ATTICUS d all things that are moved the source and fountain of their motion is the soul. And that which would be the work of a rational and wise soul, to make nothing without a purpose, this he attributes to nature, but gives nature no share in the name of soul; as if things were derived not from powers but from names.'

CHAPTER XIII

p. 815 BUT the chief point and power of Plato's system, his theory of ideas, has been discredited, and abused, and insulted in every way, as far as it was in Aristotle's power. For as he was unable to conceive that things of a grand, divine, and transcendent nature require a certain kindred power for their recognition, and trusted to his own meagre and petty shrewdness, which was able to make its way through things terrestrial, and discern the truth in them, but was not capable of beholding the plain of absolute b truth, he made himself the rule and judge of things above him, and denied the existence of any peculiar natures such as Plato affirmed, but dared to call the highest of all realities triflings and chatterings and nonsense.

'Rather is the supreme and final speculation of Plato's philosophy that which treats of this intelligible and eternal being of the ideas, wherein verily the utmost toil and stress is set before the soul. For a most happy man is he, who has shared in the effort and attained the end, while he who has failed from want c of power to obtain an insight is left without any share at all of happiness.

'And for this reason Plato too strives earnestly in every way to show the strength of these ideal natures. For he says that it is not possible either rightly to assign a cause of anything whatsoever, except by participation in the ideas, or to have knowledge of any truth except by reference to these: nay not even a particle of reason would any have, unless they should acknowledge the existence of these ideas.

'They again who have decided to maintain the doctrines of Plato lay the chief stress of their arguments on this point, and quite necessarily. For nothing is left of the Platonic system, if

815 b Of Plato, Phaedrus, 248 B

one will not grant them on Plato's behalf these primary and d ATTICUS principal natures. For it is in these that he is especially superior

to all other men.

For as he conceived God in relation to these ideas as Father of all, and Creator, and Lord, and Guardian; and as from men's ·works he recognized that the artist formed a previous conception of that which he was about to make, and then afterwards adapted the likeness to the conception thus formed in the case of the things made; in the same way therefore Plato comprehended at a glance that God's conceptions, the patterns of the things made, are earlier than the things themselves, being incorporeal and intelligible, ever existing in the same conditions and modes, themselves the highest and first beings, and in part the causes to all the rest of their being p. 816 just such as they severally are, according to their likeness to them; and seeing that they are not easy to be discerned, nor yet able to be clearly expressed in speech, Plato himself treated of these subjects as far as it was possible to represent them in speech or thought, and to prepare those who were to follow after him; and having arranged his whole philosophy to this end, he asserts that with these ideas and the perception of them are concerned the wisdom and the science, whereby the proper end of man and the life of blessedness are attained.'

So far speaks Atticus. I might have quoted yet more than this from his book which I have mentioned: let us be satisfied, however, with what has been set forth, and pass on next to the sect of the Stoics. Among the hearers then of Socrates was one Antisthenes, a man like Heracleitus in spirit, who said that madness was better than pleasure, and therefore used to advise his friends never to stretch out a finger for the sake of pleasure.

And a disciple of his was Diogenes the 'dog,' who seemed to entertain most brutelike ideas, and attracted many followers. He was succeeded by Crates, and a disciple of Crates was Zeno of Cittium, who was established as founder of the sect of the Stoic philosophers.

Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes, and Cleanthes by Chrysippus, and he by the second Zeno, and the rest in order. All these are said to have been especially devoted

TOCLES

both to hard living and to dialectic.

The doctrines then

of their philosophy are somewhat as follows.

CHAPTER XIV

ARIS- d 'THEY say, like Heracleitus, that the element of the existing world is fire, and that the original principles of fire are matter and god, as Plato says. But the former says that both principles, the active and the passive, are corporeal, while the latter says that the first active cause is incorporeal.

'Then, moreover, they say that at certain predestined and p. 817 definite times the whole world is consumed by fire, and afterwards reorganized again. The primordial fire, however, is as it were just a seed, containing the reasons and the causes of all things past, present, and future: and that the combination and sequence of these constitute fate, and knowledge, and truth, and law of all being, from which there is no escape or avoidance. And in this way all things in the world are admirably arranged, just as in any well-ordered state.'

