education, and are so much beloved for this their wisdom as to PLATO be almost carried about on the heads of their companions. Can we then suppose that, if Homer or Hesiod was really capable b of improving men in virtue, their contemporaries would have allowed them to wander about as rhapsodists, and would not rather have hugged them closer than gold, and constrained them to stay with them at home, or, if they could not persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wherever they went, until they had received sufficient education? 'It seems to me, Socrates, said he, that what you say is entirely true. 'Then must we not assume that all the poets, from Homer downwards, only copy images of virtue and of the other subjects of their poetry, and do not touch the truth? But, as we were saying just now, the painter, though he knows nothing himself about shoemaking, will make what seems to be a shoemaker to those who likewise know nothing about it, but judge by the C colours and forms? 'Yes, certainly. 'In the same way, then, I suppose, we may say that the poet also by his names and phrases lays on certain colours proper to the several arts, of which he knows nothing himself except how to imitate them, so that to others like him, judging only from the words, whether he speaks about shoemaking, or generalship, or any other subject whatever, in metre and rhythm and harmony, it seems to be extremely well spoken. 'So powerful a charm these musical forms have naturally in themselves: but when stripped of their musical colouring, you d know, I imagine, how poor the poets' works appear when read in bare simplicity as prose. Have you observed it, or not? 'I have, said he.' Now these things being so, it seems good to me to go through some short passages of Plato, wherein he maintains the doctrine of God and of providence in a more logical manner, adhering in this also to the Hebrew dogmas. And first let us observe how he sets forth the opinions of the atheists. p. 621 PLATO CHAPTER L "THERE are some who say that all things come, and have come, and will come into existence some by nature, some by art, and some by chance. 'Do they not say well then? "Yes, it is probable, I suppose, that wise men are right in b what they say. Nevertheless let us follow them up, and inquire what they on that side mean. 'By all means. 'It seems, they say, that the greatest and fairest things are wrought by nature and chance, and the less important by art, which receiving from nature the great original works of creation moulds and frames all the smaller, which we all call artificial. 'What do you mean? 'I will state it still more plainly thus. Fire and water and C earth and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art. And the bodies which come next to these, the earth, and sun, and moon, and stars, have been created by help of these elements, which are absolutely inanimate. And being severally carried by the chance with which they meet from their several forces, they combine in some intimate way, hot with cold, or dry with moist, and soft with hard, and all other principles which by chance were yet necessarily combined with a mixture of their opposites, and in this way and according to these conditions they have thus created both the whole heaven and all things in the heaven, and all animals too and plants, all seasons being produced, they say, from these elements, not by virtue of intelligence, nor any god, nor art, but, as we say, by nature and chance. 'And afterwards from these mortal elements art sprang up later, mortal like them, and has since produced certain playd things, not partaking much of truth, but certain images akin one to another, such as are produced by painting and music and all their assistant arts. And the arts which do produce anything good, are those which combine their own power with that of nature, as for example medicine, and husbandry, and 621 a 1 Plato, Laws, 888 E gymnastics. Moreover it is said that political science also co- PLATO operates in some small measure with nature, but for the most p. 623 part with art: and thus that all legislation allies itself not with nature but with art, the assumptions of which are not true. 'How do you mean? 'In the first place, my excellent friend, these people say that gods exist not by nature but by art and by certain laws, and that these laws differ in various ways, according as the several states agreed among themselves in establishing their legislation: and moreover that what is honourable by nature is one thing, but by law another; and that principles of justice have no existence at all by nature, but that men go on disputing with one another, and are always changing them; and whatever alterations they make. are severally valid at the time when they make them, being made b by art and laws, and not by any natural principle. 'All these, my friends, are doctrines of men whom the young think wise, both poets and prose writers, who say that conquest by force is the best right. And from this cause young men are assailed by impious thoughts, as that there are no gods such as the law commands them to believe in, and therefore dissensions arise, from their drawing men towards what they call the right life of nature, which is in reality to live in mastery over all others, and not as serving others according to law. 'What a description you have given, O Stranger, and what injury by young men both publicly to states and to private families!' Also after other passages he says: 'But now, Cleinias, answer me again, since you too must take part in the discussion. For the man who talks thus probably believes fire, and water, and earth, and air to be the first elements of all things, and these are what he calls nature, and believes the soul to be made out of them afterwards: and this not only seems to be probable, but he really tries to prove it to us by his argument. 'Yes, certainly. 'Is it possible then that we have discovered a source, as it were, of the senseless opinion of all men who ever meddled d 622 o 3 Plato, Laws, 891 C PLATO with physical inquiries? Consider and examine every argument: for indeed it is a matter of no small importance, if those who take up impious arguments, and lead others, should be found to be using their arguments not at all rightly, but in a mistaken manner. This seems indeed to me to be the case. 'You say well; but try now to explain how it is. It is likely then that we shall have to deal with rather unusual arguments.' Also soon after he adds this: 'Nearly all of them, my friend, seem to have been ignorant both of the nature and of the power of the soul, and especially p. 623 of its origin, that it is the first of all things, created before all bodies, and the chief ruling principle of all their change and 'Then thought, and attention, and mind, and art, and law must be prior to hard and soft, and heavy and light: and moreover the great primal works and actions must be works of art, as being first of all; and natural products and nature, which they are wrong in calling by this name, must come afterwards and take their beginning from art and mind. 'How wrong? "By "nature" they mean the generation of the first principles. But if the soul shall be found to be first, not fire nor air, then the soul having been the very first generated would most rightly be said to exist pre-eminently by nature. This is true, if one b has proved soul to be older than body, but not otherwise. 'What you say is most true.' CHAPTER LI 'COME then, if we ought ever to invoke divine aid, let us do so now: let the gods be invoked with all earnestness to come to the demonstration of their own existence; and let us hold fast to this as a sure cable in embarking upon our present argument. 632 d 11 Plato, Lawe, 893 A When I am questioned upon matters of this kind, it seems to be PLATO the safest course to answer such questions in the following d manner. 'When any one says to me, Stranger, are all things at rest, and nothing in motion, or the very contrary? Or are some of them in motion, and some at rest? Some I suppose are in motion, I shall say, and some at rest. Is there not then some place in which the fixed are at rest, and the moving move? 'Of course. 'And some, I suppose, would move in one single place, and others in more than one. 'Do you mean, I shall say, that the things which are in the condition of rest at the centre move in one single place, just as the circumference of circles revolves, though the circles are said to be at rest? 'Yes.' And afterwards he adds: 'Let us further state it in the following way, and answer ourselves again. If all things were somehow combined in one mass at rest, as most of such philosophers are bold enough to say, which of the above-mentioned kinds of motion must first arise among them? 'Of course the self-moving: for unless there were previously some change in themselves, they could never begin to change from any external cause. p. 624 'As the beginning then of all motions, and the first which arises in things at rest and continues in things in motion, the selfmoving, we must say, is necessarily the eldest and mightiest of all b changes; and that which is changed by another, and itself moves others, is the second. 'Most true. 'Since therefore we have reached this stage of the argument, let us make the following answer. 'What answer? 'If we see this self-motion take place anywhere in the element of earth, or water, or fire, whether separate or combined, what condition shall we say exists in such element? 624 a a Plato, Laws, 895 A |