cient, are equally the effects, not of the strength but of the weakness of the understanding. In questions, therefore, which have appeared to me either unimportant or of very dubious solution, I have thought it better to be silent, than to amuse the reader with those remarks in which I have myself found no satisfaction. In a very few cases, however, I have in some measure departed from this rule; and, in order to prevent the reader from being misled in a matter of consequence, by explanations more specious than solid, have even attempted to refute those solutions given by others which appeared to pervert the sense, though I had nothing satisfactory of my own to substitute in their place.* Having said thus much of the purposes for which the notes are not, it is proper now to mention those for which they are, intended.

10. First, then, as was hinted before, such different readings as affect the sense, and are tolerably supported by manuscripts, versions, or their own intrinsic evidence, insomuch that the judgments of the learned are divided concerning them, are commonly given in the notes; their evidence briefly stated; and the reason assigned for the reading adopted in the translation. In this I carefully avoid all minuteness, having no intention to usurp the province, or supersede the labours of those who have, with so much laudable care and diligence, collected those variations, and thereby facilitated the work of other critics. Indeed, as the variations are comparatively few which are entitled to a place here; and as, in those few, I do not enter into particulars, but only give what appears the result of the evidence on both sides; I cannot be said, in any respect, to interfere with the department of such critics as Mill and Wetstein. The little which occurs here ought, on the contrary, to serve as a spur to the learned reader, to the more assiduous study of this important branch of sacred literature. In like manner, variations of consequence, affecting the sense, in versions of such venerable antiquity as the Syriac and the Vulgate, though not accompanied with correspondent readings in any Greek copies, are not often passed over unobserved. In all dubious cases I give my reason for the reading preferred in this translation, whether it be the common reading or not; and, after mentioning the other, with what may be urged in its favour, leave the reader to his choice.

11. The other, and the principal end of these notes, is, to assign the reasons for the way wherein the words or sentences of the original are rendered in this translation. As it would have been improper, because unnecessary, to give a reason for the manner wherein every word, or even sentence, is translated, I shall here mention the particular cases in which it has been judged expedient to offer something in the notes in vindication of the version. The first is, when the rendering given to the

* See the note on Mark x. 30.

words does not coincide in meaning with that of the common version. Where the difference is manifestly and only in expression, to make remarks must generally appear superfluous; the matter ought to be left to the taste and discernment of the reader. To attempt a defence of every alteration of this kind, would both extend the notes to an unmeasurable length, and render them, for the most part, very insignificant.

But, secondly, there are a few instances wherein all the difference in the version may in fact be merely verbal, though not manifestly so; and therefore, as to the generality of readers, they will at first appear to affect the sense, it may be of consequence to take notice of them. The difference between sound and sense, the words and the meaning, though clearly founded in the nature of things, is not always so obvious as we should imagine. That, in language, the connexion between the sign and the thing signified is merely artificial, cannot admit a question. Yet the tendency of the mind, when much habituated to particular sounds as the signs of certain conceptions, is to put both on the footing of things naturally connected. In consequence of this, a difference only in expression may appear to alter the sentiment, or at least very much to enervate and obscure it. For this reason, in a few cases wherein the change made on the place is in effect merely verbal, I have, to obviate mistakes, and to show that in alterations even of this kind I have been determined by reasons which appear to me weighty, attempted a brief illustration in the

notes.

Thirdly, in certain cases, wherein there is no difference between the common translation and the present, either in thought or in expression, but wherein both differ from that of other respectable interpreters, or wherein the common version has been combated by learned critics, I have assigned my reasons for concurring with the English translators, and for not being determined by such criticisms, though ingenious, and though supported by writers of character. This is the more necessary, as there has been of late, both abroad and at home, a profusion of criticisms on the sacred text; and many new versions have been attempted, especially in France and England. As these must be supposed to have had some influence on critical readers, it would have been improper to overlook entirely their remarks. Such, therefore, as seem to be of moment, and have come to my knowledge, or occurred to my memory, I have occasionally taken notice of. This I have done, with a view sometimes to confirm their reasoning, sometimes to confute it, or at least to show that it is not so decisive as a sanguine philologist (for even philologists are sometimes sanguine in deciding) is apt to imagine. In this article the learned reader will find many omissions, arising partly from forgetfulness, and partly from the different judgments which are inevitably formed by different persons concerning the import

ance of particular criticisms. When the decision of any point may be said to depend, in whole or in part, on what has been discussed in the Preliminary Dissertations, I always, to avoid repetitions, refer to the paragraph or paragraphs of the Dissertation where such a discussion is to be found.

12. Another purpose for which I have sometimes employed the notes, is the explanation of a name or word, which, though from scriptural use it be familiar to our ears, has little currency in conversation, because rarely or never applied to any common subject. Of this kind are the words parable, publican, scribe, of which I have attempted an explanation in the notes: add to these, all the terms which, though current in conversation, have something peculiar in their scriptural application. I have generally avoided employing words in meanings which they never bear in ordinary use. As it is from the prevailing use that words, as signs, may be said to originate, and by it that their import is ascertained, such peculiarities rarely fail to create some obscurity. There are nevertheless instances in all languages, in which, on certain subjects, (for religion is not singular in this,) common terms have something peculiar in their application. In such cases, we cannot avoid the peculiarity of meaning without having recourse to circumlocution, or such other expedients as would injure the simplicity of the expression, and give the appearance of affectation to the language. When, therefore, I have thought it necessary to employ such words, I have endeavoured to ascertain the scriptural acceptation in the notes; or, if the explanation has been anticipated in these Dissertations, I have referred to the place. Of such peculiarities, which are far from being numerous in this version, the following will serve as examples :

