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remain in the body: the argument, however, must be there in ARISTOmen's souls, as being always the same and gaining their belief, for it can be only this that makes them incapable of assent. 'But that it is not possible for a man to have no opinions, one may learn in the following manner. For it is impossible that he C who perceives by sense does not perceive: now perception by sense is a kind of knowledge. And that he also believes his sensation is evident to all: for when he wishes to see more exactly, he wipes his eyes, and comes nearer, and shades them.

'Moreover we know that we feel pleasure and pain: for it is not possible for one who is being burned or cut to be ignorant of it. And who would not say that acts of memory surely and of recollection are accompanied by an assumption? But what need one say about common concepts, that such a thing is a man, and again concerning sciences and arts? For there would be none of d these, were it not our nature to make assumptions. But for my part I pass over all other arguments. Whether, however, we believe, or whether we disbelieve the arguments used by them, in every way it is an absolute necessity to form an opinion.

It is manifest then that it is impossible to study philosophy in this fashion; and that it is also unnatural and contrary to the laws, we may perceive as follows. For if on the other handthings were in reality of this kind, what would remain but that we must live as if asleep, in a random and senseless fashion? So that our lawgivers, and generals, and educators must all be talking nonsense. To me, however, it seems that all the rest of mankind are living in a natural way, but only those who talk this nonsense are puffed up with conceit, or rather are gone stark mad.

'Not least, however, one may learn this from the following case. Antigonus, for instance, of Carystus, who lived about the same p. 763 times and wrote their biography, says that Pyrrho being pursued by a dog escaped up a tree, and, when laughed at by those who stood by, said that it was difficult to put off the man. And when his sister Philiste was to offer a sacrifice, and then one of her friends promised what was necessary for the sacrifice and did not provide it, but Pyrrho bought it, and was angry, upon his friend saying that his acts were not in accord with his words nor worthy of his impassivity, he replied, In the case of a woman certainly we

ARISTO ought not to make proof of it. Nevertheless his friend might CLES b fairly have answered, If there is any good in these arguments of yours, your impassivity is useless in the case even of a woman, or a dog, and in all cases.

C 'But it is right to ascertain both who they were that admired him, and whom he himself admired. Pyrrho then was a disciple of one Anaxarchus, and was at first a painter, and not very successful at that; next, after reading the books of Democritus, he neither found anything useful there nor wrote anything good himself, but spake evil of all, both gods and men. But afterwards wrapping himself up in this conceit, and calling himself free from conceit, he left nothing in writing.

c 'A disciple of his was Timon of Phlius, who at first was a dancer in the chorus at the theatres, but having afterwards fallen in with Pyrrho he composed offensive and vulgar parodies, in which he has reviled all who ever studied philosophy. For this was the man who wrote the Silli, and said:

d

"Mankind how poor and base, born but to eat,

Your life made up of shame, and strife, and woe."

And again:

"Men are but bags with vain opinions filled."

'When nobody took notice of them any more than if they had never been born, a certain Aenesidemus began just yesterday to stir up this nonsense again at Alexandria in Egypt. And these are just the men who were thought to be the mightiest of those who had trodden this path.

'It is evident then that no one in his right mind would approve such a sect, or course of argument, or whatever and however any one likes to call it. For I think for my part that we ought not to call it philosophy at all, since it destroys the very first principles of philosophy.'

These then are the arguments against those who are supposed to follow Pyrrho in philosophy. And near akin to them would be the answers to be urged against those who follow Aristippus of Cyrene, in saying that only the feelings are conceptional. Now Aristippus was a com

panion of Socrates, and was the founder of the so-called Cyrenaic sect, from which Epicurus has taken occasion for his exposition of man's proper end. Aristippus was p. 764 extremely luxurious in his mode of life, and fond of pleasure; he did not, however, openly discourse on the end, but virtually used to say that the substance of happiness lay in pleasures. For by always making pleasure the subject of his discourses he led those who attended him to suspect him of meaning that to live pleasantly was the end of man.

