acknowledgment, suppressed many readings he was possessed of. Simon takes notice of the same thing.* And it must be owned, that Beza's conduct in other particulars gives ground to suspect, that his impartiality, in a matter of this kind, was not to be relied on. The only other editor I know, who has had recourse to guessing for the improvement of his text, is the English translator in 1729, often before mentioned. He has, along with his version, republished the Greek text, corrected, as he pretends, from authentic manuscripts. It does not, however, appear that he has been guided by critical principles in judging of manuscripts, or of the preference due to particular readings. His chief rule seems to have been their conformity to his own notions, which has led him to employ a boldness in correcting altogether unwarrantable. 99 6. What follows may serve as evidence of this. Dr. Mill was so much pleased with a correction proposed by Bentley,† as to say, "Mihi tantopere placet hæc lectio, ut absque unanimi codicum in altera ista lectione consensu, genuinam eam intrepide pronunciarem;" to which our editor gives this brief and contemptuous reply,- "As if there was any manuscript so old as coMMON SENSE." The greatest regard is doubtless due to common sense; but where the subject is matter of fact, the proper province of common sense lies in comparing and judging the proofs brought before it, not in supplying from invention any deficiency in these. Common sense, or rather reason, is the judge in the trial: manuscripts, versions, quotations, &c. are the testimonies. It would be a bad scheme in civil matters to supersede the examination of witnesses, on pretence that the sagacity of the judge rendered it unnecessary. Yet it might be pretended, that his penetration is such that he can discover, at a glance, the truth or the falsity of the charge, from the bare physiognomy of the parties. But can you imagine, that people would think their lives, liberties, and properties, secure in a country where this were the method of trial? Or will this method, think you, be found to answer better in critical than in judicial matters? If, under the name of COMMON SENSE, we substitute the critic's fancy in the room of testimony and all external evidence, we shall find, that we have established a test of criticism which is infinitely various, not in different sects only, but in different individuals. The common sense of the aforesaid English editor, and the common sense of Beza, (yet neither of them was destitute of this quality,) would, I am afraid, have not very often coincided. 7. Shall we then set aside reason, or common sense, in such inquiries? On the contrary, no step can properly be taken without it. The judge is necessary in the trial, so are the witHist. Crit. du N. T. lib. ii. cap. 29. + The passage on which the correction was proposed is Gal, iv. 25. nesses: but there will be an end of all fairness, and an introduction to the most arbitrary proceedings, if the former be made to supply the place of both. In cases of this kind, we ought always to remember that the question, wherever any doubt arises, is a question of fact, not a question of right or of abstract truth. It is, 'What was said;' not 'What should have been said;' or 'What we ourselves would have said,' had we been in the author's place. This is what we never mistake in the explanation of any Pagan writer, or of any modern, but are very apt to mistake in the explanation of the Bible. If a Christian of judgment and knowledge were translating the Alcoran, there would be no risk of his confounding things so manifestly distinct. The reason is, such a translator's concern would only be to give the meaning of his author, without either inquiring, or minding, whether it were agreeable or contrary to his own sentiments. Whereas it is a thousand to one that the Christian, of whatever denomination he be, has, previously to his entering on the interpretation, gotten a set of opinions concerning those points about which Scripture is conversant. As these opinions have acquired a certain firmness through habit, and as a believer in Christianity cannot, consistently, maintain tenets which he sees to be repugnant to the doctrines contained in Scripture, he will find it easier (unless possessed of an uncommon share of candour and discernment) to bring, by his ingenuity, (especially when aided by conjectural emendations,) the dictates of revelation to a conformity to his opinions, than to bring his opinions to a conformity to the dictates of revelation. This tendency is the real cause of so much straining as is sometimes to be found in the manner of criticising holy writ; straining, let me add, to a degree which we never see exemplified in interpreting any classical author. In the latter we are comparatively little interested, and are therefore ready to admit, on many occasions, that such are the sentiments expressed in his writings, though very different from our sentiments. But as Christians will not admit this with regard to the Bible, they have often no other resource, but either to wrest its