The first shall be the word lawyer, which I have, after the old translators, retained as the version of vouoc; not that it entirely answers in the Gospel to the English use, but because it has what I may call an analogical propriety, and bears nearly the same relation to their word vouos, that the word lawyer bears to our word law. The deviation from common use is at most not greater than that of the words patron and client in the translation of any Roman historian. Some, indeed, have chosen to render voμukoç, scribe; and others, for the same reason, to render γραμμαTEVç, lawyer, because in one instance a person called voμukoç in one Gospel, Matt. xxii. 35, is named in another γραμματεύς, Mark xii. 28. But this argument is not conclusive. "Jonathan, David's uncle," we are told, 1 Chron. xxvii. 32, was a counsellor, a wise man, and a scribe." Can we infer from this that these are synonymous words? The contrary, I think, may be concluded with much greater reason. If, then, Jonathan had been called by one historian barely a counsellor, and by another barely a scribe, it would not have been just to infer that counsellor and scribe, though both in this instance applicable to the same

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person, are words of the same import. Yet the argument is no better in the present case. That there is, however, an affinity in their significations, can hardly be doubted, as both belonged to the literary profession, which was not very extensive among the Jews. But that they are not entirely coincident, may be inferred from a passage in Luke, (ch. xi. 45,) where we are informed that our Lord, after severely censuring the practices of the Scribes, yoaμμares, and Pharisees, is addressed in this manner by one of the vouкo who happened to be present: "Master, thus saying, thou reproachest us also." That the reproach extended to them he infers from the thing said, "thus saying;" but there had been no occasion for inference if they had been addressed by their common appellation, and if scribe and lawyer had meant the same thing. Neither in that case could he have said " us also," that is, us as well as those whom thou hast named, the Scribes and Pharisees. Our Lord's reply (ver. 46,) makes it, if possible, still more evident, that though what he had said did indeed comprehend them, the title which he had used did not necessarily imply so much : "Woe unto YOU ALSO, ye lawyers," KAI ΥΜΙΝ τοις νομικοις ουαι; which could not have been so expressed if the denunciation immediately preceding had been addressed to them by name. Others think voμukoç equivalent to voμodidασкaλoç, rendering both doctor of the law. But as we have not sufficient evidence that there is in these a perfect coincidence in meaning, and as they are differently rendered in the Syriac version, it is better to preserve the distinction which the original makes, at least in the names.

Another example of a small deviation from familiar language is in the word sinner, auaprwλos, which, in common use, is applicable to every rational being not morally perfect, but frequently in Scripture denotes a person of a profligate life. Now, as the frequency of this application, and the nature of the occurrences, remove all doubt as to the meaning, it may be considered as one of those Hebrew idioms which it is proper in a translator to preserve. Neither desert nor wilderness exactly corresponds to tonuos in the New Testament;* but they are near enough to answer the purpose better than a periphrasis. The like may be said of neighbour, which, in familiar language, is never used with so great latitude as in holy writ. And in general, when words in scriptural use are accompanied with perspicuity, they ought to be preferred to words in greater currency which are not used in the common translation; and that even though the import of these more familiar words should be sufficiently apposite. It is for this reason alone, that, in relation to human characters, we should reckon it more suitable to the language of the Spirit to say righteous than virtuous, just than honest.

*See Note on Mark i. S.

13. The only other use I have made of the notes, and that but seldom, is to remark passingly what may serve either to illustrate the character of the style of those writings, or to display the spirit which every-where animates them: for in these we discover the intrinsic evidences they carry of a divine original. This has induced me, sometimes, to take notice also of the moral lessons to which some things naturally lead the attention of the serious reader. There is not on this ground the same hazard, as on the speculative questions of school divinity, of rousing even among Christians a whole host of opponents, or stirring up unedifying and undeterminable disputes. Practical observations, though too little minded, are hardly ever controverted. Besides, they are not of that kind of questions which genders strife, but are most evidently of that which ministers godly edifying. On this article some will think that I have been too sparing; but, in my judgment, it is only in very particular cases that the introduction of such hints is pertinent in a scholiast. When the scope of the text is manifestly practical, it is enough that we attend to the sacred authors. To enforce what they say, by obtruding on the reader remarks to the same purpose, might appear a superfluous, or even officious interruption. The effect is fully as bad when the observation, however good in itself, appears far-fetched for the best things do not answer out of place. Perhaps the least exceptionable account that can be given of such remarks as are at once pertinent and efficacious, is, that they arise naturally, though not obviously, out of the subject.

14. To conclude: As I do not think it the best way of giving an impartial hearing to the sacred authors, to interrupt the reading of them every moment, for the sake of consulting either the glosses or the annotations of expositors, I have avoided offering any temptation to this practice, having placed the notes at the end. When a portion of Scripture, such as one of the sections of this version, is intended to be read, it is better to read it to an end without interruption. The scope of the whole is in this way more clearly perceived, as well as the connexion of the parts. Whereas, when the reader finds the text and the notes on the same page, and under his eye at once, the latter tend too evidently to awaken his curiosity, and, before he has proceeded in the former far enough to have a distinct view of the scope of the passage, to call off his attention; but when they are separated, as in this work, it may be supposed, that a reader will finish at least a paragraph before he turn over to a distant part of the book. This method gives this advantage even to the notes, if judicious, that as the argument there used in favour of a particular reading, or of a particular rendering of a sentence, is often drawn from the scope and connexion of the place, he will be better qualified to judge of the justness of the criticism. It ought always to be remembered, that an acquaintance with the