Among his other hearers was his own daughter Arete, who having borne a son named him Aristippus, and he from having been introduced by her to philosophical studies was called his mother's pupil (μnтpodldakтos). He quite plainly defined the end to be the life of pleasure, ranking as pleasure that which lies in motion. For he said that b there are three states affecting our temperament: one, in which we feel pain, like a storm at sea; another, in which we feel pleasure, that may be likened to a gentle undulation, for pleasure is a gentle movement, comparable to a favourable breeze; and the third is an intermediate state, in which we feel neither pain nor pleasure, which is similar to a calm. So of these feelings only, he said, we have the sensation, Now against this sect the following objections have been urged (by Aristocles).

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'NEXT in order will be those who say that the feelings alone CARISTOare conceptional, and this was asserted by some of the Cyrenaics. For they, as if oppressed by a kind of torpor, maintained that they knew nothing at all unless some one standing by struck and pricked them; for when burned or cut, they said, they knew that they felt something, but whether what burned them was fire, or what cut them iron, they could not tell.

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ARISTO-d 'Men then who talk thus one might immediately ask, whether they at all events know this that they suffer and feel something. For if they do not know, neither could they say that they know only the feeling: if on the other hand they know, the feelings cannot be the only things conceptional. For "I am being burned" was a statement, and not a feeling.

'Moreover these three things must necessarily subsist together, the suffering itself, and that which causes it, and that which suffers. The man therefore who perceives the suffering must certainly by sensation feel the sufferer. For surely he will not know that some one is being warmed, it may be, without knowing whether it is himself or his neighbour; and whether now or last year, and whether at Athens or in Egypt, whether alive or dead, and moreover whether a man or a stone.

"Therefore he will also know by what he suffers: for men know one another, and roads, and cities, and their food. Artisans again know their own tools, and physicians and sailors prognosticate p. 765 what is going to happen, and dogs discover the tracks of wild beasts. 'Moreover the man who suffers anything certainly perceives it either as something affecting himself or as another's suffering. Whence therefore will he be able to say that this is pleasure, and that pain? Or that he felt something by taste, or sight, or hearing? And by tasting with his tongue, and seeing with his eyes, and hearing with his ears? Or how do they know that it is right to choose this, and avoid that? But supposing them to know none of these things, they will have no impulse nor desire ; b and so would not be living beings. For they are ridiculous, whenever they say that these things have happened to them, but that they do not know how or in what manner. For such as these could not even say whether they are human beings, nor whether they are alive, nor, therefore, whether they say and declare anything.

"What discussion then can there be with such men as these? One may wonder, however, if they know not whether they are upon earth or in heaven; and wonder still more, if they do not know, though they profess to study this kind of philosophy, whether four are more than three, and how many one and two make. C For being what they are they cannot even say how many fingers they have on their hands, nor whether each of them is one or more.

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'So they would not even know their own name, nor their ARISTOcountry, nor Aristippus: neither therefore whom they love or hate, nor what things they desire. Nor, if they were to laugh or cry, would they be able to say, that is laughable, and that painful. It is evident therefore that we do not even know what we are now saying. Such men therefore as these would be no better than gnats or flies, though even those animals know what is natural and unnatural.'

Although there are endless arguments that one might d use against men in this state of mind, yet these are sufficient. The next thing is to join them in examining those who have taken the opposite road, and decided that we ought to believe the bodily senses in everything, among whom are Metrodorus of Chios, and Protagoras of Abdera.

Metrodorus then was said to have been a hearer of Democritus, and to have declared 'plenum' and 'vacuum' to be first principles, of which the former was 'being,' and the latter' not-being.' So in writing about nature he employed an introduction of this kind, 'None of us knows anything, not even this, whether we know or do not know': an introduction which gave a mischievous impulse to Pyrrho who came afterwards. Then he went on to say p. 766, that all things are just what any one may think them.'

And as to Protagoras it is reported that he was called an atheist. In fact he, too, in writing about the gods used this sort of introduction:

'So as to gods I know not either that they exist, nor what their nature is: for there are many things that hinder me from knowing each of these points.'

This man the Athenians punished by banishment, and burned his books publicly in the middle of the marketplace. Since then these men asserted that we must believe our senses only, let us look at the arguments urged against them (by Aristocles).

765 d 12 Diogenes Laertius, ix. 10

766 a 6 ibid. ix. 51