Independent contractors; sub-contractors appeared that no notice was ever given to the plaintiff of the change of employers; that there was no change in the work; that the time book and the time checks were the blank forms used by the company; that the workmen presented their vouchers on the printed forms of the company to the office of the company, and there received their money. It was held that the defendant was liable, as "S" was its ostensible agent. (E. L.) Donnelly v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 117 Cal. 417; 49 Pac. Rep. 559. Where plaintiff was employed by certain miners to work as a shot firer in the mine, and was paid partly by defendant, the mine operator, and partly by the miners, it was held that the relation of master and servant existed between the plaintiff and defendant. (E. L.) Princeton Coal Mining Co. v. Downer, 93 N. E. Rep. 1009; 000 Ind. App. 000. But where a mine owner, giving another a contract to mine, reserved no rights to interfere with details of the work, but only required it to be done in conformity with the contract and the mining rules, it was held that he was an independent contractor and the relation of master and servant did not exist between an employé of the contractor and the owner. (E. L.) Merriweather v. Sayre Mining & Mfg. Co., 49 So. Rep. 916; 000 Ala. One employed by defendants to squeeze boxes for them in their factory with their machinery, as and when directed by their foreman, who was paid by the box, with the right to hire and pay his own assistant, was held not to be an independent contractor, and for his negligence in operating the machine, whereby his assistant was injured, the defendants were liable. (E. L.) Messmer v. Bell & Coggeshall Co., 117 S. W. Rep. 347; 000 Ky. 000. A lumber company hired a person with his mill and a fireman, paying for the mill and fireman a stipulated price per month and also made the person thus hired foreman of the iumber camp. This foreman hired decedent to act as fireman of the boiler, which exploded and killed him. It was Independent contractors; sub-contractors held that the foreman was not an independent contractor and the decedent was an employé of the defendant lumber company. (E. L.) Keen's Adm'r v. Keystone Crescent Lumber Co., 118 S. W. Rep. 355; 000 Ky. 000. A manufacturing company leasing a mill to a person under an agreement to pay him so much per thousand feet for logs shipped on board, with a guaranty that he would make a certain sum per month, was held not liable to an employé of the person with whom the contract was made for such person's negligence, in the absence of evidence that the company reserved general control over the operation of the mill. (E. L.) Midgette v. Branning Mfg. Co., 64 S. E. Rep. 5; 150 N. C. 333. A contractor rented from a third person a hod elevator and appliances. The elevator, from its installation in the building under construction, was run by the contractor and his own employés, except the engineer, who moved the elevator on signals from employés of the contractor. An employé of a sub-contractor was injured while in the cellar of the building, by the elevator coming down and striking him. There was no sign, guard, or warning at the elevator shaft or elsewhere in the cellar. There was no question of negligence in the operation of the elevator other than the failure to guard and warn. It was held that the third person who owned the elevator was not liable for the injuries. (E. L.) Anderson v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 129 App. Div. 639; 113 Supp. 989. Where a tug is employed to tow a vessel, the master and crew of the tug are employés of the owners of the tug and any claims for negligence must be made against the owners of the tug and not against the owners of the vessel being towed. (E. L.) Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 123. Where the owner of a vessel employed the captain and chief engineer, and the captain employed the mate, who employed the sailors, and the charterer could not discharge the captain without the owner's consent, and if the expenses Independent contractors; sub-contractors exceeded the receipts the owner paid the deficit, it was held that there was not such a surrender by the owner to the charterer as to relieve the owner from liability for injuries to a seaman by the mate's negligence. (E. L.) Nelson v. Western Steam Nav. Co.; 100 Pac. Rep. 325; 52 Wash. 177. Where the defendant furnished all materials and employed H by the day to procure men and superintend the construction of a building, H paying the workmen with money furnished by the defendant, on a statement from time to time showing the amount required, it was held that the workmen were the servants of the defendant. (E. L.) Rankel v. Buckstaff-Edwards Co., 120 N. W. Rep. 269; 138 Wisc. 442; 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1180. A man having a contract to build laborers' cottages agreed with a mason for the latter to do the