apply it also to five other ceremonies, in all seven. Yet even this application is not of equal latitude with that wherein it is used in the Vulgate. The sacrament of God's will,* the sacrament of piety, † the sacrament of a dream, the sacrament of the seven stars, § and the sacrament of the woman, || are phrases which sound very strangely in our ears.

12. So much for the introduction of the term sacrament into the Christian theology, which (however convenient it may be for expressing some important rites in our religion) has, in none of the places where it occurs in the Vulgate, a reference to any rite or ceremony whatever, but is always the version of the Greek word μvorηpiov, or the corresponding term in Hebrew or Chaldee. Now the term μvornoiov, as has been shown, is always predicated of some doctrine, or of some matter of fact, wherein it is the intention of the writer to denote, that the information he gives either was a secret formerly, or is the latent meaning of some type, allegory, figurative description, dream, vision, or fact referred to. No religion abounded more in pompous rites and ordinances than the Jewish, yet they are never in Scripture (any more than the ceremonies of the New Testament) denominated either mysteries or sacraments. Indeed with us Protestants, the meanings in present use assigned to these two words are so totally distinct, the one relating solely to doctrine the other solely to positive institutions, that it may look a little oddly to bring them together in the discussion of the same critical question. But to those who are acquainted with Christian antiquity, and foreign use in these matters, or have been accustomed to the Vulgate translation, there will be no occasion for an apology.

μυστηριον,

13. Before I finish this topic, it is proper to take notice of one passage, wherein the word μvornotov, it may be plausibly urged, must have the same sense with that which present use gives to the English word mystery, and denote something which, though revealed, is inexplicable, and to human faculties unintelligible. The words are, "Without controversy great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory," 1 Tim. iii. 16. I do not here inquire into the justness of this reading, though differing from that of the two most ancient versions, the Syriac and the Vulgate, and some of the oldest manuscripts. The words, as they stand, sufficiently answers my purpose. Admit, then, that some of the great articles enumerated may be justly called mysteries in the ecclesiastical and present acceptation of the term, it does not follow that this is the sense of the term here. When a word in a sentence of holy writ is susceptible of two interpretations, so that the sentence, whichsoever of the two ways the word be in* Eph. i. 9. Dan. ii. 18, 30, 47,

1 Tim. iii. 16.

§ Rev. i. 20.

|| Rev. xvii. 7.

terpreted, conveys a distinct meaning suitable to the scope of the place--and when one of these interpretations expresses the common import of the word in holy writ, and the other assigns it a meaning which it plainly has not in any other passage of Scripture-the rules of criticism manifestly require that we recur to the common acceptation of the term. Nothing can vindicate us in giving it a singular, or even a very uncommon signification, but that all the more usual meanings would make the sentence involve some absurdity or nonsense. This is not the case here: The purport of the sentence plainly is, "Great unquestionably is the divine secret, of which our religion brings the discovery: God was manifest in the flesh," &c.

PART II.

OF BLASPHEMY.

I PROPOSED, in the second place, to offer a few thoughts on the import of the word Bλaopnua, frequently translated blasphemy. I am far from affirming, that the present use of the English word there is such a departure from the import of the original, as in that remarked in the preceding article between μvornoiov and mystery; at the same time it is proper to observe, that in most cases there is not a perfect coincidence. Bλaopnua properly denotes calumny, detraction, reproachful or abusive language, against whomsoever it be vented. There does not seem, therefore, to have been any necessity for adopting the Greek word into our language, one or other of the English expressions above mentioned being in every case sufficient for conveying the sense. Here, as in other instances, we have, with other moderns, implicitly followed the Latins, who had in this no more occasion than we for a phraseology not originally of their own growth. To have uniformly translated, and not transferred, the words Blaopnμia and Blaopnμev, would have both contributed to perspicuity, and tended to detect the abuse of the terms when wrested from their proper meaning. That Blaopnuua and its conjugates are in the New Testament very often applied to reproaches not aimed against God, is evident from the passages referred to in the margin; in the much greater part of which the English translators, sensible that they could admit no such application, have not used the words blaspheme or blasphemy, but rail, revile, speak evil, &c. In one of the passages quoted, (Jude 9,) a reproachful charge brought even against the devil is called κρισις βλασφημίας, and rendered by them railing accusation. That the word in some * Matt. xii. 31, 32; xxvii. 39. Mark xv. 29. Luke xxii. 65; xxiii. 39. Rom. ii. 8; xiv. 16. 1 Cor. iv. 13; x. 30. Eph. iv. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 4, 14. Jude 9, 10. Acts vi. 11, 13. 2 Pet. ii. 10, 11.

