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and individual freedom they enjoy here deportation may be withheld on the grounds of impending physical persecution. Wherever possible, consistent with the purposes of the statute, considerable latitude should be extended to the foreign law. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Blazina v. Bouchard (supra at 511, cited by respondent's counsel for another proposition) indicated that repugnance of a governmental policy to our own concepts of religious freedom cannot in itself justify our labeling actions taken under that policy as "physical persecution."

The record does not reveal the specific facts underlying individual instances of prosecution in Greece of Jehovah's Witnesses. The letter from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society describes only in a general way such prosecutions. It says that the members of the sect were charged with talking about the Bible to others or getting together in their own homes to discuss the Bible, and that, in some cases, false charges were brought against Witnesses who had done nothing. The Presiding Minister in Greece describes two convictions naming the Witnesses involved. Each received a fine of 2000 drachmas and probation for six months for displaying their religious literature plus imprisonment of two and a half months in one case and one month in the other. The particular circumstances upon which the prosecutions were based do not appear, however.

We have considered the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent, assuming that the Jehovah's Witnesses in Greece who encountered police opposition were engaged in activities generally protected in this country and that prosecution under the Greek constitutional provision of members of the sect is widespread. We note, however, that the affidavit of a member of the sect resident in this country, formerly a Jehovah's Witness in Greece, alleges repeated persecution and hunting out by the police there—but refers only to one instance of actual imprisonment which lasted about 30 hours. As previously noted, the maximum other imprisonments described in the record were for about five months. Looking at the general situation as revealed by this record of Jehovah's Witnesses in Greece vis-a-vis Greek law, including the extent of the sanctions imposed by the authorities, we agree with the special inquiry officer's conclusion that any prosecution or other official opposition which might result from respondent's religious activities in Greece would not fall within the purview of section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We shall dismiss the appeal.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed. vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Nietmotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). These rights are not absolute however. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). A few cases have upheld particular applications of the police power restricting such rights. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.568 (1942); People v. Bohnke, 287 N.Y. 154, 38 N.E. 2d 478 (1941), cert. den. 316 U.S. 667 (1942). The Supreme Court has said that the First Amendment has two aspects-freedom to believe and freedom to act, the first being absolute but the second subject to regulation for the protection of society. Cantuell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 304 (1940).

The Court ruled in Murdock that a nondiscriminatory tax on distribution of literature was invalid when applied against Jehovah's Witnesses. Martin v. Struthers invalidated an ordinance forbidding knocking on the door or ringing the doorbell of a residence in order to deliver a handbill as applied against handbills distributed on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses. In Nietmotko denial of a request by Jehovah's Witnesses for a permit to hold a meeting in a public park was overruled where the denial appeared to be based not upon any valid exercise of the police power but upon arbitrary action on the part of the local officials.

On the other hand, in Cox v. New llampshire a statute requiring a permit and license fee for parades was held valid in a case involving Jehovah's Witnesses. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire upheld a state statute applicable only to the use in a public place of words directly tending to cause a breach of the peace. The speaker was a Jehovah's Witness who had been engaged in distributing literature of his sect on the street and addressing passers-by. He used the inflammatory words against the City Marshall after a disturbance broke out. People v. Bohnke upheld an ordinance which prohibited, without prior consent of the occupants, entry by nonresidents of the community upon private residential property for certain purposes, including the distribution of pamphlets or other literature. Appellants were nonresident Jehovah's Witnesses distributing religious information.

Thus in this country the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to proselyte is not without limitation. In Greece, however, that right appears to be nonexistent. Counsel for respondent urges us to adopt the standards in this country in determining whether the action of the Greek authorities against Jehovah's Witnesses constitutes physical persecution. Although at times particular aspects of questions arising under section 243(h) should be considered in the light of the standards in this country rather than those in the country in question, we do not believe the statute contemplates that unless aliens will enjoy within their own country the same type, degree, and extent of religious and individual freedom they enjoy here deportation may be withheld on the grounds of impending physical persecution. Wherever possible, consistent with the purposes of the statute, considerable latitude should be extended to the foreign law. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Blazina v. Bouchard (supra at 511, cited by respondent's counsel for another proposition) indicated that repugnance of a governmental policy to our own concepts of religious freedom cannot in itself justify our labeling actions taken under that policy as “physical persecution.”

The record does not reveal the specific facts underlying individual instances of prosecution in Greece of Jehovah's Witnesses. The letter from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society describes only in a general way such prosecutions. It says that the members of the sect were charged with talking about the Bible to others or getting together in their own homes to discuss the Bible, and that, in some cases, false charges were brought against Witnesses who had done nothing. The Presiding Minister in Greece describes two convictions naming the Witnesses involved. Each received a fine of 2000 drachmas and probation for six months for displaying their religious literature plus imprisonment of two and a half months in one case and one month in the other. The particular circumstances upon which the prosecutions were based do not appear, however.

