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cific applications are open to judicial challenge, as are other general categories in the law, by a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," citing Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878). 356 U.S. at 60.

In the absence of any judicial decision defining more clearly a requirement that any election coming within the purview of the statute must be political in the sense that it is likely to affect the relations between this country and the country concerned, we do not feel called upon to make such a determination here. We believe, however, that participation in foreign elections of a purely local character may well be inconsistent with allegiance to this country, and that in many such elections the repercussions may be unfavorable to the United States. We doubt that Congress contemplated that each and every election be analyzed from the point of view of its effect on our foreign relations, especially since that effect may be extremely difficult, or impossible to ascertain at or about the time of the election. Cf. Bisceglia v. Acheson, supra.

Factors in elections such as the nature of the issues involved, their possible effect on the foreign relations of the United States, the administrative and controlling bodies, the presence or absence of support of certain issues or candidates by political parties, may be relevant and material, individually or in combination, in determining whether some elections are "political" for purposes of the statute. We do not attempt to rule here for all the different types of elections of a public nature.

We hold, however, the elections to choose representatives of the people for the conduct of the government of a geographical subdivision of a foreign state fall squarely within the purview of the statute. Therefore, the absence in this record of evidence delineating the factors set forth above is immaterial.

The Attorney General's ruling in Matter of F-, supra, occurred early in the history of the statutory provisions covering expatriation by voting in foreign elections, and was somewhat tentative. It is clear, however, that the meaning with respect to local elections which has been given to the term "political election" by the Attorney General, and subsequently by this Board, is also the meaning attributed to that phrase by the only courts which have directly considered the question. Our review of the law leads us only to the conclusion that the elections in which the applicant participated were "political" in the colloquial sense. We find nothing in Perez, even as dicta, which

induces us to conclude otherwise. We consider that the decisions of the courts of appeals in Bisceglia v. Acheson, decided in this circuit, and in Miranda v. Clark are controlling in this situation.

The Service takes a firm position that the view of the Department of State is contrary to the law on the point considered here. The Service Representative in oral argument has referred us to Bisceglia v. Acheson and Kuwahara v. Acheson, as well as the prior precedents of this Board, and argues that Perez does not alter them. We strongly

concur.

The difficulties in which this 74-year-old, ill widow finds herself stem solely from the conflicting interpretations which the two Government agencies place upon section 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 and its successor, section 349 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The facts were made available equally to both agencies. There is little doubt that if the consular officer had considered the applicant expatriated, she would have qualified readily for an immigration visa and been found admissible by the Service. While noting the many decisions relating to expatriation which indicate that factual doubts should be resolved in favor of the individual, and the law construed as far as is reasonably possible in his favor, we hold that the law and the facts in this case are clear and necessitate a ruling that the applicant has expatriated herself. The order of the special inquiry officer will be affirmed.

ORDER: It is directed that the order of the special inquiry officer be and is hereby affirmed.

MATTER OF DI FILIPPO

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

A-12008546

Decided by Board September 7, 1962

Respondent's conviction for making false statements in violation of section 106 A(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act of Canada, as amended, is not a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable at entry-crime prior, to wit: making false statement in violation of section 106A of the Canadian Unemployment Insurance Act, and theft.

The examining officer has appealed from the order of the special inquiry officer terminating proceedings. The issue is whether respondent's conviction for violation of section 106A (a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act of Canada involves moral turpitude.

The case was before the Board on a previous occasion. On March 19, 1962, the Board ordered proceedings reopened in connection with the deportation charge for the purpose of obtaining additional information concerning the convictions, and, in connection with the application for relief, to enable respondent to refute derogatory information in the record concerning his character.

Respondent is a 30-year-old married male, a native and citizen of Italy who was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on January 31, 1961, to join his wife, a citizen of the United States. Respondent has been convicted of crime in Canada on two occasions. On October 22, 1959, he was convicted for theft under section 280 (a) of the Criminal Code of Canada for stealing $60 on October 20, 1959. He was fined $100 and costs, and a jail sentence to a month was suspended. The American Consul has found that this crime was a petty offense and consequently its existence did not make respondent ineligible for the issuance of the visa.

After respondent's admission to the United States, an information in four counts was filed against him in Canada on February 8, 1961,

charging him under section 106A (a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act of Canada with having made false statements on April 26, 1960, and on May 10, 1960. He was convicted in a magistrates court in Ontario Province on a plea of guilty to all counts; on March 13, 1961, he was fined $55 and costs of each count. He last returned to the United States on April 25, 1961.

The record reveals that section 106A of the Unemployment Insurance Act of Canada, as amended, reads as follows:

Every person is guilty of an offense who

(a) in relation to any claim for benefit makes a statement or representation that he knows to be false or misleading or

(b) being required under this Act or the regulations to furnish information, furnishes any information or makes any representation that he knows to be false or misleading. (p. R-7.)

The special inquiry officer decided, both on the basis of the testimony of an expert witness and his own research, that moral turpitude was not involved because the section does not require a false statement to be material, and because a false statement is sufficient for a conviction although it may have only a remote relationship to the obtaining of insurance benefits. The special inquiry officer expressed the belief that the statute does not require a criminal intent. He found this fact especially significant because a prior law called for a criminal intent. The prior law, section 67 of the Canadian Unemployment Insurance Act of 1945, stated that the making of the false statement must be "for the purpose of obtaining any benefit or payment"; section 106A eliminates the language concerning the purpose for which the false statement is made. The special inquiry officer was also influenced by the fact that a person who had made false statements for the purpose of defrauding the government could apparently be prosecuted for false pretenses under sections 303 and 304 of the Criminal Code of Canada which do require criminal intent.

The examining officer contends that the difference in section 106A and its predecessor is not significant for both laws concern an attempt to gain a benefit by false or misleading statements. The examining officer reasons that since another provision of the insurance law provides for the imposition of an administrative penalty where a person has committed an offense described by section 106A, the institution of criminal action implies that the actionable statements were material to the claim for benefits. Reliance is also had upon legislative debate. At oral argument, the Service representative pointed out that in two cases involving false claims for unemployment insurance the Board. found moral turpitude has been involved. Matter of L-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 705 and Matter of D-G-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 488 are cited. Counsel at oral argument requested that no change be made in the opinion of

MATTER OF DI FILIPPO

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

A-12008546

Decided by Board September 7, 1962

Respondent's conviction for making false statements in violation of section 106 A(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act of Canada, as amended, is not a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1)]—Excludable

at entry-crime prior, to wit: making false statement in violation of section 106A of the Canadian Unemployment Insurance Act, and theft.

The examining officer has appealed from the order of the special inquiry officer terminating proceedings. The issue is whether respondent's conviction for violation of section 106A (a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act of Canada involves moral turpitude.

The case was before the Board on a previous occasion. On March 19, 1962, the Board ordered proceedings reopened in connection with the deportation charge for the purpose of obtaining additional information concerning the convictions, and, in connection with the application for relief, to enable respondent to refute derogatory information in the record concerning his character.

Respondent is a 30-year-old married male, a native and citizen of Italy who was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on January 31, 1961, to join his wife, a citizen of the United States. Respondent has been convicted of crime in Canada on two occasions. On October 22, 1959, he was convicted for theft under section 280 (a) of the Criminal Code of Canada for stealing $60 on October 20, 1959. He was fined $100 and costs, and a jail sentence to a month was suspended. The American Consul has found that this crime was a petty offense and consequently its existence did not make respondent ineligible for the issuance of the visa.

After respondent's admission to the United States, an information in four counts was filed against him in Canada on February 8, 1961,

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