other places* ought to have been rendered in the same general terms, I shall afterwards show. But with respect to the principal point, that the word comprehends all verbal abuse, against whomsoever uttered, God, angel, man, or devil,-as it is universally admitted by the learned, it would be losing time to attempt to prove. The passages referred to will be more than sufficient to all who can read them in the original Greek.

2. But it deserves our notice, and it is principally for this reason that I judged it proper to make some remarks on the word, that, even when Bλaopnuua refers to reproachful speeches against God, and so comes nearer the meaning of our word blasphemy, still the primitive notion of this crime has undergone a considerable change in our way of conceiving it. The causes it would not perhaps be difficult to investigate, but the effect is undeniable. In theological disputes, nothing is more common, to the great scandal of the Christian name, than the imputation of blasphemy thrown by each side upon the other. The injustice of the charge, on both sides, will be manifest on a little reflection, which it is the more necessary to bestow, as the commonness of the accusation, and the latent but contagious motives of employing it, have gradually perverted our conceptions of the thing.

Thus

3. It has been remarked already, that the import of the word Blaopnua is maledicentia, in the largest acceptation, comprehending all sorts of verbal abuse, imprecation, reviling, and calumny. Now let it be observed, that when such abuse is mentioned as uttered against God, there is properly no change made on the signification of the word-the change is only in the application, that is, in reference to a different object. The idea conveyed in the explanation now given is always included, against whomsoever the crime be committed. In this manner every term is understood that is applicable to both God and man. the meaning of the word disobey is the same, whether we speak of disobeying God or of disobeying man. The same may be said of believe, honour, fear, &c. As therefore the sense of the term is the same, though differently applied, what is essential to constitute the crime of detraction in the one case, is essential also in the other. But it is essential to this crime, as commonly understood, when committed by one man against another, that there be in the injurious person the will or disposition to detract from the person abused. Mere mistake in regard to character, especially when the mistake is not conceived, by him who entertains it, to lessen the character, nay, is supposed, however erroneously, to exalt it, is never construed by any into the crime of defamation. Now, as blasphemy is, in its essence, the same crime, but immensely aggravated, by being committed against an object infinitely superior to man, what is fundamental to the existence of the crime will be found in this, as in every other species which * Acts xiii. 45; xviii. 6; xxvi. 11. Col. iii. 8. 1 Tim. i. 13. 2 Tim. iii. 2.

comes under the general name. There can be no blasphemy, 'therefore, where there is not an impious purpose to derogate from the Divine Majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God.

4. Hence, we must be sensible of the injustice of so frequently using the odious epithet blasphemous in our controversial writings; an evil imputable solely to the malignity of temper which a habit of such disputation rarely fails to produce. Hence it is, that the Arminian and the Calvinist, the Arian and the Athanasian, the Protestant and the Papist, the Jesuit and the Jansenist, throw and retort on each other the unchristian reproach. Yet it is no more than justice to say, that each of the disputants is so far from intending to diminish, in the opinion of others, the honour of the Almighty, that he is, on the contrary, fully convinced that his own principles are better adapted to raise it than those of his antagonist, and for that very reason he is so strenuous in maintaining them. But to blacken as much as possible the designs of an adversary, in order the more effectually to render his opinions hateful, is one of the many common, but detestable, resources of theological controvertists. It is to be hoped that the sense, not only of the injustice of this measure, but of its inefficacy for producing conviction in the mind of a reasonable antagonist, and of the bad impression it tends to make on the impartial and judicious in regard both to the arguers and to the argument, will at length induce men to adopt more candid methods of managing their disputes; and, even when provoked by the calumnious and angry epithets of an opposer, not to think of retaliating, but to remember, that they will derive more honour from imitating, as is their duty, the conduct of Him who, when he was reviled, reviled not again.

