Acting on unauthorized orders 19. Acting on unauthorized orders. An accident which occurs while a man is complying with an order which, although he knows or ought to know he need not obey, because it is against the rules, but which is given to him by one from whom he received his orders, may, nevertheless, be an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Statham v. Galloways Limited, 2 W. C. C. 149. A boy thirteen years of age, whose duty was to do all sorts of things under the direction of a foreman, was untruthfully told by another man that the foreman said he was to do certain work, and the boy did it, in the course of which he was injured, and it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. Brown v. Scott (1899), 1 W. C. C. 11. A cinder pit man, who was acting as hostler's helper in running a yard engine, falsely stated to decedent, his coemployé, that the general foreman told him to direct decedent to act in his place while he took charge of the engine. This representation was untrue, as no such direction had been given. It was held that responsibility for the death of the decedent could not be attached to the railroad company because the decedent had acted on such statement. (E. L.) Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky v. Pope's Adm'r, 119 S. W. Rep. 237; 133 Ky. 835. Where a servant is injured in obeying his superintendent's orders and it does not appear that the servant knew that the service was intended for the superintendent's personal benefit, an instruction relieving the master from liability, on the ground that plaintiff's injury occurred while not engaged about the master's business, is properly refused. (E. L.) Sims v. Omaha K. C. & E. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. App. 197. A minor, employed by the proprietor of a newspaper as a carrier, worked under the foreman of the distribution department, who had nothing to do with the machinery. The foreman ordered the minor to remove papers from a folding Acting in an emergency machine, in doing which he was injured. It was held he was a volunteer and the master was not liable. (E. L.) Hatfield v. Adams, 96 S. W. Rep. 583; 29 Ky. Law Rep. 880. 20. Acting in an emergency. Where one renders aid to the servant of another at the request of the servant and under circumstances which create a necessity for aid, the person rendering aid becomes an emergency employé of the servant's master. (E. L.) Cannon v. Fargo, 138 App. Div. 20; 122 Supp. 576; (E. L.) Marks v. Rochester Ry. Co., 41 App. Div. 66; 58 Supp. 210; (E. L.) Geibel v. Elwell, 19 App. Div. 285; 46 Supp. 76. There is, however, a good deal of conflict on this point in the various States. See 26 Cyc. 1287. It is an employé's implied duty to exercise reasonable care to preserve from injury his employer's property, and in an effort to that end he is not a mere volunteer. (E. L.) United States Cement Co. v. Koch, 85 N. E. Rep. 490; 42 Ind. App. 251. Where a freight train approached a down-grade, and it was necessary for some member of the crew to ride on the cars so as to control their speed, and the brakeman, when ordered to do so, refused, it was held that an emergency arose, which compelled the conductor to undertake the task himself, and he was not acting outside the line of his duty when so doing, where it entailed no neglect of his duties as conductor. (E. L.) Yongue v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 112 S. W. Rep. 985; 133 Mo. App. 141. A foreman over a gang of men digging a trench for a sewer, after a severe thunder shower, went to inspect an electric light wire, which had broken and dropped on the crane and other portions of the apparatus being used in the work of excavation. He walked toward the pole to trace the wire along the street to find out whether or not it was a live wire. He stopped near the pole, staggered and fell over dead. It was found that his death was due to an electric shock. It was held that his death was due to an injury arising out of and in the course of his em Acting in an emergency ployment and compensation was awarded to his widow. Houghton v. W. G. Root Construction Co., 35 N. L. Law J., 332. Where the plaintiff, a minor, employed to drive an entry in a mine, was injured while assisting a co-employé in propping a dangerous portion of the roof which the defendants, although notified, had failed to prop, and such precaution was immediately necessary in order that the work which the plaintiff was employed to do might be continued, it was held that the plaintiff was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his injury. (E. L.) Ballou v. Potter, 106 S. W. Rep. 1178; 32 Ky. Law Rep. 779. One who, at the request of a conductor of a freight train, in an emergency, temporarily assists in the work of unlocking a safe, is for the time being, a servant of the railroad company and entitled to the same protection as any other servant. (E. L.) St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bagwell, 124 Pac. R. 320; 33 Okla. 189. Where a driver of a delivery wagon, being