We have considered the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent, assuming that the Jehovah's Witnesses in Greece who encountered police opposition were engaged in activities generally protected in this country and that prosecution under the Greek constitutional provision of members of the sect is widespread. We note, however, that the affidavit of a member of the sect resident in this country, formerly a Jehovah's Witness in Greece, alleges repeated persecution and hunting out by the police there—but refers only to one instance of actual imprisonment which lasted about 30 hours. As previously noted, the maximum other imprisonments described in the record were for about five months. Looking at the general situation as revealed by this record of Jehovah's Witnesses in Greece vis-a-vis Greek law, including the extent of the sanctions imposed by the authorities, we agree with the special inquiry officer's conclusion that any prosecution or other official opposition which might result from respondent's religious activities in Greece would not fall within the purview of section 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We shall dismiss the appeal.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed. Interim Decision #1280

MATTER OF MATURANA

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

A-10582913

Decided by Board April 12, 1963

A person born in Puerto Rico on October 4, 1931, of a native-born Spanish citizen

father and a Cuban citizen mother who came to Puerto Rico in 1913 and 1922, respectively, who, shortly after birth, was taken by her parents to Spain where she resided until her entry at San Juan, P.R., on May 17, 1957, was issued a national document of identity as a Spanish citizen in 1952 and was issued a Spanish passport, was a national or citizen of Spain at birth under the provisions of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain, as amended by the Act of December 9, 1931; therefore, she did not acquire United States citizenship under the provisions of section 5b of the Act of March 2, 1917, as amended by the Act of June 27, 1934, since she was a citizen or national of a foreign power

(Spain) residing abroad permanently on June 27, 1934. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952—Section 241 (a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1)]-Excludable

at time of entry under section 212(a) (20) [8 U.S.C. 1182 (a) (20)); immigrant, no visa.

The case comes forward on appeal from the order of the special inquiry officer dated November 6, 1962 finding the respondent to be an alien and ordering that she be deported to Spain on the charge contained in the order to show cause.

The facts of the case are not in dispute. The record relates to an unmarried female who was born in Manati, Puerto Rico on October 4, 1931. She last entered the United States at San Juan, Puerto Rico on May 17, 1957 in possession of United States Passport No. 471 issued at Madrid, Spain on May 8, 1957 and was admitted as a United States citizen. At the time of her entry she possessed no immigration document other than a Spanish passport which had been issued to her on May 14, 1957 at Madrid, Spain showing her nationality as “Spanish by origin.” She testified at the original hearing on May 29, 1958 that she applied for a Spanish passport after she had received her United States passport because she was required to do so by the Spanish police before she could obtain permission to leave Spain (pp. 12 & 13). At the time of her last entry she intended to reside permanently in the United States.

The respondent and her parents left for Spain shortly after her birth and the respondent resided in that country until her entry at San Juan, Puerto Rico on May 17, 1957. During that period of approximately 26 years her father had died in Spain in September 1937 and the respondent and her family continued to reside in that country where the respondent obtained her schooling and employment.

The respondent testified that her father was a citizen of Spain and never had or acquired any other nationality and that her mother was a citizen of Cuba at the time of the respondent's birth and acquired no other nationality except possibly that of Spain by virtue of her marriage. The mother stated that the respondent's father, Luis Cueto Ibanez, first came to Puerto Rico about 1913 or 1914; that she arrived in Puerto Rico on January 1, 1922 ex SS. Magallanes accompanied by her husband and that they remained until 1931, subsequent to the birth of the respondent. The mother testified that between April 11, 1899 and April 12, 1900 she resided in Spain (Ex. 4).

The Service obtained a certified copy of the affidavit contained in the respondent's passport file executed by her at the American Embassy at Madrid, Spain on July 11, 1956 in the course of which she stated that she had obtained National Document of Identity No. 2809982 issued to her on January 14, 1952 by the Direction General of Security, Madrid, Spain to enable her to travel within Spain. The discovery that the respondent had been issued a national document of identity as a Spanish citizen on January 14, 1952 prompted the special inquiry officer to grant a Service motion to reopen on the basis of new evidence after an earlier decision of another special inquiry officer dated August 19, 1958 had terminated proceedings on the ground that the respondent acquired United States citizenship under the provisions of the Act of March 2, 1917 as amended by the Act of June 27, 1934 and that respondent's alienage had not been established. In granting the motion to reopen the special inquiry officer observed that the better procedure might have been to institute a new deportation proceeding by way of a new order to show cause and to submit all the prior evidence in the new proceeding. Inasmuch as the evidence adduced at the prior hearing and at the reopened hearing have been considered by the special inquiry officer in reaching his decision, and in the absence of any objection to the grant of the motion to reopen by counsel, it is believed that due process has been observed and that the failure to issue a new warrant does not vitiate the proceeding.

Ex parte Guest, 287 F. 884 (D.C. R.I., 1923) ; Valerio v. Mulle, 148 F. Supp. 1946 (1956); Pineiro-Lopez v. Kennedy, 293 F. 2d 540 (1961); Matter of C—, 4 1. & N. Dec. 415.

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