them. But neither Epicurus nor Aristotle can rightly be reckoned ATTICUS on the side of providence. For if according to Epicurus providence disappears, although the gods according to him employ the utmost solicitude for the preservation of their own goods, so must providence disappear according to Aristotle also, even if the heavenly motions are arranged in a certain order and array.

For we seek a providence that has an interest for us, and in such that man has no share who has admitted that neither daemons, nor heroes, nor any souls at all can live on hereafter. b 'But therein Epicurus, in my judgement, seems to have acted more modestly for as if he despaired of the gods being able to abstain from the care of mankind if they came in contact with them, he transferred them, as it were, to a foreign country, and settled them somewhere outside the world, excusing them from the charge of inhumanity by the removal, and by their separation from all things.

'But this our super-excellent discoverer of nature, and accurate judge of things divine, after putting human affairs under the C very eyes of the gods yet left them uncared for and unregarded, being administered by some force of nature, and not by divine reason. Wherefore he himself cannot fairly escape that other charge which some imagine against Epicurus, that it was not according to his judgement, but through fear of men, that he allotted room in the universe to the gods, just like a spectator's place in a theatre.

And they regard it as a proof of the man's opinion, that he deprived the gods of their activity towards us, from which alone a just confidence in their existence was likely to be derived. For d this same thing is done by Aristotle also; for by his both putting them far off and giving over the proof to sight only, an operation too feeble to judge of things at so great a distance, it may readily be thought that from shame he admits the existence of gods there,

For as he neither left anything outside the world, nor gave his gods access to things on earth, he was compelled either to confess himself altogether an atheist, or to preserve the appearance of allowing gods to remain, by banishing his gods to some such place as that. But Epicurus, by excusing the higher powers from diligent care because of the want of communication, seems to throw a decent veil over his disbelief in the gods.'

p. 801 Such are the remarks of Atticus against Aristotle's repudiation of the doctrine of providence. The same author further adds to what has been quoted the following remarks, aiming at the same philosopher's unwillingness to admit that the world was created.

b

CHAPTER VI

WHEREAS again Moses decided that the world was created, and set up God as Maker and Creator over the universe, and whereas Plato's philosophy taught the same doctrines as Moses, Aristotle, having travelled the contrary course on this point also, is refuted by the aforesaid author writing as follows word for word:

ATTICUS C 'In the first place then Plato speculating upon the origin of the world, and considering that every one must necessarily seek after this great and very beneficial doctrine of Providence, and having · reasoned out the conclusion that the uncreated has no need either of a maker or of a guardian for its well-being, in order that he might not deprive the world of providence, denied that it was uncreated.

'And we pray that we may not at this point be opposed by those of our own household, who choose to think that according to Plato also the world is uncreated. For they are bound in justice to pardon us, if in reference to Plato's opinions we believe d what he himself, being a Greek, has discoursed to us Greeks in clear and distinct language.

:

"For God," says he, "having found the whole visible world not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly manner, brought it out of disorder into order, because He thought that this was altogether better than the other." And still more plainly he shows that he did not adopt creation in an enigmatic way, nor yet for need of clearness, in the discourse which he has made the Father of all hold upon this point after the creation of the universe.

"For," says he, “since ye have come into being, (and he is speaking p. 80a to the gods) though ye are not altogether immortal nor indissoluble, nevertheless ye shall certainly not be dissolved, since ye have gained my will."

'But, as I was saying, with those who talk to us at home, as 801 d 3 Plato, Timaeus, 30 A

d ro ibid. 41 B

being our friends, we will discuss the matter in a friendly way ATTICUS and quietly with gentle arguments. For Aristotle seems to have brought them also over, as having been unable to resist his attack upon the doctrine, and unwilling to impute to Plato what seemed to have been detected as a fallacy.

'But according to our hearing, whereas Plato claims for the world that it is the noblest work made by the noblest of Creators, and invests the Maker of all with a power by which He made the world which did not previously exist, and having made it, will if b He please preserve it ever in safety, and whereas according to him the world is in this way supposed to be created and imperishable, who among the Peripatetics gives us any confirmation of these doctrines?

'We must gently admonish their ally, that it is not absolutely necessary that whatever has been created must also perish, nor conversely that what will never perish must necessarily be uncreated. For we must neither admit that the sole cause of the imperishable is derived from its being uncreated, nor must we leave the passing of the created to destruction as admitting no remedy.

