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of the first preference visa petitioner and has since remained in the United States. Deportability on the charge stated in the order to show cause is established.

The respondent has established good moral character for the period he has resided in the United States. He attended universities where he was awarded a degree of Bachelor of Science in Physics in September 1960 and a degree of Master of Science in Physics on December 15, 1962. At the University of Minnesota he was employed as a technician and engineer trainee and after graduation he worked for UNIVAC for 14 months at a salary of $160 per week. The respondent is now attending classes at Stanford University, not for credit, but merely as an auditor. He has done parttime work as a Russian translator and is presently living on his savings which total about $1800. His parents, also of the Chinese race, were naturalized in the Philippines in 1956 or 1957 and although he apparently derived Philippine citizenship through his parents' naturalization, he has had some difficulty in securing a Philippine passport because of a question of identity. The respondent has five brothers and seven sisters in the Philippines, all of his brothers being employed. He is in possession of a valid passport of the Republic of China on Formosa.

The quota for the Philippines is oversubscribed and respondent cannot obtain an immigrant visa for that reason. He testified his deportation would result in hardship to himself because he would find it difficult to adjust to a new environment outside of the United States and he would have limited opportunities in his field of academic training. He believes that he might obtain work as a teacher.

The respondent has applied for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended. As one of the necessary qualifying ingredients, he must establish that his deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to himself since he has no qualifying relatives in the United States.

The respondent is 28 years of age and has resided in the United States only since September 1956 or a few months in excess of eight years. He was about nineteen and a half years old when he came to this country as a student intending to return to his native country at the completion of his education. However, while in the United States he underwent a change of mind and now desires to remain in this country. All of his family ties are in the Philippines where his father was formerly engaged in the textile business and where his five brothers are all employed. In addition, he has seven sisters

there. Apparently, the respondent left UNIVAC, the company which petitioned for his first preference because of difficulties as the result of undue pressures on him. He is presently doing part-time work as a Russian translator. Bearing in mind that the respondent entered the United States as a student, that he has no family ties in this country and all of his ties are in the Philippines, the mere fact that the respondent would suffer some economic hardship does not constitute "extreme hardship" so as to qualify him for the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation. Upon the record it is believed that voluntary departure is the maximum relief which should be granted.

The special inquiry officer has referred to Matter of Hwang, Int. Dec. No. 1319, and to certain decisions rendered by him in the belief that he was bound by the guide lines laid down in Matter of Hwang. Matter of Hwang does not lay down any hard and fast rules. It states that the personal privation contemplated in a situation characterized by "extreme hardship" within the meaning of the statute is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning but necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It was pointed out that the term "extreme hardship" admits of varying degrees of severity; the limits of personal deprivation and economic detriment contemplated in the term "extreme hardship" cannot be stated in a hard and fast rule. It was conceded that it could be found that the return of an alien who was admitted as a foreign student to the country whence he came might result in extreme hardship within the meaning of section 244 (a) (1), as amended, in certain circumstances, but the absence of substantial equities arising from the fact that after admission as a student and the residence in the United States for approximately eight years did not affirmatively establish extreme hardship.

Thus it can be seen that we did not preclude an alien who entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student from a grant of suspension of deportation pursuant to section 244 (a) (1) where there existed in a case equitable factors which resulted in a finding of exceptional hardship within the meaning of the statute. A close examination of the cases selected by the special inquiry officer discloses the existence of other favorable and equitable factors which resulted in a finding of exceptional hardship.1 Each case must be

1In one of the cases there was long residence of 25 years; in another, the alien had spent her formative years in the United States, all of her family ties and meaningful associations were in the United States and she was no longer familiar with the dialect which was the prevailing language of the island to which she would return; in still another case the alien had not resided in her native country, China, since she was 17 years old.

analyzed on the basis of the factual details present therein and each case must be considered on its own merits in making a finding of exceptional hardship. The line which may separate a finding of extreme hardship may be at times close, but it is based upon a study of the circumstances of each case and the presence of substantial equities.

ORDER: It is ordered that the order of the special inquiry officer dated February 10, 1965 be and the same is hereby approved.

MATTER OF YOUSSEF

In Deportation Proceedings

A-12640176

Decided by Board May 3, 1965

A student from the United Arab Republic who came to the United States on a scholarship from his government to do graduate work, having entered into a contract with his government not to marry without permission and to return and work for his government, and who, by his subsequent marriage to a United States citizen without permission, broke the contract, noncompliance with which committed him to refund all money received under the scholarship, is denied adjustment of status under section 245, Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, as a matter of discretion, in the absence of a showing that his government does not want him back, or that he has made adequate financial arrangements to discharge his obligation to his government, or that he has been relieved of this obligation.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952: Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Remained longer, student.

Respondent is a native and citizen of the United Arab Republic, 25 years of age, who was admitted to the United States on or about December 15, 1960, as a student. He was authorized to remain in this country in student status until November 21, 1963. In August 1964 the Service gave him one opportunity to depart voluntarily, but he failed to depart. Respondent is married to a United States citizen and applied for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The special inquiry officer granted his application. The trial attorney for the Immigration Service appeals from that order. The appeal will be sustained, and the application for adjustment will be denied.

The special inquiry officer reviewed respondent's background in some detail, and we will not repeat that discussion here. Respondent came to the United States on a scholarship from his government for the purpose of doing graduate work in this country. He signed an agreement with the Government of the United Arab Republic that

he would not marry without its permission, and that after obtaining a Ph.D. degree he would work for his government for a maximum period of seven years. If he did not comply with these conditions, he agreed to refund all money received by him in the form of salary and expenses while he was under scholarship. The respondent entered the United States on December 15, 1960. In 1961 he wrote the Embassy of the United Arab Republic in Washington, requesting permission to marry, and was informed that it was forbidden by law. On December 22, 1962, he married a United States citizen. On June 23, 1964, the Cultural Attache at his Embassy, Washington, wrote respondent (Ex. 3):

We have received advice from the Missions Department that the Missions Executive Committee has made the decision to end your mission since you have violated the law by marrying a foreigner. You are required to refund all salaries received and other expenses paid for you while under scholarship. I would like to hear from you as soon as you receive this letter.

On July 26, 1964, and again on September 28, 1964, respondent wrote the Embassy of the United Arab Republic in Washington, requesting an itemized statement of all money paid to him while under scholarship. He stated that he was financially unable to repay the money in one lump sum, that he would pay $200 a month until the entire amount was refunded, that he would commence making the monthly payments upón receiving an itemized statement of the money he owed his government. He believes that he owes approximately $10,000. His scholarship paid his tuition at the University of California, and in addition gave him $200 a month for living expenses.

Respondent testified on November 17, 1964, that he had never received an answer to his letters of July and September 1964. He asserted, and counsel stated before the Board, that respondent's agreement allowed him the option of repaying the money to his government and not returning personally, and that there is no basis for a conclusion that respondent wishes to renege on his contractual agreement.

The special inquiry officer stated that he considered himself bound in this matter by Matter of Wolfe, Int. Dec. No. 1368 (Acting Reg. Comm., June 23, 1964). He did not agree with Matter of Wolfe, stating that if he were to follow his own inclination he would deny adjustment of status, but it would be "presumptuous" for him to act contrary to the Service policy set forth in Matter of Wolfe. He said that "scores" of foreign students in the San Francisco District alone are permitted each year to adjust their status to that of permanent residents. Therefore, he granted respondent's application.

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