Carmichael, supra in which it was recognized that the "interests at stake" for the resident alien are "momentous" and that "the stakes are indeed high and momentous for the alien who has acquired a residence here." Combining these statements with the more general observation appearing in Delgadillo that "deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile" it was held that the congressional protection of returning resident aliens in section 101 (a) (13) was not to be woodenly construed. The court therefore concluded that it effectuates congressional purpose to construe the intent exception to section 101 (a) (13) as meaning an intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. It enumerated the major factors to whether such intent can be inferred as the length of time the alien is absent; the purpose of visit, as for example to accomplish some object which itself is contrary to some policy reflected by the immigration laws; and whether the alien has to secure any travel documents in order to make his trip. The court reached the conclusion that an innocent, casual and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders may not have been "intended" as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him to the consequences of an "entry" into the country on his return. In the instant case, the respondent, a permanent resident alien, made an innocent, casual and brief excursion to Mexico for a few hours. On the occasion of each absence he was going to visit relatives in Mexico. On its face, we cannot distinguish the present case from the holding in Rosenberg v. Fleuti. We conclude that the respondent did not "intend" to depart in the sense contemplated by section 101 (a)(13) and the deportation order cannot stand. The order of the special inquiry officer terminating the proceedings will be affirmed. ORDER: It is ordered that the order of the special inquiry officer dated June 28, 1963 terminating the proceedings be and the same is hereby affirmed. '374 U.S. 449, 10 L. ed. 2d 1000. MATTER OF GHAZAL In DEPORTATION Proceedings A-10542984 Decided by Board August 1, 1963 An alien admitted to the United States upon presentation of a nonquota immigrant visa procured by fraud is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status under section 245, Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1)]—Excludable at time of entry under section 212(a) (20), immigrant, no visa. This case comes forward on appeal from an order entered by the special inquiry officer on June 3, 1963, denying the respondent's application requesting that his immigrant status be adjusted to that of a permanent resident as provided in section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and directing that he be deported from the United States to Syria on the charge contained in the order to show cause. The respondent, a 43-year-old married male, native and citizen of Syria, first entered the United States at El Paso, Texas on November 29, 1955, at which time he had in his possession and presented for inspection nonquota immigrant visa issued in the name of Aldo Lutfi at the American Consulate in Juarez, Mexico. The aforementioned nonquota visa was issued to the respondent on the basis of his claimed birth in Brazil, South America. The respondent last entered the United States at Miami, Florida on February 22, 1958, at which time he had in his possession a reentry permit issued in the name of Aldo Lutfi on March 16, 1956. The record clearly reflects he is a native and citizen of Syria and his true and correct name is Abdul Wahab Ghazal. Deportation proceedings were instituted against the respondent on June 9, 1960. Upon conclusion of the hearing held in deportation proceedings, the special inquiry officer on July 19, 1960 entered an order directing that the respondent be deported from the United States in the manner provided by law on the charge set forth in the order to show cause. During the deportation hearing held at Miami, Florida, in July 1960, the respondent designated Brazil as the country to which he wanted to be deported. A further recital of the remaining facts in this case is not deemed necessary inasmuch as they have been fully and adequately discussed by the special inquiry officer in his decisions of July 19, 1960 and June 3, 1963. The only question for us to resolve in this proceeding is whether the respondent is eligible to have his immigration status adjusted under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The special inquiry officer has concluded that he is ineligible to be accorded permanent resident status under section 245 of the Act and his reasons there for are set forth in detail in his decision of June 3, 1963. There is no legal basis for the special inquiry officer's conclusion that the respondent is ineligible to be accorded permanent resident status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended provides that "the status of an alien, other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if**** The facts in this case are readily distinguishable from those in Matter of Da Silva, Int. Dec. No. 1268, decided by this Board on February 21, 1963. In the cited case the alien had been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence and he thereafter became deportable because of convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude after entry. In matter of Da Silva, supra, we held that an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who subsequently became deportable because of convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude, is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. In the instant case the nonquota visa presented by the respondent at the time of his initial admission to the United States was procured by fraud. It was issued in a name other than his own and upon his falsely claiming that he was born in Brazil. Hence, the respondent was never lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence because the visa with which he effected entry was procured by fraud and he was not entitled to the nonquota status specified in his immigrant visa. As previously noted, section 245 of the Act as amended provides that the status of any alien, other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and admitted into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, ***. The respondent in the instant proceeding was inspected and admitted into the United States in November 1955 and at the time of his last admission on February 22, 1958. Hence, we conclude he is statutorily eligible to have his immigrant status adjusted under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Upon full consideration of all the evidence of record and counsel's representations in oral argument, we have concluded to remand the case to the special inquiry officer in order that he may reconsider or consider anew the respondent's application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, Accordingly we will so order. ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be sustained. It is further ordered that the case be remanded to the special inquiry officer for further proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing opinion. MATTER OF Woo In DEPORTATION Proceedings A-11822728 Decided by Board August 13, 1963 While an applicant for suspension of deportation who is exempt from the requirement of any specified period of continuous physical presence as provided by section 244 (b), Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is also exempt from the necessity of establishing good moral character for the period coextensive with the physical-presence period, he must establish good moral character between the date he filed his suspension application and the date it is finally adjudicated. Conduct prior to the filing date can be considered in determining whether good moral character has been established during the period in question. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable at entry under section 212 (a) (20)—No immigrant visa. The special inquiry officer on June 18, 1963 entered an order granting the respondent's request that his deportation be suspended under the provisions of section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and directed that the case be certified to this Board for final decision in accordance with the applicable regulations. The respondent, a 28-year-old married male, native and citizen of China, was first admitted to the United States at San Francisco, California on March 24, 1948 under the name of Louie Chung Hing as the United States citizen son of Louie Sheuck Yu, a native-born citizen of the United States. The respondent last entered the United States at Travis Air Force Base on or about May 16, 1960 as a member of the United States Armed Forces. Deportation proceedings were instituted against the respondent on February 14, 1962. Hearings in deportation proceedings were held at Seattle, Washington on March 6 and March 26, 1962, at which time the respondent and counsel admitted the truth of the factual allegations set forth in the order to show cause and conceded deportability on the charge stated therein. The respondent was not a citizen of the United States on the |