5. But, after observing that this perversion of the word blasphemy results, for the most part, from the intemperate heat and violence with which polemic writers manage their religious contests, it is no more than doing justice to theologians and ecclesiastics (though it may look like a digression) to remark, that this evidence of undue acrimony, is by no means peculiar to them. So uncontrollable is this propensity in men of violent passions, that even sceptics cannot pretend an entire exemption from it. Some allowances ought doubtless to be made for the rage of bigots, inflamed by contradiction, from the infinite consequence they always ascribe to their own religious dogmas; but when a reasoner, an inquirer into truth, and consequently a dispassionate and unprejudiced person, (and doubtless such a man Lord Bolingbroke chose to be accounted,) falls into the same absurdity, adopts the furious language of fanaticism, and rails against those whose theory he combats, calling them impious blasphemers, to what allowance can we justly think him entitled? I know of none except our pity; to which indeed, a manner so much beneath the dignity of the phi

losopher, and unbecoming the patience and self-command implied in cool inquiry, seems to give him a reasonable claim. Since, however, with this defect of discernment, candour, and moderation, philosophers as well as zealots, infidels as well as fanatics, and men of the world as well as priests, are sometimes chargeable, it may not be unreasonable to bestow a few reflections on it.

6. First, to recur to analogy, and the reason of the thing: I believe there are few who have not sometimes had occasion to hear a man warmly, and with the very best intentions, commend another for an action which in reality merited not praise but blame. Yet no man would call the person who through simplicity acted this part a slanderer, whether the fact be related of his friend were true or false, since he seriously meant to raise esteem of him; for an intention to depreciate is essential to the idea of slander. To praise injudiciously is one thing, to slander is another. The former, perhaps, will do as much hurt to the character which is the subject of it, as the latter; but the merit of human actions depends entirely on the motive. There is a maliciousness in the calumniator, which no person who reflects is in danger of confounding with the unconscious blundering of a man whose praise detracts from the person whom he means to honour. The blasphemer is no other than the calumniator of Almighty God. To constitute the crime, it is as necessary that this species of calumny be intentional as that the other be. He must be one, therefore, who, by his impious talk, endeavours to inspire others with the same irreverence towards the Deity, or perhaps abhorrence of him, which he indulges in himself. And though, for the honour of human nature, it is to be hoped that very few arrive at this enormous guilt, it ought not to be dissembled, that the habitual profanation of the name and attributes of God, by common swearing, is but too manifest an approach towards it. There is not an entire coincidence: The latter of these vices may be considered as resulting solely from the defect of what is good in principle and disposition; the former, from the acquisition of what is evil in the extreme; but there is a close connexion between them, and an insensible gradation from the one to the other. To accustom one's self to treat the Sovereign of the universe with irreverent familiarity is the first step; malignly to arraign his attributes, and revile his providence, is the last.

7. But it may be said, that an inquiry into the proper notion of Blaopnua, in the sacred writings, is purely a matter of criticism concerning the import of a word, whose signification must be ultimately determined by scriptural use. Our reasonings, therefore, are of no validity, unless they are supported by fact. True; but it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that as the word Blaopnuev, when men are the objects, is manifestly used for intentional abuse, the presumption is, that the signification is the same when God is the object. Nay, according to the rules of criticism,