Jordan which stated there appeared in person Irsan Ben Said Hamdan on behalf of his brother, the beneficiary, as per duly executed power of attorney who declared that in accordance with the official power of attorney he divorced with the first instance Rasmieh, the daughter of Mousa Mahmoud, the legal wife of the beneficiary, and requests that this be registered and confirmed to her, she being absent. His declaration was supported by two witnesses and accordingly his act was duly confirmed by the judge of the Sharia Court who notified Irsan that he has made in behalf of his brother, Othman, the act of divorce, with first instance, of his wife Rasmieh, and that his brother, Othman, is at liberty to call on her during the official period by word or deed, provided that he should register same at the Sharia Court, and in case he does not appear during the period, she is considered automatically divorced from him as from this date: 6.5.62.

In connection with the appeal the petitioner submitted a bill of complaint for divorce on the ground of separation in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico at Caguas reciting that because of doubt as to the validity of the judgment of divorce at Nablus, Jordan on June 5, 1952 (sic), due to the fact that it is not evident from said judgment that said defendant was duly served at the time of the petition therefor or of the judgment entered, also due to the fact that neither is it evident from said judgment that same was final and conclusive praying for divorce on the ground of continuous and uninterrupted separation for more than three years. This complaint for divorce is dated April 1, 1965.

In further connection with the appeal counsel for the petitioner has submitted a communication dated April 23, 1965 inclosing photo copies of the completion certificates that have been received from Jordan showing that the first wife of the beneficiary was duly notified of the divorce proceedings against her; also showing that the divorce decree became final upon her appearance subsequent to the judgment and the "test period". The translation of the Arabic document refers to a revocable divorce certificate dated 6.5.1962 showing that it was served on the first wife, Rasmiyya Musa Mahmoud on 13.5.1962. There was also a notice of judgment given in the presence of both parties, the plaintiff being named as Rasmiyya Musa Mahmoud and the beneficiary, Ersan Said Hamdan (the proxy), regarding the subject of alimony issued by the Sharia Court, Nablus, Jordan, declaring that the plaintiff has applied for alimony from the respondent as the representative to his brother who divorced her revocably according to the divorce certificate given by the 'court on 6.5.1962; and since he did not return her to him, and since

the respondent has carried the divorce according to his power of attorney which was given to him by her previous husband and since he has given a declaration before the Magistrate of Nablus to support her during his brother's absence in America, etc., therefore, and since revocable divorce does not cancel marriage definitely during the test period in which wife may return to her husband in word or in deed, and since alimony during test period is regarded as ordinary wife alimony the judge of the Sharia Court decides in accordance with Article 62 of Family Rights Law an amount of fifteen Dinars representing alimony during the whole period and covering all her requirements which she may legally require starting from the date of the divorce till the termination of that period. The judgment is dated 12.6.1962.

The communication from counsel also indicates that the beneficiary is proceeding with his action for divorce in the Puerto Rican court and requests that the beneficiary should be given every opportunity to clarify the matter by (1) in the event such evidence is obtained as will leave no doubt as to the validity of the divorce from the first wife, the case should either be remanded to the District Director at San Juan, Puerto Rico or an extension should be granted during which to clarify this matter; or (2) if the beneficiary is for any reason unable to obtain such clarification, he should be granted an extension in order to bring to a successful termination the divorce proceeding in Puerto Rico for which his presence as a witness in his own behalf will be necessary.

The date of the judgment of divorce rendered by the Sharia Court at Nablus, Jordan is indicated as 6.5.1962. It has been confirmed that this is the usual continental European manner of writing the date and is equivalent to May 6, 1962, rather than June 5, 1962. The document submitted by counsel indicates that the wife, Rasmiyya, was served on May 13, 1962 and she obtained a judgment for alimony from the Sharia Court at Nablus, Jordan on June 12, 1962.

Jordanian Law No. 92 of 1951 on Family Rights is set forth in Appendix A of Matter of Awadalla, Int. Dec. No. 1348. JordanianMoslem law as it relates to divorce is summarized in Matter of M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 556, in which it is set forth that a divorce is effected by means of repudiations of the wife by the husband. The modes of accomplishing the required repudiations are various: by a single pronouncement of repudiation which is revocable within three months by express words or conduct; by three successive pronouncements during three successive periods, with the marriage finally being dissolved on the third repudiation; by three successive pronouncements of repudiation made on a single occasion, probably

before witnesses; or by a single irrevocable declaration in writing (bill of divorce) which is final immediately, but must be communiIcated to the wife.