unfamiliar with the route, asked a boy to go with him. and show him the way, it was held that the boy became an emergency servant and a fellow-servant of the driver. (E. L.) Gunderson v. Eastern Brewing Co., 71 Misc. 519; 130 Supp. 785. The claimant was employed as a fireman in the Fire Department of the civil administration under the Isthmian Canal Commission, and while assisting as a pipe man in an effort to extinguish a fire which had broken out in a building situated in Colon, he was injured. It was conceded that the man when injured was without the limits of the Canal Zone. It was held, that the man had been employed in an emergency and the fact that the injury occurred outside the territory under the control of the United States, in view of the circumstances stated, was not sufficient to exclude him from the operation of the Act, and compensation was awarded. Re James Nellis, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. page 221. A boy was employed to grease the wheels and axles of railway trucks. While waiting for trucks to come up he Acting in an emergency thought the switch was against the engine, and began to pull the lever in order to open it and was injured. It was held that there was evidence of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Harrison v. Whitaker Bros., 2 W. C. C. 12. A workman was employed by a lion tamer to look after the baggage, clean out lion cages, and generally make himself useful, but it was no part of his duty to feed lions. One afternoon the workman was left in sole charge of the cages of lions, with orders to see that no harm came to them, or to anyone else, by reason of their fierceness. One of the lions got out of a cage and into a dressing room, but there was no evidence to show how it happened. The workman went into the dressing room and tried to drive the lion back into the cage, when the lion turned on him and killed him. It was held that as the deceased had been left in charge, it was his duty to get the lion back into the cage, and that as he was killed in the discharge of his duty, the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. Hapelman v. Poole (1908), 25 T. L. R. 155; 2 B. W. C. C. 48. Authority for a servant to act on an emergency in his master's interest may be implied. Where a workman was injured in attempting to stop his master's runaway horse, it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, although his work was wholly unconnected with the horses. Rees v. Thomas (1899), 80 L. T. 578; 1 W. C. C. 9. A man employed by the owner of a canal boat, as driver, who was forbidden by his employer to take part in the steering or management of the boat, was drowned while engaged in steering. A boatman, who had been temporarily in charge of the horse, had deserted a short time before the accident, and the other boatman, who was also master of the boat, then decided to drive, telling the deceased at the same time to steer. It was held that no emergency had arisen which justified the deceased in violating the orders of his employer Acting in an emergency in steering the boat, and that therefore the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. Whelan v. Moore (1909), 43 Irish L. T. 205; 2 B. W. C. C. 114. Where a conductor was injured while operating a car on which he was not the conductor, and he was operating the car merely for the motorman's accommodation, it was held that he was not an emergency employé and could not recover for injuries received. (E. L.) Central Kentucky Traction Co. v. Miller, 153 S. W. Rep. 750; 147 Ky. 110. An employé left a place of employment, which was not dangerous, to stop a runaway car passing on a side track, and in doing so, closed a switch, which had been left open to prevent cars running on to the main track, and while in pursuit of the car on the main track he was injured by a second runaway car. He had no duty to perform about such car, or its operation, and acted without request or direction. It was held that no recovery could be had, although the car ran away because of a defective track, as the proximate cause of the injury was the servant's voluntary act. (E. L.) McGill v. Maine & N. H. Granite Co., 46 Atl. Rep. 684; 70 N. H. 125. Intestate's brother was employed by the defendant railroad company to operate a pumping station, but during such employment procured voluntary assistance of intestate, who aided the brother, with defendant's knowledge and consent, and during the performance of such work the intestate was killed. It was held that in the absence of proof of an emergency or a necessity for the intestate's employment or that his brother had any authority to engage an assistant, the relation of master and servant did not exist between the defendant and the intestate. (E. L.) Grissom v. Atlanta & B. Air Line Ry., 44 So. Rep. 661; 152 Ala. 110. Where one of two butcher boys on a wagon fell off and was injured, a stranger who witnessed the accident volunteered to get on the wagon and take care of the boy while he was being carried home. She accordingly got on the wagon and |