ARIUS b DIDYMUS

CHAPTER XV

'THE whole ordered world (xóoμos) with all its parts they call god, and say that he is one alone, and finite, and living, and eternal, and god: for all bodies are contained in him, and in him there is no vacuum. For the name order (kóaμos) is applied to the quality of all substance as well as to that which has an C arrangement of like kind consequent on the ordering (diakóσμnow).

'Wherefore according to the former rendering they say that the world is eternal, but as to its orderly arrangement created and subject to change at infinite periods past and future.

'And the quality of all being is an eternal world and god; d the name world (kóσpos) also means the system compounded of heaven, and the air, and earth, and sea, and the natures contained in them; and again the name world means the dwellingplace of gods and men, and of all things made for their sake.

'For in the same way as the name city has two meanings, the

816 d

Aristocles, a Fragment preserved by Eusebius: of. Diels, Doxographi Grasci, p. 464, n. 9

dwelling-place, and the system resulting from the combination of ARIUS residents and citizens, so also the world is, as it were, a city DIDYMUS composed of gods and men, in which the gods hold the rule, and

the men are subject.

'There is, however, a community between them, because they partake of reason, which is nature's law: and for their sakes all other things have been made. From which things it follows that we must suppose that the god who administers the whole takes thought for mankind, being beneficent, and kind, and friendly to p. 818 man, and just, and possessed of all virtues.

'For this reason indeed the world is also called Zeus, since he is the cause of our life (): and inasmuch as from eternity be administers all things unchangeably by connected (cipopéry) reason, he is also called Fate (cipapμémy); and Adrasteia, because nothing can escape him (drodidpáσkei); and Providence, because he arranges things severally for good.

'Cleanthes would have the sun to be the ruling power of the world, because it is the greatest of the heavenly bodies, and contributes most to the administration of the whole by making the b day and the year and the other seasons.

'Some, however, of the sect thought that the earth was the ruling power of the world. But Chrysippus thought it was the ether, the clearest and purest as being most mobile of all things, and carrying round the whole course of the world.'

Let this extract then suffice from the Epitome of Arius Didymus. But with reference to the opinion of the Stoics concerning God it is sufficient to quote the words of Porphyry in the answer which he wrote to Boëthus On the Soul, in the form following:

CHAPTER XVI

'THEY do not hesitate to call God an intelligent fire and c PORallow Him to be eternal, and to say that He destroys and devours PHYRY all things, being such a fire as that which is known to us, and to contradict Aristotle who deprecates saying that the ether consists of fire of this kind.

818 o Porphyry, On the Soul, in answer to Boëthus

PORPHYRY

'But if they are asked how such a fire lasts so long, though they do not say that it is fire of another kind, yet after describing it as of such a nature, and claiming credence for their own assertion, they add on to this unreasonable belief that it is also an eternal fire, though they assume that even this etherial fire is partially quenched and rekindled. But why should one spend time in pursuing any further their blindness in regard to their own doctrines, and their indolence and contempt for the doctrines of the ancients?'

p. 819 NUMENIUS

CHAPTER XVII

'BUT what then is "being"? Is it these four elements, earth and fire and the other two intermediate natures? Are then these the real beings, either collectively, or any one of them singly? But how can they be, since they are both created and destroyed again, for we may see them proceeding one out of another, and interchanging, and subsisting neither as elements nor as compounds? b These cannot thus be a body with true being.

с

d

'But though not these, yet it is possible that matter may have true being? But for matter also this is utterly impossible, through want of power to continue. For matter is a running and swiftly changing stream, in depth, and breadth, and length undefined and endless.'

And presently he adds:

'So it is well stated in the argument that, if matter is infinite, it is undefined; and, if undefined, irrational; and, if irrational, it cannot be known. But as it cannot be known it must necessarily be without order, as things arranged in order must certainly be easy to be known: and what is without order, is not stable: and whatever is not stable cannot have true being.

'Now this was the very point on which we agreed among ourselves before, that it is not permissible for all these things to be associated with true being. I should wish this to be the opinion of all men, be it at all events mine. I deny, therefore, that either matter in itself, or material bodies are true being. 'What then? Have we anything else besides these elements in the

819 a 1 Numeníus, a Fragment preserved by Eusebius