In the instant case the judgment of May 6, 1962, made by a single pronouncement, was a revocable divorce and did not cancel the marriage definitely during the test or idda period of three months thereafter. The beneficiary was represented by his brother with a duly executed power of attorney and this type of proxy divorce constitutes a valid divorce in Jordan. The divorce decree of the Sharia Court at Nablus, Jordan was served on the wife on May 13, 1962 and thereafter she obtained a judgment for alimony against the proxy of her former husband on June 12, 1962. There is no indication that the beneficiary returned to his first wife during the revocable period, that is, during the idda period of three months. The divorce, therefore, became final as of May 6, 1962.

The evidence establishes that the beneficiary, through a duly executed power of attorney designating his brother as his proxy, obtained a valid divorce decree under Jordanian-Moslem law. Under ordinary rules of international comity, the divorce should be recognized unless there are strong reasons of public policy in the forum where the subsequent marriage was celebrated. No such policy has been shown to exist. It is not known why the beneficiary represented that he did not have any previous marriages when he married the petitioner on June 16, 1962 at Arecibo, Puerto Rico. However, according to the evidence of record, the beneficiary properly and legally terminated his prior marriage by a decree of divorce obtained in the Sharia Court in Jordan on May 6, 1962. The present marriage of the petitioner and the beneficiary appears to be valid. The petition will be approved.

ORDER: It is ordered that the visa petition be approved for nonquota status on behalf of the beneficiary.

MATTER OF PALACIO

In Visa Petition Proceedings

A-14242599

Decided by Board May 7, 1965,

Since the amended Judgment of Legitimation of beneficiary by petitioner, entered April 27, 1965, by the Superior Court of the State of California under section 230, California Civil Code, decrees legitimation of the beneficiary-born out of wedlock June 27, 1944 in the Philippines-as of December 31, 1952, when he was 8 years old and was living with the petitioner in the Philippines, beneficiary comes within the definition of "child" in section 101(b) (1) (C), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and, therefore, is eligible for nonquota status. (Note: See also, Matter of Palacio, Int. Dec. No. 1453, of which the alien in this case is also the subject.)

The case comes forward pursuant to motion of counsel for the petitioner attaching an amended Judgment of Legitimation under section 230 of the California Civil Code and requesting that the visa petition be granted.

The visa petition was filed by a native of the Philippines and a naturalized citizen of the United States, 60 years old, male, seeking nonquota status on behalf of his unmarried child, born June 27, 1944, a native and citizen of the Philippines. The beneficiary was born out of wedlock. The petitioner married his present wife, Maria Dalisay Angeles, on May 6, 1963.

In connection with the visa petition there was previously submitted a decree of the Superior Court of the State of California, City and County of San Francisco, declaring that the petitioner is the legitimate father from birth of the beneficiary as well as other included children, that the said minor children are legitimate children of the petitioner and that a valid and subsisting relationship of parent and child exists between petitioner and the said minor child. In view of the fact that it did not appear from the face of the judgment that this was a legitimate proceeding pursuant to section 230 of the California Civil Code, and may have been a proceeding pursuant to section 231 of the California Civil Code or

section 255 of the Probate Code of California, and it further appearing that it was not established that the beneficiary had been received into the home of the petitioner, the denial of the visa petition was dismissed on April 7, 1965. Our order was without prejudice to a reopening upon submission of a judgment by a California Court showing that the petitioner has been legitimated pursuant to section 230 of the California Civil Code together with the date of such legitimation.

There has now been submitted an Amended Judgment of Legitimation under section 230 of the California Civil Code in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the City and County of San Francisco, dated April 27, 1965, providing for a judgment in accordance with section 230 of the California Civil Code acknowledging the existence of the parental relationship between petitioner and the minor children named therein, including the beneficiary who was born on June 27, 1944. It was ordered adjudged and decreed that the petitioner is the legitimate father of the beneficiary and of the other minor children and the children are the legitimate children of the petitioner and that a valid and subsisting relationship of parent and child has existed between petitioner and the said minor children since their birth. It was further ordered adjudged and decreed that the date of legitimation of the beneficiary is December 31. 1952, when beneficiary was eight years of age.

Section 230 of the California Civil Code, which has been construed as an out-and-out statute of legitimation, provides that the father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his son, receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were his legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The amended judgment legitimates the child as of December 31, 1952 which is the date of the presumed death of Librada, the first wife of the petitioner (actually, this marriage was dissolved by a California divorce decree on April 26, 1963). The petitioner resided in the Philippines in a husband and wife relationship with Nena de Silva, the natural mother of the beneficiary, from prior to the birth of the beneficiary on June 27, 1944 and had five children by her, the last having been born on December 19, 1957. The petitioner left the Philippines in 1957. According to the Amended Judgment, the court evidently considered the relationship between the petitioner and Nena de Silva sufficient to base a finding of "receiving into the

1

Ballantine v. De Silva, 226 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir., 1955), affirmed 351 U.S. 570, rehearing denied 352 U.S. 907.