beneficiaries have used his surname since birth and that he last saw the children in December 1963 when he visited Jamaica. Both children have been living in Jamaica with his brother, Ernest, since they were about three years and six months old, respectively. The affiant claims to have been supporting the children because both mothers abandoned them and that he has been in contact with his brother regarding their welfare (although he did not present any letters from his brother or money order receipts). The affiant further stated that his wife, the petitioner, has known about these children since they were married but that the only time the children stayed with them was for one or two nights at his mother's home in Jamaica when they visited there in 1960. The petitioner has submitted an affidavit dated January 21, 1966 which stated that she married her husband on March 10, 1956 and that she has been aware of the existence of her husband's children since they were married. She states that she has met the children in December 1960 and again in September 1964 when she and her husband vacationed in Jamaica and on each occasion, the children spent one night with them at her mother-in-law's home and one night at her brother-in-law's home, where they reside permanently. The visa petition relating to Leon Arthur Morris contains an affidavit by Ernest Morris, the uncle, executed October 12, 1964 which states that for the past eight years the said Leon Arthur Morris has been in his sole care and custody and has been permanently residing with him during that period; that from time to time he received financial assistance for Leon Arthur Morris from Stanley Morris; that the affiant is ready and willing to release him and relinquish all his rights and/or claim to the custody, care and maintenance of Leon Arthur Morris to Stanley Morris whenever requested by him so to do. The files also contained an indenture and release agreeing to the adoption of the beneficiaries by the petitioner and her husband, the natural father of the beneficiaries. These documents were executed before a Justice of the Peace in Westmoreland, Jamaica on September 18, 1963 and June 19, 1964 respectively.1 It is obvious at the outset that the natural father of these illegitimate children has no standing under section 101 (b) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to petition on behalf of these 1 This indenture and release for adoption does not constitute a valid adoption under the Adoption of Children Law, 1956, which provides that the court having jurisdiction to make adoption orders shall be the Supreme Court of Judicature or any resident magistrates court and also makes provision for an Adoption Board to be present in court in cases of adoption. beneficiaries. The petitioner's wife claims to qualify as a stepparent because of the provisions of subsection (B) of section 101 (b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which defines the term "child" to include a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child has not reached the age of 18 years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred. In Matter of W-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 685, we held that subsection (B) does not extend immigration benefits to the illegitimate child of the father who subsequently marries a citizen of the United States and whose wife thereafter seeks immigration benefits for the illegitimate children of her husband as her stepchildren. The holding in Matter of W—, supra, was limited in the case of Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The beneficiary in that case was born out of wedlock and was abandoned by his natural mother in infancy. Thereafter he was cared for by the petitioner who in 1952 married the natural father of the beneficiary when he was five years old. The beneficiary in that case lived with the natural father and his wife from infancy until the wife immigrated to the United States in 1957 and was followed by her husband a year later. The court, influenced by the broad language of subsection (B) of section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and after examining the legislative history of the statute which tended to suggest conflicting interpretations, was persuaded that "on the facts of the case" the beneficiary was the plaintiff's "stepchild". The court pointed out that the plaintiff, her husband and the beneficiary had concededly been a close family at the outset, and immediately after her citizenship was secured in 1962, the plaintiff petitioned to reunite the family unit; futher, in 1963, the petitioner and her husband had legally adopted the beneficiary in Jamaica although this adoption was without legal significance from an immigration viewpoint since the beneficiary was then over 14 years of age. The facts in the present case do not fall within the scope of the holding in the Nation v. Esperdy, supra. Here, prior to the marriage of the putative father and the petitioner in 1956 in the United States, there had been no family unit in existence in Jamaica between the parties. The beneficiaries were raised by their natural father's brother. The petitioner has seen the beneficiaries only for very brief periods of time subsequent to the marriage and there was never a family unit established between the petitioner, her husband, and his natural children, the beneficiaries. The documents of adoption executed in 1963 and 1964 do not constitute a valid adoption under the law of Jamaica. There was never in existence a family 245-235-67- -36 unit in Jamaica such as was present in the Nation case and which so strongly swayed the court's decision in that case because of the humanitarian and sympathetic factors present. It is concluded that the beneficiaries herein do not qualify as stepchildren within the meaning of subsection (B) of section 101 (b) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and that a steprelationship for immigration purposes does not exist in this case. The appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed. MATTER OF NGHIỆM In Deportation Proceedings A-10392808 Decided by Board April 6, 1966. A native and citizen of Viet Nam who has been in the United States since his last admission as an exchange visitor physician in 1958 has not established that because he has been away from his country so long, has refused to return, is American trained and has an American family, he would be subject to persecution within the meaning of section 243 (h), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, if deported to Viet Nam. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2)]—Exchange visitor-remained longer. Respondent is married, male, 41 years of age, a native and citizen of Viet Nam, who was admitted to the United States on September 5, 1958, as an exchange visitor until September 15, 1962. He was granted until December 23, 1962, to depart, but did not avail himself of the grant. He has conceded deportability and applies for withholding of deportation to Viet Nam pursuant to section 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. The special inquiry officer denied this application. Respondent appeals to the Board from the denial. The appeal will be dismissed. The special inquiry officer has set forth with care the respondent's educational and professional background, and the manner in which he has employed his time since he has been in the United States. He is a doctor and was teaching in the Department of Medicine at the University of Saigon before coming to the United States. He was first in the United States from 1955 to 1956 and attended the School of Public Health, University of Michigan at Ann Harbor, and received a Master of Public Health degree. When he returned to the United States in 1958 he studied at Harvard School of Public Health, and was granted a Master of Science in Teaching. He then attended the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and was granted a Doctor of Public Health degree in 1962. He worked in the Department of Environmental Medicine of the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene as a research associate; that school filed a petition on his behalf for a first preference which was granted by the Baltimore office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service on March 27, 1963. Respondent pleads that he will be subject to persecution or discriminated against in Viet Nam because he has been away from the country so long and has refused to return. Most of the record goes to his fear of the government of Viet Nam prior to the revolution in that country which occurred on November 2, 1963. Most of the exhibits consist of magazine and newspaper reports on the Diem administration which was overthrown by General Nguyen Khanh. Respondent admitted in his last reopened hearing on May 20, 1965, that he is not well acquainted with the present government, but he believes that there is continued instability in the political parties and in the Vietnamese Government, regardless of the identity of the head of state. He asserts that having an American family places him in a particularly precarious position. It is our feeling that, since the revolution overthrowing the Diem regime two and a half years ago, at least part of the record regarding political conditions in that country is out of date. It is apparent that respondent has no desire to return to his country to use the special training he has received in the United States for the good of his fellow countrymen. He declares that physicians educated in the United States are discriminated against in Viet Nam in favor of physicians trained in France, and that the dean of the medical school at Saigon had told him personally that no credit could be given for training acquired in this country. This cannot be considered to be evidence supporting a claim of persecution in Viet Nam. Respondent came to the United States first in 1955. When he returned two years later for additional training he must have been fully aware of the government's attitude of discrimination, if it exists, in favor of French trained physicians. The fact that respondent has attempted to remain in the United States and has delayed his return to his native country as long as possible does not constitute evidence that respondent will be subject to persecution in Viet Nam. If this constituted evidence of persecution, every case coming before the Board would, necessarily, be resolved favorably to the alien. Every person applying for section 243 (h) relief from deportation has delayed his departure as long as possible, and must, to some degree, have charged the government in |