his native land with repressive tactics; otherwise the appeal would not be before us.

On April 11, 1963, respondent married a United States citizen. One child was born of this union and at the time of his last hearing respondent offered evidence to establish that his wife was again pregnant, and was expecting a second child to be born in August 1965. Respondent's wife has two children by a previous marriage who live with her. Her former husband, one Dr. Lindgren, testified in behalf of respondent at his hearing in May 1963. Dr. Lindgren also served with the United States Public Health Service in Viet Nam. Dr. Lindgren is remarried, and the record establishes that he pays support for his two daughters to respondent's wife, and that relationships between the two families are friendly.

The Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, informed the District Director at Baltimore that on February 25, 1965, the Agency for International Development requested the enforced departure of respondent "even though this constitutes an exception to the present Service policy of not requiring departure of section 212(e) applicants pending completion of the study of the Exchange-Visitor Program" (Ex. R-4). The AID memorandum, dated March 13, 1965, is quite lengthy, and makes the following points: (1) that the government of Viet Nam and our mission undertook the training of Dr. Thieu as part of the expansion of medical education facilities badly needed in Viet Nam; (2) that Dr. Thieu signed an agreement to work for the Viet Nam Government for ten years as a member of the faculty of the University of Saigon in return for the advance medical education given him; (3) that Dr. Thieu arrived in the United States under the sponsorship of the World Health Organization on September 5, 1958, that his support was assumed by the Agency for International Development on September 1, 1960, and that his visa support was terminated by that agency on September 15, 1962; (4) that Dr. Thieu was fully aware when he signed these contracts of the requirement of section 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that he would be required to return to his native land to utilize his training; (5) that Dr. Thieu was not selected for training under the AID program for his personal benefit but for the contribution he could make to the program in Viet Nam; (6) that Dr. and Mrs. Thieu were aware of the fact at the time they married that they would have to choose either two years' separation or that Mrs. Thieu would have to spend two years in Viet Nam in order to be with her husband. It was the opinion of the agencies involved that the respondent's case did not involve the "type of unforeseeable hardship envisoned by the regu

lations implementing section 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act". The application for a waiver of the requirements of section 212(e) was denied by the District Director at Baltimore, Maryland, and, on May 20, 1965, respondent's application for adjustment under section 245 was withdrawn.

While the above facts do not resolve the issue as to whether or not respondent would be subject to physical persecution upon his return to Viet Nam, we insert them in our decision for the reason that they indicate respondent's background and the circumstances under which he returned to the United States in 1958 for further study and training.

Respondent testified at his reopened hearing on May 20, 1965, (1) that if he is returned to Viet Nam he would have to take “a position" in political affairs; (2) that "people might be nasty" to him because he had the special privilege of remaining in the United States for a number of years, and (3) because he has an American family, he might be discriminated against. He states that he would not be free to practice medicine to support himself and his family, and the small salary paid by Viet Nam to its physicians would not permit him to support an American family. He would not be free to choose employment, and he believes that the present regime is still a dictatorship.

Respondent was investigated and cleared for a passport by the former (Diem) regime, which he professes to have feared the most. He was permitted to return to the United States for a second period of training, after having been here once already. If it is true that United States trained physicians are discriminated against in Viet Nam both by the government and by French-trained physicians, it is difficult to comprehend why he chose extended training in the United States. He admits that his own knowledge of conditions in Viet Nam predates the overthrow of the Diem regime.

For the most part the Board has not considered that joining protest groups and making public statements after entering the United States supports a withholding of deportation under section 243 (h). Many aliens have attempted to build up a 243 (h) case by this sort of activity. Whatever public statements and protests respondent may have made while in the United States do not seem to us sufficient to make him persona non grata to the present regime.

