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section 212(a) (23) and section 241 (a) (11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to make it certain that a conviction of an alien for violation of any law relating to illicit possession of marihuana shall render him excludable or deportable.?

The Statement of the Managers on the part of the House refers to the fact that House Joint Resolution 397, as amended, also includes the provisions of the House Bill strengthening our antinarcotics laws in providing for mandatory exclusion and deportation of aliens who engage or have engaged in trafficking of marihuana.3

The punctuation of the statute clearly shows an intent on the part of the Congress to confine the reference to the phrase "after entry” to the narcotic drug addict but there is no reference to the phrase "after entry” in that portion of the statute wherein the Congress is concerned with a person who has been convicted “at any time” of certain violations. Both the statutory language and the legislative history clearly manifest an intention on the part of the Congress to render deportable an alien who at any time had been convicted of violation of the law relating to illegal possession of marihuana, whether that conviction had occurred before, on or after the alien's entry into the United States. In omitting any reference to a conviction after July 14, 1960, there was clearly manifested an intention to render deportable an alien whose conviction had occurred prior to July 14, 1960. The respondent's conviction falls squarely within the terms of section 241(a) (11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the respondent is deportable as charged.

Counsel's argument that conviction must occur subsequent to the date of the amendment is accordingly rejected. This is not the proper forum to contest the constitutionality of the law. The respondent declined to apply for discretionary relief. The appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

* Idem pp. 21-22, 27. * House of Representatives Report No. 2088 (86th Cong., 2d Sess.) p. 2.

MATTER OF KOEHNE

In VISA PETITION Proceedings

A-10750041

Decided by Board May 8, 1963

A divorce decree granted in absentia in Hungary in 1962 to two nationals of that

country then domiciled and physically present in New York is, in the exercise of comity, recognized as valid by the State of New York where the marriage occurred in Hungary and both parties entered appearance through counsel.

The petitioner, a native and national of Hungary, has resided in the United States since her admission for lawful permanent residence at the port of Newark, New Jersey on December 31, 1956. She seeks third preference classification under section 203(a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (3)) for her spouse, a native of Germany, whom she married at New York City on August 2, 1962.

The District Director at New York denied the petitioner's application on the ground that a Hungarian divorce decree dissolving a former marriage of the petitioner is a nullity because it was obtained in absentia while both the plaintiff and the defendant (the petitioner herein) were domiciled and physically present in the State of New York. The petitioner appeals from the District Director's decision that she is not the lawful spouse of the beneficiary for immigration purposes.

The facts concerning the petitioner's marital status are as follows. She married one Laszlo Deme at Budapest, Hungary on August 2, 1955. They emigrated to the United States in the winter of 1956 and became residents of the City of New York in the spring of 1957. The petitioner separated from her Hungarian spouse in the fall of 1960. The plaintiff husband filed an action for a divorce in the Central District Court at Budapest, Hungary in February of 1962.

The divorce decree, dated April 24, 1962, discloses that the plaintiff husband and defendant wife (petitioner herein) entered their appearance in the Hungarian court through counsel; that evidence in the form of affidavits was presented to the court; that the defendant wife raised no objection to dissolving the marriage; and that neither of the parties appeared before the Hungarian court during the divorce proceeding. It appears that the Hungarian court assumed jurisdiction of the parties on the ground that Budapest was the situs of the marital res by reason of the marriage in that city on August 2, 1955 and the fact that the appearance was voluntary on the part of both parties who were then nationals of Hungary.

The issue before us is whether the marriage of the petitioner and the beneficiary at New York City on August 2, 1962 is a valid marriage for immigration purposes in light of the facts set forth above. The validity of a marriage for immigration purposes is governed by the law of the place of celebration, in this case the State of New York. Vatter of P4, 4 I. & N. Dec. 610, A.G., March 18, 1962.

The District Director concludes that under the Civil Practice Act of the State of New York ? the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of matrimonial actions, that adultery is the only ground for an absolute divorce and that the statute has certain jurisdictional requirements with regard to the residence of the defendant and the service of the complaint which were not met in the instant case.

We agree with the District Director that the Civil Practice Act of the State of New York controls with regard to whether the State of New York is required to accord recognition under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to a divorce decree awarded by another state to a party or parties domiciled in the State of New York. Cf. Glaser v. Glaser, 376 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E. 2d 305. However, when dealing with a divorce granted by the court of a foreign country, the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution does not apply and the question is solely one of comity. Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490, C.A.N.Y., 1923.