'Whence then are we to get any help on these points from the C doctrines of Aristotle, a man who pursues the argument on these subjects, not indirectly, nor merely as stating his own opinion, but sets himself in direct opposition to Plato, and both brings the created under a necessity of perishing, and says that what is imperishable maintains its imperishable condition only from the fact of not having been created, nor even leaves any power in God, d which He can use to do any good. For what has never existed before now, this, he says, never can come into existence.

And so far is he from supporting Plato's doctrine by these statements, that he has ere now frightened some even of Plato's zealous disciples by what he said, and led them to reject his doctrine, because they were not able to perceive, that although, according to the nature of things alone without the will and power of God, neither the created is imperishable nor the imperishable created.

'Yet when one has established as the chief cause that which proceeds from God, one must take this as guide in all things, and show it to be a cause on no point inferior to any others. For it is p. 803 ridiculous that, because a thing has come into existence, it must

ATTICUS therefore perish, and yet not perish, if God so wills; ridiculous also that, because a thing is uncreated, it has strength to escape from perishing, and yet that the will of God is insufficient to keep any created thing from perishing.

'The builder is able to set up a house not yet existent, and a man can make a statue not previously existent, and another frames a ship out of unwrought timber and gives it over to those b who want it, and all the other artificers, who pursue the constructive arts, have this power to bring some non-existent thing into existence; and shall the universal King and Chief Artificer not so much as share the power of a human artificer, but be left by us without any share in creation? Not so, if at least we be able in any small degree to form an estimate of a divine cause.

'But though competent to create and to will what is excellent, (for He is good, and the good feels no envy about anything), is He yet unable to preserve and guard what He has made? Yet surely even the other artificers are competent to do both. The builder, C for instance, and the shipwright not only build new ships and houses, but are able also to repair those which are wearing away * from time, substituting in them other parts in place of those which have been damaged.

'So that surely so much as this must be conceded to God also. For how can He who is able to make a whole thing be unable to make it in part? So then why need it be made new, if one who is a maker in general is also to preserve his beautiful work against every accident? For to be willing to undo what was well made is the part of an evil one.

¿But there is no stronger bond for the preservation of things

created than the will of God. Or, while many things which shared in the zeal and will of man, as nations and cities and works, after existing an enormous time still remain when he who willed them is no more, shall the things which have had a share in God's purpose, and have been made for Him and by Him,— shall these then pass away and no longer remain while their Maker is still present?

'What cause can have done violence to the purpose of God? Can it be the necessity proceeding from the things created themselves? But this by accepting the orderly arrangement confessed 808 b 7 Plato, Timasus, 19 F

itself overcome by God. But can it be some cause from without ATTICUS acting in antagonism to God? Yet neither does any such cause P. 804 exist, nor is it right to make God inferior to any in matters in which He has before prevailed and made order, unless indeed we altogether forget that we are discoursing about the greatest and most divine power.

'But enough, for perhaps we are carried away by zeal into this argument concerning the truth. One thing is plain which we set forth, that they can be no teachers concerning the creation of the world who do not allow it any creation at all.'

Further, concerning the fifth essence in bodies introduced by Aristotle we must quote the following state-b ments:

CHAPTER VII

'FOR instance, with regard to the so-called elements, which are the primary constituents of bodies, Plato, like those before him, following the clear evidence concerning them, said that they were c these four which are generally acknowledged, namely, fire, earth, air, and water, and that all other things are produced from their combinations and changes. But Aristotle, as it seems, hoped to appear extraordinarily wise, if he could add another body, and counted in with the four visible bodies the fifth essence: and he thus made a very brilliant and bountiful use of nature, but failed to observe that in physical inquiry one must not lay down laws, but search out nature's own facts.

To the proof then that the primary natures of bodies are four, d which is what the Platonists want, the Peripatetic would not only give no help, but would even be almost its only opponent. For instance, when we say that every body is either hot or cold, or moist or dry, or soft or hard, or light or heavy, or rare or dense, and when we find that there can be nothing else to partake of any of these conditions besides the four elements,—for if anything is hot, it is either fire or air; and if cold, either water or earth; and if dry, fire or earth; and if moist, water or air; and if soft, air or fire; and if hard, water or earth; and light and rare, as for p. 805 instance, fire and air; and heavy and dense, as water and earth; -and when from all the other simple forces we perceive that