the facility of credit, and the facility with which debts may be cancelled by acts of insolvency. The more rigidly contracts are observed, the more rapidly will the capital of a country increase, the greater will be the inducements to industry, and the stronger will be the barriers against extravagance and vice.

Of the loan of other property.

The principles which apply in this case are very similar to those which have been already stated.

1. The lender is bound to furnish an article, which, so far as he knows, is adapted to the purposes of the borrower. That is, if the thing borrowed has any internal defect, he is bound to reveal it. If I loan a horse to a man who wishes to ride forty miles to-day, which I know is able to go but thirty, it is a fraud. If I let to a man a house which I know to be in the neighborhood of a nuisance, or to be, in part, uninhabitable from smoky chimneys, and do not inform him, it is fraud. The loss in the value of the property is mine, and I have no right to transfer it to another.

2. So the lender has a right to charge the market price arising from the considerations of use, risk, and variation in supply and demand. This depends upon the same principles as those already explained.

3. The borrower is bound to take the same care of the property of another, as he would of his own; to put it to no risk different from that specified or understood in the contract; and to pay the price, upon the principle stated above. Neither party has any right to influence the other by any motives extraneous to the simple business of the

transfer.

4. The borrower is bound to return the property loaned, precisely according to the contract. This includes both time and condition. He must return it at the time specified, and in the condition in which he received it, ordinary wear and tear only excepted. If I hire a house for a year, and so damage its paper and paint, that, before it can be let again, it will cost half the price of the rent to put it in repair, it is a gross fraud. I have, by negligence, or other cause, defrauded the owner of half his rent. It is just as

immoral as to pay him the whole, and then pick his pocket of the half of what he had received.

The important question arises here, If a loss happen while the property is in the hands of the borrower, on whom shall it fall? The principle I suppose to be this:

1. If it happen while the property is subject to the use specified in the contract, the owner bears it; because it is to be supposed that he foresaw the risk, and received remuneration for it. As he was paid for the risk, he, of course, has assumed it, and justly suffers it.

2. If the loss happen in consequence of any use not contemplated in the contract, then the borrower suffers it. He having paid nothing for insurance against this risk, there is nobody but himself to sustain it, and he sustains it accordingly. Besides, were any other principle adopted, it must put an end to the whole business of loaning; for no one would part with his property temporarily, to be used in any manner the borrower pleased, and be himself responsible for all the loss. If a horse die while I am using it well, and for the purpose specified, the owner suffers. If it die by careless driving, I suffer the loss. He is bound to furnish a good horse, and I a competent driver.

3. So, on the contrary, if a gain arise unexpectedly. If this gain was one which was contemplated in the contract, it belongs to the borrower. If not, he has no equitable claim to it. If I hire a farm, I am entitled, without any additional charge for rent, to all the advantages arising from the rise in the price of wheat, or from my own skill in agriculture. But if a mine of coal be discovered on the farm, I have no right to the benefit of working it; for I did not hire the farm for this purpose.

The case of insurance.

Here no transfer of property is made, and, of course, nothing is paid for use. But the owner chooses to transfer the risk of use from himself to others, and to pay, for their assuming this risk, a stipulated equivalent. The loss to society, of property insured, is just the same as when it is uninsured. A town is just as much poorer when property is destroyed that is insured, provided it be insured in the town, as though no insurance were effected. The only

difference is, that the loss is equalized. Ten men can more easily replace one hundred dollars apiece, who have nine hundred remaining, than the eleventh can replace his whole property of one thousand.

The rule in this case is simple. The insured is bound fully to reveal to the insurer every circumstance within his knowledge, which could in any measure affect the value of the risk; that is to say, the property must be, so far as he knows, what it purports to be, and the risks none other than such as he reveals them. If he expose the property to other risks, the insurance is void; and the underwriter, if the property be lost, refuses to remunerate him; and if it be safe, he returns the premium. If the loss occur within the terms of the policy, the insurer is bound fully and faithfully to make remuneration, precisely according to the terms of the contract.

