the other. If inconsistent, the expression of the Congressional will which is later in time prevails. Nullification of a treaty by implication is not favored, however.10 Here there is no inherent inconsistency between, on the one hand, our Treaty of Extradition with Venezuela and the statutory provisions for extradition and, on the other, the statutory provisions of deportation, including withholding of deportation on the basis of impending physical persecution. Any inconsistency which might result would arise only from divergent applications of those provisions by different government officials. Statutes should be interpreted and applied, however, so as to render them harmonious and to give maximum effect to the provisions of each. A decision by the Secretary of State granting extradition will terminate any deportation proceedings in whatever posture they might be at the time. Thus, although pending section 243 (h) proceedings might support a request for reconsideration of the Secretary's decision, or for some form of judicial relief, failing either of those remedies the 243 (h) proceedings would be effectively terminated. The same result would obtain if respondent had successfully prosecuted such application to a conclusion. Since the granting of the stay would not necessarily bar extradition, the stay of deportation might be abruptly terminated. The Treaty requirement that Venezuela will try respondent only for the crimes specified in the warrant of extradition (for which the judge has already found probable cause) and the express prohibition against trial or punishment for a political crime or offense distinguish the extradition proceedings from these." Only if Venezuela should, because of overriding political considerations, dishonor its obligations under the Treaty would the factors to be considered in the two proceedings merge. Moreover, if the Secretary of State considers whether Venezuela might physically persecute respondent, his conclusion on the overall likelihood of physical persecution might differ from a decision by the special inquiry officer, or by us, granting withholding of deportation. The withholding of deportation authorized by section 243 (h) of the Act may terminate at any time the Attorney General deems that de Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra ; Ex parte Gin Kato, 270 F. 343 (D.C., 1920); In re Giacobbi, 32 F. Supp. 508 (1939), aff'd sub nom U.S. ex rel. Giacobbi v. Fluckey, 111 F. 2d 297 (C.A. 2, 1940). 10 United States v. Domestic Fuel Corp., 71 F. 2d 424 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1934). "The magistrate found that the evidence did not establish probable cause for the charges of murder and participation in murder as accessory before the fact. He also found that the financial crimes were not of a political character-hence not barred by Article III of the Treaty. portation may be effected without subjecting the alien to physical persecution. Therefore, issuance of a warrant of extradition here might be considered basis for terminating any stay of deportation granted under section 243 (h). In a sense the language of the Treaty and of the statutory provisions involved in respondent's case would all have been given effect. But the 243 (h) proceedings would actually have served no useful purpose from the point of view of the determination of respondent's case. As the Service motion and argument point out, such proceedings would serve only to complicate the extradition proceedings. We think they should not be made available for the purpose of bolstering up respondent's argument before the Secretary of State or providing a diversionary and distracting element in the overall proceedings involving respondent, which are already extensive. Orderly procedure requires deferral of any proceedings under section 243 (h) until a final decision is rendered in the extradition case. Procedures under that section will be available to respondent if the extradition proceeding terminates in his favor, and if otherwise warranted at that time. We, therefore, deny respondent's motion solely on the grounds that it is inappropriate at this time. Respondent contends that we lack authority to withdraw the outstanding deportation order.12 The statutory provisions for deportation say that aliens in certain categories in the United States shall be deported upon the order of the Attorney General. Neither the statute nor the regulations limits the Attorney General's discretionary authority in the timing the the entry of such an order. Respondent's counsel concedes that we have authority to withdraw an order of deportation in certain instances where the grounds for deportation have been eliminated or where certain applications for relief, such as suspension of deportation and voluntary departure, are to be granted.13 He also concedes that entry of the deportation order could have been deferred in the first place. Our general authority extends to exercising whatever discretion and authority-appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the casethe law confers upon the Attorney General in the matters before us for determination.14 We do not doubt we have the discretionary power to withdraw the order of deportation if we deem such action warranted. 12 In none of the cases cited by respondent to show that the Attorney General has a duty to deport after entry of a final order of deportation was an extradition proceeding pending along with the deportation proceeding. 13 The Attorney General has held an outstanding order of deportation may be withdrawn to grant suspension of deportation. Matter of B—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 713. 