Acts not negligent; compensation granted pensation was granted. In another case where a stone mason injured his finger during employment, and blood poisoning set in in an unknown way, causing death, compensation was granted. In still another case a brick-layer injured his finger in the course of his employment and afterwards the material upon which he was working getting into the wound causing blood poisoning, compensation was granted. A laborer called upon to perform a task out of his regular line of work is not chargeable with negligence because he adopts, through negligence, a method dangerous in fact, but not obviously dangerous to an inexperienced man. Re Robert Turner, Id., p. 319. In the last-mentioned case a machinist was instructed to do some blasting with black powder. He advised his superior officer that no black powder was to be procured, but that there was a supply of dynamite. The employé also expressed the opinion that the work could be done with dynamite and also stated that he was somewhat familiar with the use of dynamite. Two blasts were set off successfully, without damage, and while preparing another blast in a manner which was declared to be improper, there was a premature explosion and the man was killed. It was held that under the circumstances compensation should be awarded. 21. Acts not negligent; compensation granted. The claimant was employed as a powder man, and while engaged in loading a hole with powder an explosion occurred, whereby the claimant lost his left eye and his right hand as a result thereof. It was contended that the claimant was negligent in remaining in the vicinity of the hole too long, or that the fuses which he used were too short. Compensation was awarded. Re Joe Davis, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 394. The fact that a man in handling an elevator does so while he is standing on the floor outside of the elevator Acts not negligent; compensation granted rather than getting into the same, and the elevator in descending strikes his foot and crushes it, is not necessarily to be charged with such negligence as will prevent him from claiming compensation. Re William G. Crandall, Id., p. 58. A rock was found by a laborer containing a charge of powder that had not been exploded. He called to claimant who was known as a powder man to come and see the rock. The claimant and a number of other laborers went there and while looking at the same another laborer who had gone up with the others picked up a hammer and began to strike the rock. Upon his striking it the second time all of the men ran away except himself and the claimant, and upon his striking it again it exploded, killing the laborer who was striking, and injuring the claimant. It was contended by the overseer that the claimant was negligent for the reason that he had authority to stop anyone in doing what the laborer was doing and that the claimant should have drawn the charge or fired the same. The claimant contended that he, on trying to prevent the laborer from striking the rock, was told by the laborer that there was no danger and he would just take off a small piece. Just as he was trying to induce the laborer to cease striking the explosion occurred. It was held that under the circumstances he was entitled to compensation. Re Solomon Kahalewai, Id., p. 411. The claimant was working as a powder man, and while cleaning a hole, after it became clogged, with a metal bar or drill, he caused the powder to explode and he was injured. It appeared that the use of such a bar in tamping dynamite was a matter of common occurrence or usage and while more dangerous than the use of a wooden bar, it was held that the use of the metal bar was not such negligence as precluded the recovery of compensation. Re Frank Schultz, Id., p. 409. The claimant, a drill helper, was at his drill when a gang of Spanish laborers, about to fire a blast, shouted a warning. The mine to be fired was on the other side of the hill and Acts not negligent; compensation granted about three or four hundred feet from the claimant's drill. The claimant could not see the Spanish laborers, but he heard the warning shouted and took shelter under a large boulder about twenty feet from the drill. Others belonging to this gang took shelter under another large boulder about 100 feet from the drill. He was at a safe distance if the blast had been a small one, but he had no means of knowing whether it was large or small. When the place was fired a large rock loosened from the side of the hill, rolled down over the boulder under which the claimant had taken shelter and injured him. The Division engineer contended that the claimant's injury was due to his own carelessness in not getting out of the way and going as far as the other workmen had gone, when warned of the blast. It was held, however, in granting compensation that the claimant had not been guilty of negligence or an unreasonable exercise of judgment in selecting the particular place of a shelter. Re Edward Clark, Id., p. 371. The claimant was drilling a piece of iron held in a jig when the trill caught, causing the jig to revolve. Instead of shifting the