words or to change their own opinions. Which of these ways will be oftener taken, it is not difficult to say. 8. I have often wished (if such a person could be found,) that an infidel of sufficient learning, penetration, coolness, and candour, would, merely for the sake of illustrating what must be allowed, even by him, to be curious pieces of ancient literature, undertake the translation of the sacred books. Such a man would have no bias upon his mind to induce him to wrest the words, in order to make them speak his own sentiments; and if he had the genuine spirit of the philosopher, historian, or antiquary, he would be solicitous to exhibit the manners, opinions, customs, and reasonings of those early ages, fairly as he found them, without adding any thing of his own either to exalt or to depress the original. I should not think it impossible to find so much fairness in a Christian, who, having resided long in India, and understood their sacred language, should undertake to translate to us the Scriptures of the Bramins; but such impartiality in an infidel living in a Christian country, would be, I fear, a chimerical expectation. There is, however, I acknowledge, a considerable difference in the cases. We view with different eyes the opinions of remote ages and distant nations, from those wherewith we contemplate the sentiments of the times in which, and the people amongst whom, we live. The observation of our Lord holds invariably: "He who is not for us, is against us; and he who gathereth not with us, scattereth," Matt. xii. 30. We find no examples of neutrality in this cause: Whoever is not a friend is an enemy; and for this reason, without any violation of charity, we may conclude that the interpretation of Scripture is safer in the hands of the bigoted sectary than in those of the opinionative infidel, whose understanding is blinded by the most inflexible and the most unjust of all passions, an inveterate contempt. Hatred, when alone, may be prevailed on to inquire, and, in consequence of inquiry, may be surmounted; but when hatred is accompanied with contempt, it spurns inquiry as ridiculous. 9. But, it may be said, though this may be justly applied to the confirmed infidel, it is not applicable to the sceptic, who, because on both sides of the question he finds difficulties which he is not able to surmount, is perplexed with doubts in relation to it. I am sensible of the difference, and readily admit that what I said of the infidel does not apply to the last mentioned character. At the same time I must observe, that those just now described appear to be a very small number, and are not the people whom the world at present commonly calls sceptics. This, on the contrary, like the term free-thinker, is become merely a softer and more fashionable name for infidel; for, on all these points wherein the sceptics of the age differ from Christians, they will be found to the full as dogmatical as the most tenacious of their adversaries.* Such at least is the manner of The only exception which has appeared in this age, (if we can account one an exception who has done so much to undermine in others a belief with which at times he seems himself to have been strongly impressed,) is that eminent but anomalous genius, Rousseau. He had the sensibility to feel strongly, if I may so express myself, the force of the internal evidence of our religion, resulting from the character, the life, and the death of its author, the purity and the sublimity of his instructions; he had the sagacity to discern, and the candour to acknowledge, that the methods employed by infidels in accounting for these things are frivolous, and, to every ra tional inquirer, unsatisfactory. At the same time, through the unhappy influence of philosophical prejudices, insensible of the force of the external evidence of prophecy and miracles, he did not scruple to treat every plea of this kind as absurd, employing against the same religion even the poorest cavils that are any-where to be found in the writings of infidels. Nay, for this purpose he mustered up a world of objections, without ever discovering that he mistook the subject of dispute, and confounded the those who, in modern Europe, affect to be considered as philosophical sceptics. 10. But, to return to the consideration of the first printed editions, from which it may be thought I have digressed too far; what has been said sufficiently shows that they are not entitled to more credit than is due to the manuscripts from which they were compiled. Nobody ascribes inspiration, or any supernatural direction, to the first editors; and as to advantages merely natural, they were not on an equal footing with the critics of after-times. The most valuable manuscripts, far from being then generally known, remained scattered throughout the world. A few might fall under the notice of one curious inquirer, another few under that of another; but there had not been any number of them yet collated, and consequently their various readings had not been collected and published. Nay, that the judgment of those editors, concerning the