California "(1) In case the deceased employee leaves a person or persons wholly dependent upon him for support, the death benefit shall be a sum sufficient, when added to the disability indemnity which, at the time of death has accrued and become payable, under the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, to make the total disability indemnity and death benefit equal to Applicants were desirous of ascertaining their liability on account of the death of Alphonse F. Malaret. The latter's mother was the defendant. She resided in France. The issue was one of dependency which was ascertained so far as was possible from the records of the post office money order department. Held that applicants were liable to the defendant in the sum of $230.85, as the defendant showed that deceased contributed an average of 11.4% of his wages. Poetsch & Peterson and Southwestern Surety Insurance Co. v. Malaret, Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., Dec. 8, 1913. Application filed by Lillian M. Farrington, guardian of children of James Russell, deceased. The case hinged on the neglect of deceased to adequately support his three minor children for some time prior to death. Held that applicant was entitled to the three years' death benefit, amounting to $3,600, for the reason that his failure to provide for his minor children did not relieve his estate of the legal obligation. Farrington v. Lachman & Jacobi, Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., July 12, 1913. Applicant was the wife of G. H. Moses, who was killed while working for the defendant. The facts were clear, and the defendant had the papers filed for the purpose of obtaining a ruling as to whether the dependents were entitled to the death benefit of $4,500. Beside the widow there were five children, two of whom were minors. Held that applicant was solely and wholly dependent for support upon the deceased and was entitled to the death benefit. Moses v. Standard Oil Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., Feb. 24, 1913. In this case the employer filed an application in order to ascertain to whom the death benefit should be paid for the death of William O. Selfridge. One defendant, Ida May Selfridge, the surviving wife of deceased, claimed the whole amount of compensation, while the other defendant, Esther Merle Selfridge, a minor daughter of the deceased by a former marriage, claimed a portion of the compensation. Attorneys for the minor daughter claimed that it was impossible for the Industrial Accident Board to acquire jurisdiction over the person of such minor or to appoint a guardian. These attorneys filed a suit for damages in the courts in behalf of the minor child, and introduced the question of the constitutionality of the Act. No decision has been rendered at this date (January 7, 1914), and therefore the case is still pending before the Board. California three times his average annual earnings, such annual earnings to be taken at not less than three hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents nor more than one thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-six cents. "(2) In case the deceased employee leaves no person wholly dependent upon him for support, but one or more persons par Natomas Consolidated of California v. Selfridge, Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd. (filed Nov. 19, 1912.) This was an application for compensation for death. Held applicant was not entitled to compensation for the reason that it was found that she was not a dependent within the meaning of the Act, inasmuch as she was not the legal wife of the deceased. Aldinger v. Ransome Concrete Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., Sept. 12, 1913. Applicant was the employer desirous of ascertaining his legal liability on account of the death of Gus Nelson, a stevedore. The widow, the defendant, felt that she was entitled to more than three years' annual earnings, amounting to $3.557.55. Held that the claim was contrary to the Compensation Law and that the applicant was correct in its reading of the statute. Legal proceedings were threatened at one time in the hope of securing a larger amount for the loss of the bread winner. The Industrial Accident Board sympathized with the view of the widow that she and her family were inadequately compensated for their loss, and it was stated that compensation" was a word used that improperly conveyed its meaning in a case such as this. Spreckels Bros. Commercial Co. v. Nelson, Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., June 24, 1913. C. L. Belknap was killed on November 27, 1912. Death claim of $5,000 in weekly payments of $32.05 disputed by defendant on ground of deceased's wilful misconduct in violation of orders. Held that widow was entitled to the full benefit as specified. The claim of wilful misconduct was disallowed on the ground that deceased was foreman, had charge of the work of unloading piles from a railroad car, and used his discretion in unloading without the use of ropes ordered by employer. Evidence showed that this condition had prevailed for between one and two weeks prior to death, and while the superintendent was in the vicinity of the work. Decided that orders issued must be enforced and that the fatality was not caused by wilful misconduct. Belknap v. Mervy-Elwell Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., May 27, 1913. This case was dismissed after medical testimony showed that the condition of the husband of applicant resulted from a physical status that antedated the time of the alleged accident. Waite v. Oakland California Towel Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., Oct. 10, 1913. California tially dependent therefor, the death benefit shall be such percentage of three times such average annual earnings of the employee as the annual amount devoted by the deceased to the support of the person or persons so partially dependent bears to such average annual earnings; provided, that the death benefit shall not be greater than a sum sufficient, when added to the disability indemnity which, at