14 8 CFR 3.1(d). Only one argument of any force supports counsel's contention that, in respondent's case, entry and withdrawal of the deportation order is improper (although entry of the order might properly have been deferred in the first place). We consider such force is slight here. Counsel contends that the six-month period during which respondent might have been taken into custody under the present order has run. Thus, he argues, future reinstatement of that order after withdrawal would open up a new opportunity for respondent's confinement. We do not examine the legal basis for this contention. Assuming that counsel's statement of the situation is correct, we think the possibility he envisages is remote. If the deportation order is withdrawn, perhaps circumstances will not necessitate future reinstatement of deportation proceedings. If such proceedings are reinstated, perhaps a final order of deportation will not be entered. If a final order of deportation is entered, perhaps respondent will not be taken into custody under that order. On the other hand, while the deportation order is outstanding respondent remains entitled to pursue his section 243 (h) application. We have concluded that the deportation proceedings should not, during the pendency of the extradition proceedings, be reopened to enable respondent to be heard on that application. Withdrawal of the order of deportation removes the basis for the section 243 (h) application. There is only a vague possibility that respondent might in the future be prejudiced through consequences flowing from a reinstatement of the order of deportation. Against that possibility is the more immediate possibility of complicating the extradition proceedings if the deportation order remains in effect. Respondent may confine to the proceedings before the Secretary of State his argument that on political grounds he should not be extradited to Venezuela. If successful there, it is unlikely that he would have to argue further that his deportation to Venezuela should be withheld. But, if necessary, he could have full opportunity to present his case. The concurrent treaty and statutory procedures applicable to respondent may thus be given their maximum effect. We decide here only a limited phase of the overall proceedings involving respondent. In the perspective of the entire applicable statutory and treaty provisions, however, orderly procedure requires withdrawal of the deportation order as well as deferral of further proceedings pertaining to deportation. We see nothing in the matters of more immediate concern to us which requires a different ruling. We shall grant the Service motion. ORDER: It is ordered that respondent's motion to reopen the deportation proceedings to afford him an opportunity to be heard on his application for the benefits of Section 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act be and hereby is denied. It is further ordered that the Service motion to withdraw the order of September 8, 1959, directing respondent's deportation, and to hold in abeyance the deportation proceedings be and hereby is granted. It is further ordered that the order of September 8, 1959, directing respondent's deportation be and hereby is withdrawn and that any further deportation proceedings be held in abeyance during the pendency of the proceedings under the provisions of the Treaty of Extradition between Venezuela and the United States and applicable statutory provisions pertaining to extradition. MATTER OF ST. DEMETRIOS GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH In VISA PETITION Proceedings A-12757532 Decided by Deputy Associate Commissioner March 21, 1963 Urgent need within the contemplation of section 203(a)(1), Immigration and Nationality Act, does not exist when the beneficiary's services as a cantor, to be performed only during Sunday and holy-day ceremonies, are needed by petitioner church on less than a full-time basis and the beneficiary, in order to sustain himself and his family will be required to engage in additional unrelated work. The petitioner is a church located in Perth Amboy, New Jersey, with a parish consisting of 420 families. The services of the beneficiary are sought as a precantor during Sunday and holy day ceremonies. The beneficiary is a 34-year-old native and citizen of Greece, who is married and has three children. He has the equivalent of a high school education. The sole document presented in support of his qualifications is a priest's certificate stating that the beneficiary had served as a precantor for St. Demetrios Church in Tripolis, Greece, for six years. During this period, from 1954 to 1960, he was also employed as a leather worker. In 1960, the beneficiary immigrated to Canada where he was employed in restaurants, cleaning establishments and leather shops. His passport reflects his occupation as a tanner. The petitioner originally stated that one cantor is presently employed on a part-time voluntary basis, receives a percentage of the ceremony fees and tips, and is employed full-time in another field of endeavor. The petitioner stated that this individual was elderly, in poor health, and that the services of the beneficiary were desired to replace him; that it was impossible to find cantors in the United States; that the beneficiary's wages would be determined by the Board of Trustees and would probably be between $100 and $200 a month, and that the beneficiary would have to seek other employment to supplement these earnings in order to support his family adequately. On September 12, 1962, the District Director denied the petition on |