belt by means of the belt shifter with his foot, he tried to throw it off with his hand. His right hand was caught and held between the pulley, belt shifter and belt, the belt burning his hand between the thumb and forefinger. The solicitor in holding that compensation should be awarded said: "Apparently the claimant was engrossed in his work, and in his anxiety to save the drill or jig from damage he hurriedly undertook to stop the machine by shifting the belt with his hand. Under the exigencies of the moment, he evidently did what first came to his mind. This would seem to be such an accident as might happen to any ordinarily careful machinist in the usual course of his employment rather than the result of misconduct or negligence within the meaning of the act." Re C. H. Hadlock, Id., p. 408. The claimant was a boatman employed in connection with Acts not negligent; compensation granted river and harbor service work at Boston Harbor. While standing on the wharf of the engineer's depot at East Boston, casting off a line or rope holding a steamer to the wharf, and in the act of dropping the rope to the deck of the steamer, the man tripped on the cap log of the wharf and fell to the deck of the steamer, striking his side on the deck and on an iron cleat. The tide was very low and the deck of the steamer was some fifteen feet below the floor of the wharf. The right leg was badly crushed. He was taken to the hospital and three days later developed marked delirium. Later he became quiet but remained irrational. Still later he became unconscious and could not be aroused. He failed to respond to stimulation and died about seventeen days after the injury. There was some question as to whether or not the man was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the injury. The solicitor held, however, that there was not sufficient evidence of intoxication to amount to negligence and therefore compensation was awarded. Re E. J. Flaherty, Id., p. 403. On the question of intoxication the solicitor cited the following cases: Wordsworth v. Dunnam, 98 Ala., 610; Sapp v. State, 116 Ga. 182; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 53 Am. St. Rep. 39; Bageard v. Consolidated Traction Co., 64 N. J. L. 316; 45 Atl. Rep. 620; 49 L. R. A. 424; 81 Am. St. Rep. 498; Houston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Reason, 61 Tex. 613; Ward v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 85 Wisc. 601. A man working on the hull of a ship was struck in the eye by a chip from a rivet. It appeared that there was a rule in force that all employés whose work warranted it, were required to wear goggles, which were furnished by the Government and served out on tool checks. There was also a notice that if an employé received an injury through neglect to wear eye protectors he might jeopardize the validity of his claim for disability compensation. It was admitted that the claimant was not wearing goggles at the time of the injury. The solicitor in granting compensation said that he was of the opinion that although a notice had been issued re Acts not negligent; compensation granted quiring the wearing of goggles that no sufficient effort had been made to enforce it, and therefore, the man had not been guilty of such negligence or misconduct as precluded the granting of compensation. Re D. O. Morton, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 385. The solicitor followed the rule laid down in the case of Edison Alleyne (not reported) in which case a rule had been promulgated forbidding employés to ride on top of work cars and it appeared that this rule had not always been enforced. In reaching the conclusion in the Alleyne case the solicitor said: "If the rule is a reasonable one and a persistent effort is made to enforce it, even though that effort may not always be successful, the employé who violates it is guilty of negligence or misconduct within the meaning of the compensation act. But the mere announcement of a rule, followed by a merely perfunctory effort to enforce it, is not sufficient. The claimant, with other laborers, was skidding heavy timbers from the pile to the planer. All the laborers had been warned to stay behind the timber, but this claimant, in attempting to expedite the work, got in front of the timber to start it, when the skid slipped and the timber fell on his leg. It was held that under the circumstances the claimant had not been guilty of negligence or misconduct and compensation was awarded. Re Andrew Nelson, Id., p. 383. The foreman ordered a gang of workmen to carry tools to a certain place to prepare to drill. A long dirt train was across the path and the foreman ordered the men to throw the tools over the train and for the men to climb over. Some of the men were climbing over and it appeared, although the testimony on that point was conflicting, that the claimant and others climbed under. The train started and the claimant was injured. It was held that under the circumstances he had not been guilty of negligence or misconduct in attempting to cross beneath the cars and that he was therefore entitled to compensation. Re Robert George, Id., p. 382. |