On the date of October 1, 1965 the District Director, Cleveland District, after reference to material furnished by the Library of Congress dated September 3, 1965 has concluded that no change should be made in his original decision. He concludes "a status similar to that of a child born in wedlock" would not appear to meet the demands of "definitions" with reference to the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(A) nor have the requirements of section 101(b) (1) (C) with reference to custody been met as the subject was not in custody of the legitimating parent until after her eighteenth birthday since the beneficiary's only entry into the United States on December 16, 1964 was effected when she was 20 years of age. The issue then is whether the act of acknowledgment of paternity by the father legitimated the beneficiary under Yugoslavian Law.

The file contains a report dated September 3, 1965, entitled "Acknowledgment and Legitimation of a child born out of wedlock under Yugoslav Law," prepared by a Doctor Fran Gjupanovich, of the European Law Division of the Library of Congress. We shall deal with the pertinent portions of this report.

The new socialist system introduced in Yugoslavia by the 1946 Constitution paid special attention to children born out of wedlock. Under the Constitution of 1946, Article 26, as well as under that of 1963, Article 58, now in force, children born out of wedlock are considered equal to those born in wedlock with respect to their rights and duties toward their parents and the rights and duties of the parents toward them. The term "legitimate" and "illegitimate” are no longer used in domestic relations legislation. In order for a child born out of wedlock to realize its rights, its extramarital paternity must be established. This may be effected either through a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or through a court action declaring it. The principle governing the status of a child born out of wedlock has been fully implemented by the Law of December 1, 1947, on Parent and Child Relations.

Acknowledgment as an institution creating rights and duties between a child and the natural father, as established in the 1947 Law, was unknown under the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 which dealt only with the evidence in proving extramarital paternity for the sole purpose of the child's support. The provisions of the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 were repealed by the enactment of the 1947 Law on Parent and Child Relations. Pursuant to section 43 of the same Law, the provisions of this Law were also to apply to cases involving parent and child relations which had arisen before the coming into force of the said Law provided, however, no final decision was rendered before the 1947 Law became effective. The provi

sions on legitimation under the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 and under the 1947 Law on Parent and Child Relations both provided for legitimation, under certain circumstances, either by the subsequent marriage of the parents or by court decree, the illegitimate child thereby acquiring the status of a child born in wedlock.

The 1947 Law provides that the establishment of paternity is admissible and that extramarital paternity may be established by the voluntary acknowledgment of the natural father or in a court action by final decree (sections 4 and 24). The person who admits that he is the father of a child born out of wedlock is considered as such. (section 24, paragraph 1). Acknowledgment of paternity on the part of the father is a unilateral act which becomes effective when the child's mother agrees to it (section 24, paragraph 3). Acknowledgment of paternity, in order to be effective, must be made in a form prescribed by law. Therefore, the father may acknowledge the child either before a registrar, in a public document, or in his will (section 24, paragraph 2). The 1947 Law requires no other formality for the acknowledgment before the registrar. According to an authority, the father makes the statement of acknowledgment personally before the registrar, either immediately after the birth of the child or at any time later. The registration in the public records of births is conclusive evidence of the acknowledgment and is ir revocable.

Acknowledgment of paternity has retroactive effect and is effective with respect to everyone. Family relations thenceforth exist between the child and the natural father. Both the father and the mother exercise parental power over the child. The child acquires the family name of its mother, but it may take that of its father provided the parents agree upon it.

In summary, under the law now in force in Yugoslavia, a child born out of wedlock may acquire the status or a status similar to that of a child born in wedlock by three methods, i.e., legitimation by subsequent marriage, by court decree, or by acknowledgment of the natural father. A child born out of wedlock before the enactment of the 1947 Law on Parent and Child Relations may be acknowledged only in accordance with the provisions of this Law if no final decree on the matter was rendered before the 1947 Law became effective. The report concludes that it is not possible to find any cases or authoritative comment on how today's Yugoslav courts would specifically interpret the rights and duties arising from an acknowledgment under the old law. There is, however, case law which shows an inclination on the part of present-day courts to

adjudicate under the 1947 Law the content of parent and child relations which were formalized under the old law.

