provides a basis for believing that he might be denounced on political grounds but for purely personal, or other irrelevant, reasons. Apart from whether the injuries suffered by the witness Luna constitute physical persecution within the meaning of the statute, respondent has not connected his circumstances to those of Luna.

At oral argument counsel for respondent, in an attempt to counter the Service representative's suggestion that physical persecution contemplates action aimed against a member, or members, of a particular group, suggested that mobs in the Dominican Republic might identify respondent and his compatriots in the other similar cases before us as former supporters of Trujillo. He noted they are from the middle class, have traveled to the United States, and would be distinguishable in appearance from the mobs. We do not believe, however, that the mobs would seek out an individual on the streets of Santo Domingo simply because of his middle- or upper-class appearance.

Moreover, there are obvious interpretive difficulties in holding that physical persecution for the purposes of section 243 (h) includes physical injury due to mistake. Logically, such an occurrence appears further removed from the ordinary concept of persecution than what befell witness Luna. Practically, in only highly unusual circumstances could the opinion required by the statute be reached. Additionally the fewer and less related any possibilities of injury might be the more difficult a holding of likelihood of physical persecution would become.

Therefore, even if respondent were to suffer physical injury because a mob or group in the Dominican Republic mistakenly identified him as a proper object of its wrath, in all probability the circumstances could not reasonably be considered physical persecution for purposes of the statute. In addition, respondent has not shown that any such fate awaits him in his native land. Under any of the circumstances of the second situation which might be relevant to respondent's case, he is not entitled to the benefits of section 243 (h). We do not rule on the legal effect for the purposes of section 243 (h) of circumstances in general under that situation.

We determine therefore that respondent's case rests squarely upon the third situation.5 Respondent says that it would be risky for him, or any other Dominican here, to return to the Dominican Republic under present conditions. The provisional government, he contendsalthough desiring to maintain law and order-is unable to control effectively outbreaks of mob violence arising from the general political

Subsequent to oral argument in respondent's case, his counsel argued a group of similar cases in which counsel's contentions relate solely to what we characterize as the third situation.

unrest which has followed Trujillo's assassination. He argues that any innocent bystander may be injured or killed.

Narrowly, therefore, the issue before us is whether physical harm befalling an innocent bystander during a lawless and riotous demonstration by a mob might constitute physical persecution within the meaning of section 243 (h).

We hold section 243 (h) does not cover injuries which may befall anyone who happens to be in the vicinity of an outbreak of mob violence, even though the mob is aroused by factors commonly associated with persecution-racial, religious, or political differences. The statute is designed to benefit a particular class of persons, not any national of a country which is undergoing a period of upheaval accompanied by violence. Respondent is attempting to equate physical injury arising out of political discord with physical persecution. They are not necessarily the same.

To hold that accidental bodily harm resulting from an anarchical or otherwise dangerous internal political situation does not come within the purview of section 243 (h) is not to deny a remedy to individuals who face such situations. Deportation to troubled areas may be stayed by the Service as a matter of policy during an emergency irrespective of the probability of physical persecution, just as official temporary travel bans to certain geographic areas are often imposed. Nothing which we say here should be construed as a recommendation either for or against granting such an administrative stay of deportation to respondent. We have no jurisdiction over a stay of this type."

Moreover this appeal brings before us matters not suited to adjudicative processes. Respondent relies upon current events, but the events of record are no longer current. The decision must necessarily disregard facts which occurred contemporaneously with, or immediately prior to, the hearing and consider facts which have arisen subsequently. Counsel's own argument illustrates the difficulty. His brief argues that deportation should be stayed at least until the elections promised for December 20, 1962. At oral argument he suggested that action leading toward deportation should be deferred until at least the officials elected in the December elections take office on February 27th

Since it is possible nationals of a country might incur risks during a period of violent political discord which casual visitors would not, the absence of a general ban on travel to the Dominican Republic does not weaken counsel's argument in its entirety. But the freedom of travel to the Dominican Republic does affect adversely counsel's contention that respondent faces serious danger of personal injury as an innocent bystander.