the time of the death, has accrued and become payable under the provisions of subsection (b) hereof to make the total disability indemnity and death benefit equal to three times his average annual earnings, such average annual earnings to be taken at not less than three hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents nor more than one thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-six cents. (3) If the deceased employee leaves no person dependent upon him for support, the death benefit shall consist of the reasonable expenses of his burial not exceeding one hundred dollars and such further death benefit as may be provided by law. "(d) Payment of compensation in accordance with the order and direction of the commission shall discharge the employer from all claims therefor. "§ 19. (a) The following shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: "(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she was living at the time of his death. "(2) A husband upon a wife upon whose earnings he is partially or wholly dependent at the time of her death. "(3) A child or children under the age of eighteen years (or Applicant was administrator of the estate of James Russell, deceased, and filed an application to adjust a controversy arising out of an injury sustained by James Russell. By consent the application was withdrawn, without prejudice, on October 7, 1912, prior to any hearing thereon. Blackburn v. Lachman & Jacobi, Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., Oct. 7, 1913. This application was dismissed on the ground that the City of Los Angeles had not accepted the compensation provisions of the Law of 1911, the State Supreme Court having decided that the State and municipalities were not under compensation unless they had so elected. Estep v. City of Los Angeles, Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., July 24, 1913. California over said age, but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon the parent with whom he or they are living at the time of the death of such parent or for whose maintenance such parent was legally liable at the time of his death, there being no surviving dependent parent. "(b) In all other cases, questions of entire or partial dependency and questions as to who constitute dependents and the extent of their dependency shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the death of the employee. "(c) No person snall be considered a dependent of any deceased employee unless a member of the family of such employee or unless such person bears to such employee the relation of husband or wife, child, adopted child or stepchild, father or mother, father-in-law or mother-in-law, grandfather or grandmother, brother or sister, nephew or niece. "(d) 1. If there is one or more persons wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee, such person or persons shall receive the entire death benefit, and any person or persons partially dependent shall receive no part thereof, unless otherwise ordered by the commission. "2. If there is more than one such person wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee, the death benefit shall be divided equally among them, unless otherwise ordered by the commission. "3. If there is more than one person partially dependent for support upon a deceased employee, and no person wholly dependent for support, the amount allowed as the death benefit shall be divided among the persons so partially dependent in proportion to the relative extent of their dependency, unless otherwise ordered by the commission. "(e) The death benefits shall be paid to such one or more of the dependents of the deceased, or to a trustee appointed by the commission, or a commissioner, for the benefit of the person or persons entitled, as may be determined by the commission, and the commission may, anything in this act contained to the contrary notwithstanding, apportion such benefits among the dependents in proportion to their respective needs and as may be just and equitable, and may order pay Connecticut ment to a dependent subsequent in right, or not otherwise entitled, upon good cause being shown therefor. The person to whom the death benefit is paid for the use of the several beneficiaries shall apply the same in compliance with the findings and directions of the commission. CONNECTICUT "Part B., § 9. Compensation for Fatal Injuries. Compensation shall be paid on account of death resulting from injuries within two years from date of injury as follows: (a) For burial expenses one hundred dollars; (b) to those totally dependent upon the deceased employee at the time of his injury a weekly compensation equal to half of the average weekly earnings of the deceased at the time of his injury; (c) in case there is no one totally dependent upon the deceased employee then to those partially dependent upon the deceased employee at the time of his injury a weekly compensation not exceeding that payable to total dependents and of such proportionate sum as may be determined according to the measure of dependence; (d) in case there are no dependents of the deceased employee the sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars, to be paid to the state treasurer and by him set apart as a fund to be used for the payment of lawful expenses of the commissioners; but the compensation payable on account of death resulting from injuries shall in no case be more than ten dollars or less than five dollars weekly, and such compensation shall not continue longer than three hundred and twelve weeks after death. The compensation on account of death payable under this act to a widow or widower of a deceased employee shall not cease with the death of such widow or widower, but upon her or his death within the period during which such compensation is payable it shall continue to be paid for the remainder of such period to her or his dependents as defined in section forty-three. "§ 10. Meaning of Dependence. The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be totally dependent for support upon a deceased employee: (a) A wife upon a husband |