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CHAPTER IV.

I.

THE ENDS FOR WHICH MIRACLES MAY BE WROUGHT, AS DISCOVERED BY REASON,

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O pretend to investigate all the various ends and particular designs which the divine wisdom has ever had, or may have, in performing miracles, would be presumptuous; for "who has known the sense of the Lord, or who hath been His counsellor?” Rom. xi. 14. Still it is important to examine what can be known with certainty on this head, not only because the enemies of Christianity assert that no good end can be attained by miracles, but also because some Christians seem to think this argument sufficient to disprove the continuation and existence of them in these later ages of the Church. They allege that, as the Gospel is now sufficiently confirmed and widely propagated, it seems unnecessary that God should any more interpose by miracles, and therefore they conclude that in fact He does not.

This argument assumes that the propagation and confirmation of the Gospel is the only end worthy of God's interposition; but even were this the case, the conclusion would not follow, seeing that the planting the Gospel among heathen nations, who have not yet received it, must require the assistance of miracles, as well as the

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first planting it did in those nations who have long since embraced it. The difficulties in this great work are no less now among heathen nations than they were at the beginning of Christianity; and the majority of men are still as incapable of understanding the rational arguments and proofs in favour of the Christian religion as Our ancestors were at the time of their conversion: nor can it be thought that the present heathen world would give either the time or application necessary for examining these proofs, even though it had sufficient capacity for doing so.

But miracles are a language suited to all. They require no time nor application of study to comprehend them; they conquer at once, and convince at sight. They are the most certain means of gaining the ends intended, and of subduing the obstinacy of the heart of man. Even were it true, then, that the propagation of the Gospel was the only end worthy of God's interposing by miracles, still we might reasonably expect from a God of infinite goodness that He would continue from time to time to perform them, at least for the propagation of His Gospel among those heathen nations who as yet do not know Him. But if we refect, we shall see that the propagation of the Gospel, though doubtless a very principal end of miracles, is by no means the only one, and that there are others which have been actually judged by God Himself worthy of such interposition.

IL. First, from the very nature of miracles, as above explained, it is evident that no operation whatever, no possible effect produced in the creation, can be miraculous with regard to God, or wonderful in His sight. He thoroughly knows all that can be known concerning every possible edect or operation in His creatures, and also He possesses in Himself a power not only adequate,

but infinitely superior, to every possible effect producible in them; so that nothing is either hard or difficult to Him. With the same ease that He maintains the present order in the universe, He can in a moment alter or destroy it. With the same ease that He created all things at the beginning, He can, if He pleases, reduce them again to nothing; and consequently, with respect to the almighty power of God, the most stupendous work in the creation is as easy as the smallest, and infinitely more so to Him than the throwing a stone upwards, contrary to the laws of gravity, is to man. It is enough that He wills anything to be done; and be it what it may, great or small, His all-powerful will is instantly obeyed.

Secondly, No change, alteration, or unusual effect produced in the material insensible part of the universe -merely as such, that is, when considered only in itself, without relation to sensible or intelligent creatures -can properly be called either good or evil. Our idea of evil seems always to include a relation to sensible or intelligent beings, and consists either in making them unhappy by suffering, or in bringing upon them moral guilt and turpitude, which is disgraceful to their nature, and renders them odious in the eyes of their Creator. The evil of guilt and the evil of suffering, therefore, are the only things we mean by the word evil, in the strict and proper acceptation of the term. Now these, it is plain, can have place only in intelligent creatures, and not in the mere material parts of the creation the former only being capable of suffering or guilt, but not the latter. Whatever change or alteration can be produced in material beings, may alter their form, motion, or the configuration of their parts; but nothing of this enters into the proper idea of evil.

Thirdly, As the very essence of evil consists in ren

dering intelligent creatures guilty or miserable; so good, being the contrary of evil, is, properly speaking, whatever renders these creatures innocent, virtuous, or happy; and the more anything contributes to this, the greater and more excellent it is. Mr Hutchison, in his admirable treatise of moral philosophy, speaking on this subject, very justly observes, "that our moral sense or conscience is implanted in us by the Author of our being as the proper judge of what is good and evil, and that the several objects which this judge approves as good are only such as have these two qualities-a tendency to the happiness of others, and a tendency to the moral perfection of the mind possessing them; and that the objects which this judge condemns as evil, are such as have the contrary tendencies." From this we justly infer that no change or effect produced in the inanimate creation, which is incapable of moral perfection or of happiness, can properly be called either good or evil, and that these can have place only in sensible or intelligent

creatures.

Fourthly, Our idea of God as a Being infinitely perfect, convinces us that He must essentially approve and desire the moral excellence and virtuous perfection of His creatures; and that the procuring this is an object worthy of His divine goodness and sanctity. On the contrary, we feel that He must detest and abhor moral turpitude in His creatures, and that to prohibit and prevent this is highly becoming His divine goodness and sanctity. In fact, what is this moral sense or conscience implanted in us by the Creator but the promulgation of His law in our hearts-the manifestation of His will, declaring in the most touching manner what He requires from us the most intimate and convincing proof that He wills our moral excellence and perfection, and

severely prohibits our moral turpitude? The whole exterior manifestation of His will to man by revelation, both in the old and new law, proves this truth, as the uniform tendency of revelation is to exhort, persuade, encourage, and assist us to advance and improve our souls in virtue and perfection, and to prohibit and deter us from the contrary.

Fifthly, Our idea of God, as a Being of infinite goodness, convinces us that He can never directly will the misery of His creatures in itself. In our sufferings, merely as such, He cannot possibly have pleasure. He must essentially desire and will the happiness of His creatures as an object most becoming the supreme mind, and most worthy His infinite goodness: and if at any time He inflicts sufferings upon His creatures, and renders them for a time unhappy, we cannot conceive that He rests in this as the ultimate object of His complacency, but must have in view some other end more congenial to His infinite perfections; and the light of reason points out two such ends, either in goodness procuring the moral perfection of His creatures, their greatest good, or punishing them in justice for having voluntarily, and therefore culpably, incurred the guilt of moral turpitude. Revelation also confirms this in the strongest terms; for through the whole series of the sacred Scriptures we find Almighty God everywhere represented as having the most tender love and concern for His creatures, earnestly desiring their happiness, and doing all on His part, without infringing the freedom of their will, to procure it. It is true that these same sacred writings do also sometimes represent Him in the most awful colours, as threatening or inflicting the most dreadful sufferings upon His creatures; but then we are assured that He does so against His inclinations, forced to it by their crimes, and