Extra-territorial effect of compensation statutes

which there is a workingmen's Compensation Act as an illustration, but without considering the terms of the statute of New Jersey. The sections of the Act relating to the matter are as follows:" quoting §§ 7, 8, 9 and 10.

The Court then continues:

"It appears that there is an implied contract to compensate for injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment and under it all other methods and rights to any other form of compensation are relinquished. The statute can have no extra-territorial effect, but it can require a contract to be made by two parties to a hiring that the contract shall have an extra-territorial effect. The contract is binding on the employé himself and upon the employer, and it is conclusively presumed that the parties have accepted the provisions of Section II and have agreed to be bound thereby. The method of termination of the contract is provided for in paragraph 10. It would seem that the reasonable construction of the statute is that it writes into the contract of employment certain additional terms. The cause of action of petitioner is ex contractu. The lex loci contractus governs the construction of the contract and determines the legal obligations arising from it. 9 Cyc. 664. That the cause of action is ex contractu, see Sexton v. The Newark District Telegraph Company, 34 N. J. Law Journal, 368, and 35 N. J. Law Journal, 8; Perlsburg v. Miller, 35 N. J. Law Journal, 202.

"The English cases cited in Bradbury's book are not precedents, because a claim under the English act is ex delicto.

"The objects of our act are to protect the citizens and inhabitants of New Jersey. It is based upon the proposition that the inherent risks of an employment should, in justice, be placed upon the shoulders of the

Extra-territorial effect of compensation statutes

employer, who can protect himself by an addition to the price of his product, and so cause the burden ultimately to fall upon the consumer; that indemnity to an injured employé should be as much a charge upon the business as the cost of replacing or repairing disabled or defective machinery, appliances or tools; that under our former system the loss fell immediately upon the employé, who is almost invariably unable to bear it, and, therefore, ultimately upon the community which is taxed for the support of the indigent, and that our former system was uncertain, unscientific and wasteful and fostered a spirit of antagonism between employer and employé, which it is to the interest of the State to

remove.

"The contract here was to be partly performed in New York and partly in New Jersey. The law of New York, the Admiralty law or the Act of New Jersey applies. The parties chose the law of New Jersey by making the contract here without giving the notice required by the act to come under Section 1. Shall the public policy of New Jersey to place the burden on the industry be carried into effect, or shall the sole loss fall on the petitioner in violation of the law of his state?

"It would be contrary to public policy to place the burden on the employé under the facts in the case.

"Petitioner was receiving as compensation for his services the sum of thirty-five dollars a month, together with his board and lodging on the boat, the value of which is fifteen dollars a month. His average weekly wages were eleven dollars and sixty-four cents. The petitioner is entitled to receive five dollars and eightytwo cents for ten weeks, temporary disability; five dollars and eighty-two cents for the injury to his third finger for ten weeks; and five dollars and eighty-two cents for the injury to his fourth finger for fifteen weeks.

"The petitioner, therefore, is entitled to a judgment

Extra-territorial effect of compensation statutes

directing the payment of the amounts herein before stated, together with costs."

In the case of Perlsburg v. Miller, 35 N. J. Law J., 202 (to which the Court referred in the quotation from Deeny v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., above), the workman was greasing the wheel of a wagon on the highway in front of the employer's store, when a truck driven by an employé of another firm hit the wagon and caused the injuries of which complaint was made. The employé made a settlement with the owners of the truck and gave them a general release. It was contended by the employer that the release to the third persons discharged him also, under the rule that a release to one joint tort feasor releases all. It was held that the employer was not a joint tort feasor who was responsible for the injury; that the claim for compensation was based on a contract and that therefore the settlement with and the giving of the release to the third persons did not discharge the employer from the claim for compensation.

The case of Sexton v. Newark District Telegraph Co., 34 N. J. Law J., 368; 35 N. J. Law J., 8; N. J. Law ; 86 Atl. Rep. 451; 3 N. C. C. A. 569 (referred to in the same decision), is the case in which the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act was held to be constitutional.

In the case of Edward Schmidt (Claim No. 6), Ohio St. Lia. Board of Awards, July 10, 1912, it appeared that the Rathbun-Jones Engineering Co. of Toledo, Ohio, a corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and installation of gas engines and a subscriber to the State Insurance Fund, sent an employé to the State of South Carolina where he was engaged in erecting an engine which was built by his employers. While so doing he slipped and fell from an elevated platform while starting the engine. The claimant was a citizen of Ohio and the contract of employment was made in that State. It appeared also that the employer had paid premiums to the State Fund on the payroll of employés sert

Extra-territorial effect of compensation statutes

without the State. It was held, under such circumstances, that the workman was entitled to compensation from the State Accident Fund. Particular attention was called to the section of the Ohio Act which provides that compensation shall be paid "for injuries or death to any such employé, wherever occurring, during the period covered by such premiums," provided the employé has not elected to refuse to accept the compensation principle. (§ 20, 1, of Law of 1911.) The opinion of the Board was not put on the ground that there was an implied contract under the Ohio law to pay compensation, but entirely on the ground that the statute provided for compensation wherever the injury happened. The Attorney General made a similar ruling in response to a question by the Industrial Commission, in March, 1914.

That there is power in the Legislature of one State, or of one country, to pass a compensation law which will govern the rights and liabilities of master and servant for accidents which happen outside of the State, or outside of the country, under certain circumstances, appears to be recognized by the Massachusetts court.

This is further demonstrated, to a limited extent, by the fact that both the British and the German Workmen's Compensation Acts provide for compensation, within the terms of those acts respectively, as to seamen on German and English vessels. Of course, in such cases, the vessel is considered as a part of the country the flag of which it carries, no matter where the vessel may be. But the British Act, at least, does not require that the accident shall happen on the vessel. (§ VII.) In the British case of Hicks v. Maxton, cited above, the Court discussed at some length the question of whether or not the British Act had any extra-territorial effect, and in deciding that it did not have such effect, adverted to the provision of the statute specifically providing for seamen on British vessels. The British statute has been enforced frequently by the Courts of Great Britain as to accidents which happened to seamen on British vessels in

Extra-territorial effect of compensation statutes

parts of the world other than British ports. The German Compensation Law has been enforced recently by the Courts of New York as to an accident which happened on a German vessel while it was in New York Harbor. Schweitzer v. Hamburg American Line, 3 Bradbury's Pl. & Pr. Rep. 285; 78 Misc. 448; 138 Supp. 944. In that case the defendant set up the German Workmen's Compensation Act as a plea in bar to an action for injuries alleged to have been caused by negligence on a German steamer while the vessel was in the Port of New York. When the case was first considered the Court required the plaintiff to reply to this defense. Schweitzer v. Hamburg American Line, 149 App. Div. 900; 134 Supp. 812. In making that decision the Court reserved the sufficiency of the defense as a matter of law, saying, among other things:

"There is also an intimation in the opinion of the learned Court (at Special Term) that the provisions of the German law were inapplicable under the circumstances here disclosed. We will not at the present time decide these questions. The relation between the parties was contractual, and the answer alleges that the performance of the contract was to commence at Hamburg, but that said contract was not to be completed until the return of the vessel to that port. There is authority for holding, under such circumstances, that the lex loci contractus will control."

Subsequently the case came on for trial at the Kings County Trial Term and a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Thereafter a motion was made to set aside the verdict on the ground that the German Workmen's Compensation Act was a bar to the action, in that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the German Act, and the motion was granted on that ground. Schweitzer v. Hamburg American Line, 3 Bradbury's Pl. & Pr. Rep. 285; 78 Misc. 448; 138 Supp. 944.

The provision in the compensation acts of Great Britain