entirely missed, or merged in mere corporeity. It may be added that, in imitation of Scripture language, we also, in current English, use soul for person numerically, as "Every soul on board", "more than twenty souls", &c. In neither of the above mentioned ways is spirit ever used.

On the other hand, the special uses of spirit are:

(1) To indicate the Spirit of God, the Holy Ghost or Holy Spirit. (2) In the Acts of the Apostles frequently, and sometimes elsewhere, to indicate his miraculous gifts, or with special reference to them; but, in Cor. xii. 4-11, these are emphatically distinguished in their diversity from the one giver. In 1 Cor. xiv. 12, spiritual gifts

are called πνεύματα (in the plural).

(3) To denote devils or demons, "evil or foul spirits"; and good angels, ministering spirits."

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(4) To denote temper, disposition, character; as, "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of", (Luke ix. 55); “A meek and quiet spirit", (1 Pet. iii. 4); so "a spirit of meekness", "of love", &c.; and "spirit of your mind."

In none of these senses is soul ever used.

The question now arises, is man's nature in the Scripture regarded as bipartite or tripartite ?

In the first place, the discriminations just mentioned in the Scripture usage of the terms soul and spirit, when compared with the great mass of indiscriminate usage, can hardly be urged as a sufficient ground for regarding soul and spirit as distinct hypostases, as contradistinguished constituent parts, of man's natural constitution.

In the second place, by our Lord and by the Evangelists, only a two-fold division is recognized;-it is either "soul and body" or "spirit and body." "Soul and spirit" are never discriminated. In one case only the two are placed in juxtaposition, and that in Mary's magnificat; where they are in parallelism, and mean the same thing. Such also is the general usage of the New Testament writers, St. Paul included. Our Lord never speaks of "body and spirit", but only of "body and soul." He never speaks of the spirit but only of the soul, as being saved.

But there remain a few passages in the New Testament which afe by many held to teach the doctrine of trichotomy; and thereby, as they think, to lay the foundation for a specifically Christian philosophy of human nature. This doctrine, with various modifications, was maintained by several of the early fathers, and is by some urged as a solvent for almost all anthropological difficulties in theology. The passages relied upon are: Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 12; Jude 19;

Jas. iii. 15; 1 Cor. ii. 14, and xv. 44, 45. I believe these are all that are to any purpose as proofs. And now of these in order :

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(a) Take first the passage from 1 Thess. v. 23, "Your whole spirit and soul and body." Here I submit that, in Scripture style, such an expression is not to be conceived of as setting forth or implying a philosophical analysis of man's constitution, but rather as a rhetorical fulness of statement for the whole inner and outer man; just as "Thou shalt love God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul and with all thy mind," is not to be understood as (with the body) implying a tetratomistic analysis of the constitution of man. And yet the mode of expression in this latter case is stronger for that purpose than in the former for a similar purpose; it points much more emphatically towards a real distinction and separation of parts than the simple phrase, With all thine heart and soul and mind" (like "whole spirit and soul and body") would have done. To these four (body) being included) is, in one case, added a fifth, "and with all thy strength." Does this imply the philosophy of a pentatomistic constitution of man's being? We have just seen that both the Hebrew and the Greek terms for soul and spirit are used, both in the Old and New Testaments, as, in general, synonomous expressions for that whole living being which, as Butler says, we call ourselves. It is true that, like all so-called synonomous words,-like heart and soul and mind,—they may each have some special modification of meaning and some special proprieties of use and application. But all this is not enough to show that they denote distinct things or beings or objects of thought. We must always beware how we read our modern abstractions and nice metaphysical analyses into the concrete and popular language of Scripture. The argument from 6ózis, poz (whole) as implying three parts is merely fanciful.

(b) Next comes Heb. iv. 12, "The dividing asunder of soul and spirit." This dividing is thought to settle the question as to the real distinction between soul and spirit, by showing that they are not only logically but actually separable. But here, in fact, the whole operation is logical, an operation by the word of God acting upon functions, and not directly upon entities, and an operation which is described in highly figurative language. In any event, it does not express a dividing asunder of the soul from the spirit, but a dividing of the soul and a dividing of the spirit; for it is plain that the dividing "of the joints and marrow" is not a dividing of the joints from the marrow, but a separation of joint from joint or of each joint in twain, and a cleaving asunder of the marrow, -as if by a strong downward stroke of a sword, the whole spine were to be cleft in the

midst. It is plain, too, that the critical discerning or distinguishing "of the thoughts and intents of the heart," is not a discriminating of thoughts from intents but of thought from thought and intent from intent; still less can it reasonably be supposed to imply that thoughts and intents are assumed to be two real and substantial divisions or constituent parts of the heart. If it be suggested that the soul and spirit are absolute units, indivisible entities, and, so, incapable of separation into parts; I answer, that neither the language of Scripture nor the ordinary speech of even these our philosophical and scientific times has anything to do with such nice distinctions. The Scriptures speak, and we speak, of a distracted mind, a divided heart, a wounded and broken spirit. In short, in my view, the text would have much the same sense if it read: "Dividing asunder of heart and soul," &c., or, " Of heart and spirit," &c.