The courts of the State of New York in the exercise of comity have on several occasions recognized foreign divorce decrees where there is a showing, as in the case before us, that the foreign court assumed jurisdiction over the marital res by reason of the fact that the marriage had been celebrated within the jurisdiction of the court and over the parties by reason of their voluntary appearance and joinder although they were never physically before the foreign court and at least one

1

Section 1147 of the Civil Practice Act, State of New York, provides in substance that an action for divorce on the ground that the defendant committed adultery will lie (1) where both parties are residents of the state in which the offense was committed (2) where the parties were married in the State of New York (3) where the plaintiff resided in the state when the offense was committed and is a resident thereof when the action is commenced (4) where the offense was committed within the state and the injured party when the action is commenced is a resident of the state.

MATTER OF KOEHNE

In VISA PETITION Proceedings

A-10750041

Decided by Board May 8, 1963

A divorce decree granted in absentia in Hungary in 1962 to two nationals of that

country then domiciled and physically present in New York is, in the exercise of comity, recognized as valid by the State of New York where the marriage occurred in Hungary and both parties entered appearance through counsel.

The petitioner, a native and national of Hungary, has resided in the United States since her admission for lawful permanent residence at the port of Newark, New Jersey on December 31, 1956. She seeks third preference classification under section 203(a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (3)) for her spouse, a native of Germany, whom she married at New York City on August 2, 1962.

The District Director at New York denied the petitioner's application on the ground that a Hungarian divorce decree dissolving a former marriage of the petitioner is a nullity because it was obtained in absentia while both the plaintiff and the defendant (the petitioner herein) were domiciled and physically present in the State of New York. The petitioner appeals from the District Director's decision that she is not the lawful spouse of the beneficiary for immigration purposes.

The facts concerning the petitioner's marital status are as follows. She married one Laszlo Deme at Budapest, Hungary on August 2, 1955. They emigrated to the United States in the winter of 1956 and became residents of the City of New York in the spring of 1957. The petitioner separated from her Hungarian spouse in the fall of 1960. The plaintiff husband filed an action for a divorce in the Central District Court at Budapest, Hungary in February of 1962.

The divorce decree, dated April 24, 1962, discloses that the plaintiff husband and defendant wife (petitioner herein) entered their appearance in the Hungarian court through counsel; that evidence in the form of affidavits was presented to the court; that the defendant wife raised no objection to dissolving the marriage; and that neither of the parties appeared before the Hungarian court during the divorce proceeding. It appears that the Hungarian court assumed jurisdiction of the parties on the ground that Budapest was the situs of the marital res by reason of the marriage in that city on August 2, 1955 and the fact that the appearance was voluntary on the part of both parties who were then nationals of Hungary.

The issue before us is whether the marriage of the petitioner and the beneficiary at New York City on August 2, 1962 is a valid marriage for immigration purposes in light of the facts set forth above. The validity of a marriage for immigration purposes is governed by the law of the place of celebration, in this case the State of New York. Matter of P4, 4 I. & N. Dec. 610, A.G., March 18, 1962.

The District Director concludes that under the Civil Practice Act of the State of New York ? the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of matrimonial actions, that adultery is the only ground for an absolute divorce and that the statute has certain jurisdictional requirements with regard to the residence of the defendant and the service of the complaint which were not met in the instant case.

We agree with the District Director that the Civil Practice Act of the State of New York controls with regard to whether the State of New York is required to accord recognition under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to a divorce decree awarded by another state to a party or parties domiciled in the State of New York. Cf. Glaser v. Glaser, 376 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E. 2d 305. However,

, when dealing with a divorce granted by the court of a foreign country, the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution does not apply and the question is solely one of comity. Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490, C.A.N.Y., 1923.

The courts of the State of New York in the exercise of comity have on several occasions recognized foreign divorce decrees where there is a showing, as in the case before us, that the foreign court assumed jurisdiction over the marital res by reason of the fact that the marriage had been celebrated within the jurisdiction of the court and over the parties by reason of their voluntary appearance and joinder although they were never physically before the foreign court and at least one

* Section 1147 of the Civil Practice Act, State of New York, provides in substance that an action for divorce on the ground that the defendant committed adultery will lie (1) where both parties are residents of the state in which the offense was committed (2) where the parties were married in the State of New York (3) where the plaintiff resided in the state when the offense was committed and is a resident thereof when the action is commenced (4) where the offense was committed within the state and the injured party when the action is commenced is a resident of the state.

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