'Counsel for respondent indicates that the Service had earlier refrained from deporting Dominican nationals to their homeland. A change in that policy brought on these proceedings.

of this year. In arguing similar cases on March 4, 1963 counsel said in effect that it is too early to determine conditions under the new government.

The changing political scene in the Dominican Republic necessitates these shifts in argument; the shifting basis for decision demonstrates that the grounds for a stay of deportation urged by respondent fall properly within the more flexible sphere of purely administrative action rather than the procedures imposed by the regulations under the statutory provision. The statute and regulations contemplate that the conditions relied upon be sufficiently static to enable, by a process of adjudication subject to review, formation of a considered opinion of the likelihood of physical persecution.

Yet the factual record here also supplies ample grounds for denying respondent's application for a stay of deportation because of anticipated physical persecution. Looking at conditions in the Dominican Republic either at the time of the hearing or at the present time, we find little likelihood that, if respondent returned there, his allegations would be borne out. The situation in the Dominican Republican is still developing. Nevertheless, in addition to being insufficiently connected to respondent, assertions in the record that the present democratic trend may terminate are speculative.

More importantly, however, respondent's application fails as a matter of law. Counsel for respondent has been afforded unlimited. opportunity to develop his thesis. The attorneys who represented the Service at the hearing in this and related cases have objected to certain testimony and to submission of some of the documentary evidence as not germane to the issue of physical persecution. The special inquiry officers-although often noting the merit of the objectionhave accepted such evidence into the record in order not to hamper the respondents' presentation of their position. We have reviewed counsel's contentions sympathetically in order to give these respondents the consideration of everything in their favor-over and above what we might perceive as deficiencies in their actual proof. At the minimum, however, the benefits of section 243 (h) may be extended only to one who faces being singled out for physical suffering imposed on the basis of some belief or activity which the oppressor seeks to overcome or punish. The assertions by and in behalf of respondent and his compatriots relating to the third situation, which alone find any measure of support in the record, do not bring them within this standard. We need not decide here what other requirements may be im

"Of course, many situations which would meet these broad criteria would not, on other grounds, constitute "physical persecution."

plicit in the statutory language particularly whether governmental authorities must inflict or sanction the physical persecution.

We reach the same conclusion as the special inquiry officer, if not completely upon the same grounds. Respondent's evidence and argument, as related to that evidence, do not, in our minds, conform to any reasonable statutory meaning for the term "physical persecution." 9 We shall dismiss the appeal.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed.

* In addition to the record in respondent's case, we have considered the testimony and any additional exhibits in counsel's similar cases currently before us, other material submitted by counsel to the Board, and all of counsel's arguments.

MATTER OF CRUZ

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

A-11775487

Decided by Board February 21, 1963

Respondent, born in Saipan May 5, 1933, has no claim under the Organic Act of Guam (August 1, 1950) to citizenship through his noncitizen national father by reason of the latter's birth in Guam in 1904, since under this provision of law citizenship does not extend to the children of the persons described therein.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4)]—Convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude after entry, to wit, petit theft and worthless checks.

An order entered by the special inquiry officer on December 3, 1962 terminates the above-captioned proceeding and certifies the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals for final decision. Termination is based primarily on a finding by the special inquiry officer that alienage has not been established. The Service representative has submitted a memorandum of law in support of his contention that the respondent has no claim to United States citizenship under the Organic Act of Guam enacted August 1, 1950 (64 Stat. 384). The Service representative suggests that the case be remanded to the special inquiry officer for further consideration following a ruling on the issue of alienage by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

The Issue of Alienage

We will briefly review the facts concerning the issue of the respondent's nationality. The respondent was born May 5, 1933 on Saipan, Mariana Island, now a Trust Territory under the administrative jurisdiction of the United States. His father was born of Guamanian parents on the island of Guam, June 10, 1904 (Ex. 4). The respondent's father was taken by his parents to the island of Saipan "sometime in 1912" (Ex. 4). He, the respondent's father, resided on Saipan