(c) Four passages remain; in all of which the adjective "psychic" or "psychical," (Toytzós), is used in opposition to "spiritual" or "pneumatic," (vevpatizós.) St. Jude speaks of certain men as "psychical, not having the spirit." But surely he is not speaking of men who are destitute of a trichotomistic part of the human constitution; but of men who, in their full natural powers, are destitute of the Spirit of God, and so are of a worldly and carnal disposition. In like manner St. James describes certain men as "earthly, psychical, demon-like";-as if he had said, "not having the Spirit of God, but the spirit of evil demons." So also St. Paul, in 1 Cor. ii. 14, represents the "psychical man as one who is not enlightened and taught by the Spirit of God, in contrast with the spiritual (or pneumatical) man who is so taught. Thus St. Jude furnishes the key, "psychical, not having the Spirit "-not having the Spirit of God.

The passage in 1 Cor. xv. 44 is somewhat different. Here the Apostle speaks of "a psychical body and a spiritual (or pneumatical) body." Now, as the psychical man is not a man who is destitute of a third part of man's normal constitution, or of a rational and moral nature, but a man who has not the Spirit of God; he is, while in this natural condition,-while not informed, illumined, energized by the indwelling of the Divine Spirit, worldly, carnal, sensual; and so he is associated in the Apostle's mind with this mortal and corruptible body. And the spiritual (or pneumatic), which the Apostle most commonly sets in an antithesis to the fleshly or carnal (σαρκικός-πνε μα to áp)—is thus naturally opposed here to the psychical. The psychical body, then, is that which furnishes the organic connexion. with worldly and sensible things, while the spiritual body is that which shall furnish an organic connexion with external things in a

heavenly and spiritual state;-I say, an organic connexion after the analogy of the present body in its relation to the mind or soul. For the spiritual body is body and not spirit, and therefore must come under the definition of body. If it were to be mere spirit, then every man, in the future state, would have two spirits, the spirit that he had here and another spirit received at the resurrection.

The Spirit of God is not represented as coming into direct contact with the outer man, but first with the inner man, and through that with the outer. And thus the Apostle says: "If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his spirit that dwelleth in you." And the operation of the Spirit of God upon the inner man, renewing, enlightening, sanctifying; changing the psychical to the pneumatical man; is not represented, and is not to be conceived of, as introducing into its subjects any new substance or faculties or constituent parts of their nature, but as renovating and restoring the deranged and perverted or misdirected functions; the regenerate man is renewed in the spirit and temper of his mind, renewed in righteousness and true holiness, renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him, created anew in Christ Jesus. Through the power of the Holy Ghost, Christ dwells in his people as a quickening Spirit. It is presumed that man in his original condition, before he sinned, was not destitute of the Spirit. And yet, to illustrate the reality of the psychical body, the Apostle refers to Adam as he was originally created: "And so it is written," he says, "the first man Adam was made a living soul." Thus, in his normal original state, he was a psychical man. The u, uzós, do not, therefore, necessarily carry with them a bad sense; but only when the latter is used in a distinctively negative way, as the Apostle here employs it, so that it implies the destitution of the Divine Spirit.

But now, finally, supposing that the Apostle here or elsewhere would contradistinguish soul and spirit as being distinct and co-ordinate, higher and lower, parts of man's inner nature; I should still maintain that the whole usus loquendi of the Scriptures requires us to consider it as a functional and not a substantial distinction. The twofold distinction into body and soul, body and spirit, body and mind, is to be regarded as a real and substantial distinction; but in the threefold distinction into "body, soul and spirit," that between soul and spirit simply refers to different faculties, relations or activitiesfunctions of the inner man, who is substantially an individual unit, but whose functions are thus distributed in respect to his moral

and religious state, into two great departments, lower and higher, earthward and heavenward.

Those who scout the idea of substances as a mere metaphysical figment must of course admit the negative proposition, that the distinction in question is not substantial; and it is difficult to see how they can refuse to admit the positive proposition, that it is functional. On the other hand, those who adopt the idea of substance, as it is commonly understood, must either admit the statement that the distinction in question is not substantial but functional, or they must hold that there are real substances in the world which are neither matter nor mind, and that either the soul or the spirit is such a sub

stance.

I suppose that nobody has ever denied or doubted that in man's inner nature there are higher and lower powers or faculties or functions, and that it is the higher parts that are directly receptive of the impulse of the Divine Spirit. And if this is all that is meant by the trichotomists, they need not make much noise about their discovery. The real difficulty would be to draw any precise line between the higher and the lower, and to distribute all man's faculties or functions (other than the bodily) into the two departments of soul and spirit; and especially to make this distribution as of Scripture authorily and in consonance with the actual use of these words in the Old and New Testaments, or in either of them. The commonly received and very loose division of man's nature into Intellectual, Moral and Physical does not seem to correspond to what is meant by those who make the threefold division into spirit, soul and body; for they are understood to include the higher-rational as well as moral-faculties under the spirit, while they admit that in great part the moral affections belong to the soul. But we have seen that the same affections belong also to the spirit; and St. Paul enumerates among the fruits of the spirit, "love, joy, peace," &c., and speaks of "your love in the spirit." And if it be suggested that the higher affections belong to the spirit.and the lower to the soul, it is remarkable that the very highest of the affections, that which is the foremost of the spiritual graces, the very heart of the highest spiritual life, that which will endure when faith and knowledge shall vanish away-love, is a function of the soul. See Isa. xlii. 1, "In whom my soul delighteth"; and Song of Solomon, i. 7 and iii. 1-4, where "my soul loveth" is five times repeated. Here the Septuagist uses the verb αγαπάω.

The trichotomists are understood to admit that the will belongs to the soul; and certainly the soul is represented as the active, motive