The record does not establish that respondent is wanted by his government for any reason except to fulfill the contracts he made, both with his own government and with the agencies who sponsored and supported him here. Many persons have gone to Viet Nam who are not natives of respondent's country. The revised statute,

section 11 of the Act of October 3, 1965 (8 U.S.C.A. 1253 (h)), eliminates the requirement that there be a finding that respondent would suffer "physical" persecution if returned to his native country. Even considering this record under the new law we are unable to find that deportation of respondent to Viet Nam will subject him to persecution. The appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

It is further ordered that the order of the special inquiry officer of November 8, 1965 be and is hereby approved.

MATTER OF GREEN

In Visa Petition Proceedings

A-14352272

A-14352273

Decided by Board October 29, 1965

Beneficiaries, born out of wedlock during the existence of their putative father's marriage to the United States citizen petitioner, are not stepchildren within the meaning of section 101(b) (1) (B), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, since there is no evidence of the existence of a family unit between the parties.

The cases come forward on appeal from the order of the District Director, New York District, dated August 9, 1965 denying the visa petitions on the ground that the husband of the petitioner was never married to the mother of the beneficiaries and therefore the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiaries are children within the meaning of section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; consequently the beneficiaries are not eligible for nonquota classification under section 101 (a) (27) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The petitioner is a native of Jamaica, a citizen of the United States by naturalization on December 6, 1957, 52 years old, female. She seeks nonquota status on behalf of the beneficiaries, Nicolette Alicia Green and Ann Marie Green, natives and citizens of Jamaica, born September 19, 1959 and August 29, 1956, respectively.

The petitioner alleges that the beneficiaries are her stepchildren, the illegitimate children of her husband, Sydney Oswald Green, whom she married in Jamaica on September 3, 1943. The petitioner has submitted the birth certificates of the beneficiaries, showing their mother to be Marion Charlton, the father not being shown. There have also been presented Baptism certificates relating to the beneficiaries showing they were baptized in Jamaica about 1961, the name of the father being Sydney Green, whom the petitioner married in September 1943. The files also contain an affidavit by Beatrice Francis, executed June 9, 1965 to the effect that she is the

grandmother of the beneficiaries and certifies that the father of these children is Sidney Green and the mother, now deceased, was her daughter, Marion Charlton. There is also in the files the affidavit of Sidney Green, dated May 26, 1965 to the effect that he is the father of the benefiriaries who were born out of wedlock.

It appears therefore that the petitioner was already married to her husband at the time he sired these beneficiaries by another woman. Even under the wording of section 101(b)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, it is difficult to perceive how the beneficiaries can be regarded as stepchildren. The beneficiaries are adulterine children or adulterine bastards. By the common law, as it still exists in England and Ireland and in some states, bastards cannot be legitimated; but in Scotland and on the continent of Europe generally, and by statute in many states, children are now legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents, provided the parents might legally have married at the time of the child's birth.1 Adulterine children are the issue of adulterous intercourse and are regarded more unfavorably than the illegitimate offspring of single persons.2

Counsel seeks to equate the instant case with the case of Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (1965). That case involved a beneficiary who was born out of wedlock on February 12, 1947. He was abandoned in infancy by his natural mother, the plaintiff commenced caring for him in 1949 and married the beneficiary's father in 1952 when the beneficiary was five years old. The plaintiff immigrated to the United States in 1957 and her husband followed a year later. The plaintiff became a naturalized citizen in 1962 immediately thereafter petitioned for the beneficiary's admittance on a nonquota visa. The court found that the legislative history of the amendatory Act of 1957, while tending in the Senate Report to sustain the government position that it applied only to the illegitimate child of a mother who subsequently married a United States citizen, was not compelling and did not control the interpretation of section 101(b) (1) (B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Observing that the plaintiff, her husband and the beneficiary had been a close family unit since shortly after the beneficiary's birth, and that immediately after citizenship was secured the plaintiff petitioned to unite the family unit, the court applied the "plain meaning" rule to the phrase "whether or not born out of wedlock," in view of the clearly expressed legislative intention to keep together

1 Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d.ed.), "legitimate." 'Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3d.ed.); Matter of D-M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 441; Matter of F-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 448, 451.