antiquity and correctness of the manuscripts which they used, cannot be implicitly relied on, may warrantably be concluded from this circumstance, that this species of criticism was but in its infancy, and that even learned men had not then, as now, the necessary means; of qualifying themselves for judging of the antiquity and correctness of manuscripts. Besides, those publishers themselves were not unanimous; nor were the alterations made by those of them who were posterior in time always for the better. "I am amazed," says Michaelis,* very justly, "when I hear some vindicate our common readings, as if the editors had been inspired by the Holy Ghost." Is it possible, then, to assign a satisfactory reason for the determination of Bengelius, not to admit any reading which had not the support of some former printed edition? “Ne syllabam quidem, etiamsi mille MSS. mille critici juberent, antehac [in editionibus] non receptam, adducar ut recipiam." He has not indeed confined himself in his choice of readings to any one edition, but has excluded entirely from his text those readings which, however well supported, no preceding editor had adopted. This rule which he laid down to himself is manifestly indefensible, inasmuch as the authority of the printed editions must ultimately rest on that of the manuscripts from which they are taken: whereas it can give no additional value to the manuscripts, that some of the first publishers have thought fit to prefer them, perhaps injudiciously, to others; or, to speak more properly, have thought fit to copy them as the best they had. Their merit depends entirely on the evidences we have of their own antiquity, doctrine of particular sects or denominations of Christians with the doctrine of Christ. The articles against which his artillery is generally pointed, are the comments of later ages, and not the pure dictates of holy writ. See the character of this extraordinary man, (whom I here consider only as a sceptic,) as delineated by the masterly pen of Dr. Beattie.-Essay on Truth, part iii. chap. 2. Introduct. Lect. sect. 34. + Prodromus. accuracy, &c.; for none surely will be hardy enough to say, that errors, by being printed, will be converted into truths. : 11. The only cause which I can assign for the resolution taken by Bengelius, though of no weight in the scales of criticism and philosophy, may merit some regard, viewed in a prudential and political light. The printed copies are in every body's hands; the manuscripts are known to very few and though the easy multiplication of the copies by the press will not be considered, by any person who reflects, as adding any authority to the manuscripts from which they were taken, it has nevertheless the same effect on the generality of mankind as if it did. Custom, the duration and the extent of their reception, are powerful supports with the majority of readers. The reason, therefore, which has influenced that learned editor is at bottom, I suppose, the same that influenced Jerom when revising the old Latin version, not to correct every thing which he was sensible stood in need of correction, that he might not, by the number and boldness of his alterations, scandalize the people. But this is a motive of a kind totally different from those which arise from critical considerations, and ought not to be confounded with them. 12. I do not mean to say that this is a motive to which no regard should be shown. There are two cases in which, in my opinion, it ought to determine the preference: first, when the arguments in favour of one reading appear exactly balanced by those in favour of another; secondly, when the difference in reading cannot be said to affect either the sense or the perspicuity of the sentence. In the former case, when no better rule of decision can be discovered, it is but reasonable that custom should be allowed to decide: In the latter, as we ought to avoid, especially in a version, introducing alterations of no significance, it might be justly accounted trifling to take notice of such differences. In other cases we ought to be determined by the rules of criticism; that is, in other words, by the evidence impartially examined. As to which I shall only add, that though much regard is due to the number of manuscripts, editions, versions, &c., yet, in ascertaining the preference, we ought not to be determined solely by the circumstance of number. The testimony of a few credible witnesses outweighs that of many who are of doubtful character. Besides, there are generally internal marks of credibility or incredibility in the thing testified, which ought always to have some influence on the decision. 13. At the same time, I cannot help disapproving the admission of any correction (where the expression, as it stands in the text, is not downright nonsense) merely on conjecture: for, were such a method of correcting to be generally adopted, no bound could be set to the freedom which would be used with sacred writ. We should very soon see it a perfect Babel in language, as various in its style in different editions as are the dialects of our |