work. The contractor supplied the materials, and paid the mason by the day for the work he did. The mason had to do the work within the time allowed by the head contractor, and to the satisfaction of the surveyor under the head contractor. He was not bound to work continuously, and did not do so, but worked for other people during the time of building. The County Court Judge found that the mason was not under a contract of service with the contractor. It was held on appeal that there was evidence to support the finding. Byrne v. Baltinglass Rural District Council & Kelly (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 206; 5 B. W. C. C. 566. Where the plaintiff was employed to shovel gumbo from the ground upon cars and was paid according to the amount which he did, but had no control as to where the cars to be loaded should be placed, and the defendant owning the plant had control of the cars and general management of the entire work, including supervision, through a superintendent, over the plaintiff's work, it was held that the relation of master and servant existed and the plaintiff was not an independent contractor. (E. L.) Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Romans, 114 S. W. Rep. 157; 00 Tex. Civ. App. 000. Workman injured before act takes effect but dies after statute effective An independent contractor was building a bridge for a railroad company. The railroad company was doing the track laying on its own account, and while so engaged, a "tie jack" fell from one of its flat cars over which the railroad company had exclusive management and control, and struck and injured plaintiff, who was a servant of the contractor. It was held that the contractor was not liable. (E. L.) Gurdon & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 109 S. W. Rep. 1017; 86 Ark. 76. 20. Securing position by false representations. The fact that a brakeman falsely stated, in securing his position, that he had never had any litigation with the railroad company, while ground for the rescission of his contract of employment, does not render such contract absolutely void, or terminate the relation of master and servant existing at the time of the injury. (E. L.) Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 107 S. W. Rep. 108; 000 Tex. Civ. App. 00. 21. Minor securing position by misrepresenting age. Where a minor by knowingly misrepresenting his age was accepted by a railroad as a student fireman, though the rules of the company prohibited the accepting of minors for train service, it was held he was a trespasser, or, at most, a bare licensee, and not a servant, and the railroad was not liable for his death in a collision, since it would be liable only for injuries wilfully or wantonly inflicted upon him. (E. L.) Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bondurant's Adm'r, 59 S. E. Rep. 1091; 107 Va. 515. 22. Workman injured before act takes effect but dies after statute effective. A stereotyper in the employment of a newspaper, showed, early in 1907, symptoms of lead poisoning. He finally left the employment on June 22, 1907, and eventually died on September 14, 1907. The Act of 1906 came into operation Domestic servants on July 1, 1907. It was held that the provisions of the Act were not applicable, since the deceased was not at the date of the commencement of the Act in the employment of the respondents, or of any one else, and that accordingly his widow was not entitled to compensation. Greenhill v. The Daily Record, Glasgow (1909), 46 Scotch L. R. 483; 2 B. W. C. C. 244. ARTICLE B.-SPECIFIC CLASSES OF EMPLOYÉS EXCLUDED FROM OPERATION OF ACTS 1. Domestic servants. Bouvier defines the word "domestics" as follows: "Those who reside in the same house with the master they serve. The term does not extend to workmen or laborers employed out-of-doors. 5 Binn. Penn. 167; Merlin, Report. The act of Congress of April 30 1790, § 25, uses the word domestic in this sense. "Formerly this word was used to designate those who resided in the house of another, however exalted their station, and who performed services for him. Voltaire, in writing to the French Queen, in 1748, says, 'Deign to consider, madam, that I am one of the domestics of the king, and consequently yours, my companions, the gentlemen of the king,' etc.; but librarians, secretaries, and persons in such honorable employments would not probably be considered domestics, although they might reside in the houses of their respective employers. "Pothier, to point out the distinction between a domestic and a servant, gives the following example:-A literary man who lives and lodges with you, solely to be your companion, that you may profit by his conversation and learning, is your domestic; for all who live in the same house and eat at the same table with the owner of the house are his domestics; but they are not servants. On the contrary, your valet-de-chambre, to whom you pay wages, and who sleeps out of your house, is not, properly speaking, your |