage to Michael Argyros was merely a sham marriage entered into for the sole purpose of enabling her to evade the quota restrictions; that she was not eligible for adjustment of her immigration status under 8 U.S.C. 1255; and that the special inquiry officer's action in rescinding the adjustment of status was correct. Accordingly, the respondent's appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

MATTER OF FICALORA

In Deportation Proceedings

A-14341964

Decided by Board April 21, 1966

(1) The special inquiry officer does not have authority in deportation proceedings to determine an alien's elegibility for sixth preference status in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status pursuant to section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, nor does the Board of Immigration Appeals have appellate jurisdiction over such question, the sole determination thereof resting with the District Director and the Regional Commissioner (8 CFR 103.1(e) (2) and (f)).

(2) Where a visa petition, filed just prior to the deportation hearing, to accord respondent status under the then current sixth preference portion of the Italian quota was not accepted by the Service but was returned because not accompanied by a certification from the Secretary of Labor, as required, the special inquiry officer did not err in failing to defer his decision pending respondent's compliance with the certification requirement.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(9) [8 U.S.C. 1251]—Nonimmigrant (temporary visitor for pleasure changed to student) -failed to comply with conditions of status.

The special inquiry officer, in a decision dated December 10, 1965 denied the respondent's application for adjustment of his status to that of a permanent resident; granted his alternative request for voluntary departure; and provided for his deportation from the United States to Italy, on the charge contained in the order to show cause, in the event of his failure to so depart. The respondent's appeal from that decision, which brings the case before this Board for consideration, will be dismissed.

This record relates to a 28-year-old male alien, married,' who is a native and citizen of Italy. He last entered the United States on or about September 20, 1964. He was then admitted as a nonimmigrant

He has a wife and child who are residents of Italy and are apparently natives and citizens of that country.