Mental shock or fright and nervous troubles injury entitling the employé to compensation within the Federal Act. Re T. F. Luttrell, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. p. 181. A laborer having gotten his fingers frozen in the course of his employment later burned his fingers at home by accidentally setting fire to the bandages, and it was held that while he was entitled to compensation as to the freezing of his fingers, he was not entitled to compensation respecting the burn, as this injury was not received in the course of his employment. Re A. M. Rockwell, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., page 242. The Industrial Commission of Wisconsin has also declared, but not in a litigated case, that "frostbite" is an accidental injury. Freezing to death. Applicant was the widow of Alec Young, who was frozen to death in a snowstorm while in defendant's employ. He was out in the mountains attending to highpower line work, and his death resulted from climatic conditions. The controversy arose as to whether this was an industrial accident. Held that it was, because there was no doubt that Young had been instructed by a superior officer to do necessary work, and the widow was awarded the death benefit of three years' annual earnings, amounting to the sum of $3060. Young v. Northern California Power Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., June 2, 1913. 18. Drowning. An employé, a boatman, fell overboard and was drowned, and it was held that this was a personal injury entitling the widow to compensation. Booth v. Aetna Ins. Life Co., Mass. Indus. Acc. Bd. 19. Mental shock or fright and nervous troubles. A workman has been held to have suffered an accidental injury by witnessing the effects of an accident to a fellow workman whereby nervous shock resulted. Yates v. South Kirby Featherstone & Hemsworth Collieries (1910), 103 L. T. Mental shock or fright and nervous troubles 170; 3 B. W. C. C. 418. In the last-mentioned case the court said: "When a man in the course of his employment goes to a place and sustains a nervous shock producing physiological injury, not a mere transient emotional impulse, it is an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. It is something unexpected, no doubt, in this sense, that I do not suppose the man thought for a moment or knew when he was doing what was plainly his duty in going to the rescue of the other party, that it would have this physiological effect on his system. It had that effect. There was no malingering here. It was a perfectly genuine case. Mr. Simon has not suggested anything to the contrary; and I should not myself. I think this is a case which falls within the Act of Parliament on the same principle and in the same way as if the man, on going to the rescue of the other collier, was injured by this fall, or had stumbled or fallen on his way there. That, undoubtedly, would have been a case within the Act, and I can see no real difference in principle (when once you get rid of the danger of malingering), between that case and the case where a physiological injury— physiological damage is produced by reason of what happened to this man when he went in the course of his duty to the neighboring stall, and saw what had happened to this workman." In this case a man, while at work, heard an outcry from an adjacent chamber. He found a miner severely injured and so badly wounded that he died. Subsequently the rescuer alleged that he was so affected by the appearance of peril of the miner that he was incapacitated from further employment and this was held to be a personal injury by accident. Neurosis following an injury entitles an employé to compensation when incapacity for work is due to the neurosis. Lata v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., Mass. Indus. Acc. Bd. Applicant was badly injured as the result of a fellow employé allowing an axe to fall 45, feet and strike applicant's Mental shock or fright and nervous troubles right shoulder. The collar bone was severed and a ghastly wound inflicted. There was no infection, but the applicant was not, up to the time of filing the application, able to use his arm in any degree and professes, as a result of the injury, a total paralysis of the arm and a partial paralysis of the entire right side. He had performed no labor for nearly a year following the accident. Defendant paid $393.75, and then discontinued further payments on the grounds that applicant was not totally disabled as claimed, but only partially so. Applicant refused to accept a reduced payment and instituted the proceeding. The only issue was the nature and extent of the injury, and the determination of this point was left to expert medical and surgical practitioners. Held that it was a clear case of hysterical paralysis, in accord with the expert medical testimony of the defendant, and that there was no malingering. The compensation awarded was for $231.25, this sum being the balance due of a total sum of $626, and it was further ordered that $12.50 be paid for each and every week during the continuance of said total disability or until the total payments on account of such disability shall equal three times his average annual earnings, or $3,000. Santini v. Mammoth Copper Mining Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., Oct. 14, 1913. Compensation was denied on the application of a railway conductor who contended that he had suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the employment in the service of the company. Campbell v. Detroit United Railway, Mich. Indus. Acc. Bd., Oct. 15, 1913; The Indicator, Oct. 20, 1913, at page 417. Where a personal injury is caused to a workman by accident, his right to claim compensation continues so long as the nervous effects remain, if they produce total or partial incapacity for work. Eaves v. Blaenclydach Colliery Co. (1909), 100 L. T. 747; 2 B. W. C. C. 329. A relief stamper crushed her finger, and after a period of time had physically recovered from her injury, but dreaded Mental shock or fright and nervous troubles to return to her old work for fear she should again injure herself. It was held that the total incapacity for work had ceased and an award of 1d. a week was all she was entitled to have. Pimms v. Pearson (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 489. Although nervousness may be the result of an accident if it is such as an average reasonable man could overcome it is not sufficient ground for compensation. Turner v. Brooks & Doxey (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 22. In the last-mentioned case the workman had suffered an injury of a not very serious nature. He returned for a short time and then went to a convalescent home and after that returned to work and continued in it for a period of eighteen months. Then he complained that because of nervousness due to the accident he was unable to work. The County Court judge denied compensation and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Among other things the County Court judge said: "It is one of the most difficult tasks we have in the working of the Act dealing fairly with employers and men, to deal with cases which are partially neurasthenic, and where the man does not desire to go back to work for a variety of reasons which have really nothing much to do with the original accident. I make a finding that the man if he desires further rest can have it at his own risk. I think that the applicant is fit for his work, and that his refusal to continue working is due to nervousness which an average reasonable man would overcome. *** I cannot help saying that these neurasthenic claims are on the increase. I know that the better class of working men will take the same view that I do of them. They are not good for the general body of the working community at all. It is not good that these neurasthenic cases should be continually up before the country." The Court of Appeal drew a distinction between this decision and the case of Eaves v. Blaenclydach Colliery Co. (1909), 2 K. B. 73; 2 B. W. C. C. 329. An applicant for compensation was working in a loft Insanity when a plank on the floor broke and he hurt his leg. As he was unable to walk he was taken to the hospital and was put under a high frequency electrical treatment, which was so efficacious that in five minutes the man seemed to be completely cured and was able to walk about. He was discharged as cured, but when he went back home he became as bad as ever. Again he returned to the hospital and had the electrical treatment administered, with the result that in a few minutes again he was apparently as well as ever. Within a few days after returning home he once more broke down and became as bad as before. The man alleged that he was unable to do any work. A physician giving evidence for the employé said he did not think Osband was malingering. He was suffering from traumatic hysterical paraplegia, and was unfit to do any work. Witness had told the man that a cure might be effected if his house suddenly caught fire, because he would then probably make a rush for the stairs and go down all right. The County Court judge decided that the man was suffering from traumatic hysterical paraplegia, and that it was not an imaginary paralysis, because he was not suffering from any paralysis at all. That his condition was one of hysteria, and, in the opinion of himself and the medical referee the man could not exercise his will to commence work. He was, therefore, entitled to compensation. Osband v. Tabor (1912), "The Policy Holder," April 10, 1912, p. 296. 20. Insanity. An accidental injury to the eyes resulting in total blindness, produced a condition of mind upon which softening of the brain supervened, causing death. It was held that death resulted from the injury. Mitchell v. Grant & Aldcroft (1905) 7 W. C. C. 113. A workman who had previously lost the sight of one eye received injuries to the other in the course of the employment. He became almost blind. In consequence his nervous 1 |