and Texas; the Eighth, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, Nebraska, and Colorado. These circuits are obviously too extensive. It is impossible for their circuit judges to discharge the duty required.

A moderate increase of the Supreme Court, while it would make each of the proposed sections as large as the present legal quorum of the whole court, and would admit of a division into three sections, if ever found necessary, would likewise reduce the size of the circuits, by enlarging their number, relieve the overburdened circuit judges, and enable the Supreme Court judges to perform necessary circuit duty. It is believed to be the general sentiment of the profession that they should not be wholly withdrawn from that duty. The policy of our law in the federal courts, and in most of the state courts, has always prescribed it. Such is the English system, whence ours was derived. No common law judge has ever sat in England who did not also regularly hold nisi prius courts.

It has been thought that a court of twelve or more judges might be too numerous for the dispatch of business, and would tend to too great diversity of opinion. In ordinary cases this is true, as has been already pointed out. The whole court would, however, under the proposed plan, be convened only in special cases of unusual difficulty or importance. For such rare occasions, and for such a purpose, it would not be found to be too large, too slow, or too deliberative. For very many years the twelve judges of England, who sit on ordinary occasions in different courts, were accustomed to be brought together for the hearing of questions of special magnitude or embarrassment. The tribunal thus formed was the most august known to English law; was never thought unmanageable; and their very differences of opinion upon such questions, elicited discussion and deliberation that were most salutary and satisfactory.

Another subject has also engaged the attention of the committee that of providing for some review of the deci sions of a district judge sitting alone, to try cases not large enough to admit of appeal to the Supreme Court. At pres ent no means exist for any such revision, except by application to the judge to reconsider his own ruling. This remedy has never been commended by experience.

Neither in Eng

The committee are unanimous in the opinion that some such review should be provided by law. No single judge should sit to try causes that involve so much as $5,000, from whose decision there is no appeal. land nor in any American state is this allowed. Appeals can usually be taken in cases of any amount, however small, and always where the amount is large enough to be material. To this rule the federal courts, in this class of cases, form the solitary exception.

We do not deem it necessary, however, to create for this purpose any additional judges, or to organize any new tribunals. We simply recommend that it be provided by law, that any bill of exceptions reserved on the trial of any action at law in the United States Circuit or District Courts, and any petition for rehearing in any equity suit that has been heard in a United States Circuit Court, shall be heard at a term of such Circuit Court when the circuit judge, or a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, shall be present. And that it shall be the duty of the circuit judge, and of the judge of the Supreme Court who shall be assigned to the circuit, to arrange for the holding of at least one term in each year in each district, at which one of those judges shall be present, and where bills of exceptions and petitions for rehearing in equity shall have precedence.

This method was formerly in force, in some of the circuits at least, under rule of the court. It was found

to work to the entire satisfaction of the bar, and to provide all the review necessary in the cases, referred to, in a simple and inexpensive way. Its restoration by statute would, it is believed, be every way desirable. The committee are unanimous in recommending this change, in the event that the local courts of appeal before referred to should not be created; except that one member (Mr. Hitchcock) prefers to express no opinion, except in favor of such

courts.

The same method of revision ought also to be made applicable to decisions of the district judges upon certain important interlocutory motions; especially those for injunctions and receivers, and those which settle all litigated matters preliminary to an accounting. Such motions often. involve the entire merits of a case, and are sometimes virtually decisive of it. Great interests may turn upon their decision; and even in cases large enough for appeal to the Supreme Court, no appeal can be taken until after the final decree in the cause. Meanwhile much hardship may intervene if the decision is erroneous, that cannot be redressed by the ultimate reversal.

EDWARD J. PHELPS, Chairman.

CORTLANDT PARKER,

WILLIAM M. EVARTS,

RICHARD T. MERRICK.