land. It has been held that "extreme hardship" is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning. The elements required to establish "extreme hardship" are dependent upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case (Cf. Matter of Hwang, Int. Dec. No. 1319, and Matter of Uy, Int. Dec. No. 1464). In the instant case, we are concerned with an alien who has been in the United States since her admission thereto in September of 1954. She has no dependents living in this country. Her father is a native, citizen and resident of Jamaica, and her mother a native of Jamaica is presently residing in England. Concededly the respondent's deportation from the United States would result in economic detriment to her. It is the considered opinion of this Board, however, that under the circumstances present in this particular case economic detriment in and of itself does not amount to "extreme hardship." There has been no showing that the respondent could not obtain employment in her native country or England. Factually she has testified that she could use to her advantage the training she acquired in the United States in the field of chemistry and laboratory technology. There are no substantial equities in this case except those arising from the economic factor and this factor, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding of "extreme hardship" within the meaning of the statute. There is not a scintilla of evidence present in this record showing that the respondent could not obtain suitable employment in Jamaica or England and as previously stated it is only because of the Government's liberal student and trainee policy that she has been able to acquire the necessary continuous physical presence requirements of the statute. After carefully considering all the evidence of record together with the representations of the trial attorney and counsel on appeal we will direct that the special inquiry officer's order of June 18, 1965 granting the respondent's application for suspension of deportation be withdrawn. Since the respondent is statutorily eligible for voluntary departure we will remand the case to the special inquiry officer so that he may give consideration to her alternative request for the discretionary relief of voluntary departure and to afford the special inquiry officer the opportunity to direct the respondent's deportation to the country designated by her and for such further action as may be necessary and appropriate in the premises. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal of the Service trial attorney be and the same is hereby sustained. It is further ordered that the order entered by the special inquiry 1 officer on June 18, 1965, directing that the alien's deportation be suspended under the provisions of section 244 (a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act be and the same is hereby withdrawn. It is further ordered that the case be remanded to the special inquiry officer for the purposes set forth in the foregoing opinion and for the entry of an appropriate order. MATTER OF KURYS In Visa Petition Proceedings A-13801947 Decided by Board October 4, 1965 Where, following withdrawal by petitioner of an approved visa petition to accord alien spouse nonquota status, a new visa petition on behalf of the beneficiary was filed under compulsion of a court order by the citizen petitioner who stated that a bona fide marital relationship did not exist and she did not intend to live with her husband, such petition was properly denied because it was not submitted in good faith and the appeal from the denial order dismissed since the beneficiary's attorney has no standing to appeal. The case comes forward from the order of the District Director, Hartford, Connecticut dated April 6, 1965 denying the visa petition for the reason that the petition is not being submitted in good faith; the petitioner's statement under oath indicates that she does not have a bona fide marital relationship, that she does not intend to live with her husband and that her petition is being filed under compulsion. The visa petition was filed on February 24, 1965 by the petitioner, a native of Poland and a naturalized citizen of the United States, 27 years old, female, on behalf of her husband, a native and citizen of Poland, 25 years old, male. The parties were married on October 17, 1964 at New Britain, Connecticut. The visa petition indicates that a prior petition was filed on October 23, 1964 and withdrawn on December 7, 1964. The brief of counsel contains a memorandum of decision in the case of Kazimierz Kurys v. Michalina Rittaler Kurys, No. 141412 of the Superior Court, Hartford County, Connecticut dated February 18, 1965 granting a motion for an order that a temporary injunction issue "requiring the defendant to immediately reinstate her petition made to the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to grant the plaintiff nonquota immigrant status.” A sworn statement taken from the petitioner on February 24, 1965 by a Service officer indicates that the petitioner filed a new petition 245-235-67-22 because she had been ordered to by the court and would not have submitted the petition if the court had not so ordered; further, that the petitioner had no intention of living with her husband as man and wife and that it is the petitioner's present desire to secure a divorce. At oral argument it developed that the counsel in the case is the counsel for the alien-beneficiary who appeared for the beneficiary in obtaining the injunction previously referred to above. Section 206 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that the Attorney General may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 205 of the Act. 8 CFR 206.1(b) (1) provides that the approval of a visa petition is revoked as of the date of approval in any of the following circumstances: Upon formal notice of withdrawal filed by petitioner with the officer who approved the petition. In the case of Scalzo v. Hurney1 the petitioner was ordered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to reinstate a visa petition which had previously been withdrawn. The court held that section 206 authorizes the Attorney General for good and sufficient cause to revoke the visa petition and that there is no vested status in the alien. The case of Pacheco Pereira v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2 held that an alien in the beneficiary's position has no personal right to become a nonquota immigrant; the right lies in the citizen spouse who wishes to keep the family together, citing 8 CFR 206.1(b) (1). In Matter of C—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 547, we held that the right to appeal from revocation of a previously approved visa petition lies solely with the petitioner; that the attorney who once represented the petitioner and cannot now locate her and continues to represent the beneficiary has no standing under 8 CFR 206.3 to assert an appeal. In the instant case the visa petition was filed by the petitioner under compulsion of a court order. Under the regulations an appeal from the denial of the visa petition may be filed only by the petitioner. Under the circumstances, and in view of the court decisions and the prior administrative holding of this Board, the appeal must be dismissed. If the petitioner files an appeal in good faith, the case may then be reconsidered upon the merits. ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed. 1225 F. Supp. 560, affirmed per curiam 338 F.2d 339, certiorari applied for. 2342 F.2d 422 (1st Cir., March 18, 1965). MATTER OF ORTIZ-PRIETO In Deportation Proceedings A-13326833 Decided by Board July 16, 1965 While the record fails to reveal any intent to circumvent the normal visa-issuing process in the case of a native and citizen of Chile who entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor, prior to his departure from Chile he resigned his employment as a police officer, within 10 days after arrival in the United States he obtained a social security card, and thereafter he accepted gainful employment at which time he returned the unused portion of his round-trip ticket to his wife in Chile to be redeemed; in addition, while respondent is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status pursuant to section 245, Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, he has no close family ties or dependents in this country, his wife and 3 children are natives, citizens, and residents of Chile, and on the basis of the entire record his case fails to measure up to the standard required for the favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. CHARGES: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable 212(a) (20), no valid immigrant visa. Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(9) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(9)]-Failed to comply with nonimmigrant status. Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2)]—Remained longer. This case presents an appeal from an order entered by the special inquiry officer on May 17, 1965 denying the respondent's application requesting that his immigrant status be adjusted to that of a permanent resident as provided in section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act but granting him permission to depart voluntarily from the United States, in lieu of deportation, and directing that he be deported from the United States to Chile, the country designated by the respondent, on the charge set forth in the order to show cause in the event he fails to depart when and as required. The respondent, a 26-year-old married male, native and citizen of Chile, has had continuous residence in the United States since his admission at Miami, Florida on or about September 19, 1964 as a |