It therefore appears from the report of the Library of Congress that under the law now in force in Yugoslavia, a child born out of wedlock may acquire the status or a status similar to that of a child born in wedlock by three methods: legitimation by subsequent marriage; court decree; and by acknowledgment of the natural father. The Service has seized upon the phrase "status similar to that of a child born in wedlock" in order to predicate its denial. An examination of the report indicates that this phrase was inserted only because the inheritance rights of an acknowledged child as compared to a child born in wedlock may differ in the various Yugoslav jurisdictions. However the report reiterates several times that legitimation through acknowledgment of paternity is effective with respect to everyone; that family relations thenceforth exist between the child and the natural father; and that both the father and the mother exercise parental power over the child. Summarizing, the report concludes acknowledgment by the natural father is one of the three methods of legitimation of a child born out of wedlock the other two being subsequent marriage of the parents or court decree.

The birth certificate establishes that the father acknowledged the child on July 14, 1944 and that the child's mother confirmed the statement of acknowledgment. It therefore appears that ever since the beneficiary was five months old, the petitioner has regarded her as his child. The beneficiary appears to meet the requirements of either section 101(b) (1) (A) or (C) of the Immigration and Nation

ality Act. Under the Yugoslav Law, the beneficiary is the legitimate child of the petitioner. The appeal will be sustained and the petition approved.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be sustained and the petition be approved for preference quota status under section 203(a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

1 Similar conclusions were reached after the introduction of the Communist or Socialist systems in the following cases: Matter of Gallina, 9 I. & N. Dec. 518 (1961)-Hungary; Matter of Krzyewski, 8 I. & N. Dec. 73 (1958)—Poland; unreported Matter of Pajor, A-14492231 (March 18, 1965)-Rumanian.

MATTER OF NOURI

In Visa Petition Proceedings

A-12525308

Decided by Board November 5, 1965

A divorce granted in the presence of the Consul of the United Arab Republic at Chicago, Illinois, to a nonimmigrant student in attendance at the Iowa State University, dissolving a previous marriage contracted in Egypt, is not valid for immigration purposes even though the United Arab Republic may consider such divorce valid under its laws.

This case is before us on appeal from a decision of a District Director denying the visa petition.

The petitioner was born in the United States and married the beneficiary at Harlan, Iowa on November 27, 1964. The beneficiary had previously been married in Egypt on July 4, 1963 and declared his divorce from his first wife on June 8, 1964 in the presence of the Consul of the United Arab Republic at Chicago, Illinois. The district Director held that the divorce did not meet the legal requirements of Illinois nor of the State of Iowa in which the beneficiary has his domicile. For that reason, that officer concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that her marriage to the beneficiary was valid.

We have carefully considered the statements in counsel's letter of August 20, 1965. He contends that, since the beneficiary was merely attending the Iowa State University as a student when he obtained the divorce in June 1964 and intended to return to Egypt, he was not a resident of Iowa and could not have secured a valid divorce under its laws. By his marriage in November 1964 and his present desire to become a permanent resident of the United States, it would seem that he has now abandoned his Egyptian domicile and has taken up domicile in the United States. We rejected a similar contention in Matter of M—, 7 I. &. N. Dec. 556 (1957), in which the alien attempted to divorce his first wife in Connecticut through a written declaration in the Islamic tradition and then married a

United States citizen in Connecticut. Actually, the issue here is not whether the beneficiary could have obtained a divorce under the laws of Iowa but whether the alleged divorce before the Consul at Chicago was valid. For the reasons more fully set forth in Matter of M—, supra, and in Matter of H—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 470 (1954), and in accordance with the decision in Shikoh v. Murff, 257 F.2d 306 (2d Cir., 1958), we hold that, although the United Arab Republic may consider the instant beneficiary's divorce valid under its laws, it cannot be regarded as valid for immigration purposes.

Counsel's second contention is that alternatively we should hold that the beneficiary's first marriage was not valid because he was not present in Egypt at that time and a friend signed the marriage papers on his behalf. The record before the District Director does not contain any evidence that the first marriage was a proxy marriage, and the certificate concerning the divorce contains the statement that he was married to the first wife under Marriage License No. 450667 given by legal authorities. The divorce record also shows that she had lived at 145 Campus, Ames, Iowa so that it would appear that the marriage was consummated. On this record, we must find that the beneficiary's first marriage was valid.

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that it has not been established that the marriage of the petitioner and beneficiary is valid, and the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.