As to the rate of insurance, very little need be said. It varies with every risk, and is made up of so many conflicting circumstances, that it must be agreed upon by the parties themselves. When the market in this species of traffic is unrestrained by monopolies, the price of insurance, like that of any other commodity, will regulate itself.

II. Next, where the equivalent is IMMATERIAL, as where one party pays remuneration for some service rendered by the other.

The principal cases here are these: That of master and servant, and that of principal and agent.

1. Of master and servant.

1. The master is bound to allow to the servant a fair remuneration. This is justly estimated by uniting the considerations of labor, skill, and fidelity, varied by the rise and fall of the price of such labor in the market. As this, however, would be liable to inconvenient fluctuation, it is generally adjusted by a rate agreed upon by the parties.

2. He is bound to allow him all the privileges to which moral law or established usage entitles him, unless something different from the latter has been stipulated in the contract; and he is at liberty to require of him service upon the same principles.

3. The servant is bound to perform the labor assigned

him by usage, or by contract (matters of conscience only excepted), with all the skill which he possesses, making the interests of the employer his own. If either party fail,that is, if the master demand service for which he does not render compensation, or if the servant receive wages for which he does not render the stipulated equivalent,-there is a violation of the right of property. Thus, also, there is a violation of right, if the master do not fulfil the terms of the contract, just as it was made; as, for instance, if he do not pay a servant punctually. When the service is performed, the wages belong to the servant, and the master has no more right to them than to the property of any one else. Thus saith St. James: "The hire of your laborers that have reaped your fields, that is kept back by fraud, crieth, and the cry is come into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth." And, on the contrary, the servant is bound to use his whole skill and economy in managing the property of his master ; and if he destroy it by negligence, or fault, he ought to make restitution.

2. Of principal and agent.

It frequently happens that, in the transaction of business, duties devolve upon an individual, which are to be discharged in different places at the same time. In other cases, in consequence of the subdivision of labor, he requires something to be done for him, which another person can do better than himself. In both cases, either from necessity, or for his own convenience and interest, he employs other men as agents.

Agencies are of two kinds; first, where the principal simply employs another to fulfil his own (that is, the principal's) will. Here, the principal's will is the rule, both as to the object to be accomplished, and the manner in which, and the means whereby, it is to be accomplished. Secondly. Where the principal only designates the objects to be accomplished, reposing special trust in the skill and fidelity of the agent as to the means by which it is to be accomplished. Such I suppose to be the case in regard to professional assistance.

The laws on this subject respect, first, the relation existing between the principal and the community; and,

secondly, the relation existing between the principal and agent.

I. The principal is bound by the acts of the agent, while the agent is employed in the business for which the principal has engaged him; but he is responsible no farther.

Thus, it is known that a merchant employs a clerk to receive money on his account. For his clerk's transactions in this part of his affairs he is responsible; but he would not be responsible, if money were paid to his porter or coachman, because he does not employ them for this purpose. Hence, if the clerk be unfaithful, and secrete the money, the merchant suffers; if the coachman receive the money, and be unfaithful, the payer suffers. It is the merchant's business to employ suitable agents; but it is the business of his customers to apply to those agents only, whom he has employed.

An important question arises here, namely, When is it to be understood that a principal has employed an agent? It is generally held that, if the principal acknowledge himself responsible for the acts of the agent, he is hereafter held to be responsible for similar acts, until he gives notice to the contrary.

II. Laws arising from the relation subsisting between the principal and the agent.

1. The laws respecting compensation are the same as those already specified, and, therefore, need not be repeated.

2. The agent is bound to give the same care to the affairs of the principal, as to his own. He is another self, and should act in that capacity. The necessity of this rule is apparent from the fact, that no other rule could be devised, either by which the one party would know what justly to demand, or the other when the demands of justice were fulfilled.

Hence, if an agent do not give all the care to the affairs of his principal that he would do to his own, and loss occur, he ought to sustain it. If a lawyer lose a cause through negligence, or palpable ignorance, he ought, in justice, to suffer the consequences. He receives fees for conducting the cause to the best of his ability, and, by undertaking to conduct it, puts it out of the power of the client to employ