CHAPTER XXII

THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA

In the early days of the American Republic it is probable that George Washington as little contemplated entanglements in Asia as in Europe. So far as Asia in general is concerned, most Americans probably are scarcely more apprehensive to-day. It was in accordance with such a view that the United States proved quite unresponsive to the suggestion that she might fittingly accept a mandate for the government of Syria, or of Palestine, or at least of Armenia.

Yet, even before we had a Pacific coast-line, our ships were in touch with China. No sooner was Hawaii discovered than the vessels which had found their way to the northwest began to make those Pacific voyages to which allusion has been already made. In those cases, of course, the urge was commercial rather than political, yet it is clear that when Mr. Seward1 negotiated for the purchase of Alaska from Russia he had at least the intuition that destiny was calling upon the United States to play not only a Pacific but an Asiatic rôle.

Then the dream faded, except in so far as the reopening of China and Japan to American commerce made the Pacific a reality. The vision did not return until after the inauguration of President McKinley in 1897 and the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. But the visions men had up to this point were mere phantoms of the night as compared with those excited by the dramatic events of the first days of May 1898. In those

Cf. Mr. Seward's words: "The Pacific Ocean with its shores, islands, and the vast region beyond will become the world's greatest theatre hereafter."

days, as by a bolt from the blue, the United States was made aware of a destiny across the Pacific, in lands whose very names were to the majority of Americans meaningless, unknown. The acquisition of the Philippines by purchase from Spain, following upon the Peace of Paris, must be regarded as an event second to none in the story of our political action abroad.

The date 1898 may indeed be considered epoch-making in American history for the world-consciousness it was destined to make possible. Yet there is no real antagonism between the two periods of history, before and since, for though America's time of segregation was not terminated until the events we have mentioned, the tide of history had been all along carrying the United States toward a closer contact with Asia. The movement of Americans across their own plains toward the shores of the Pacific was the movement of frontiersmen advancing to contact with the frontiersmen of the Eastern hemisphere.1 Though in 1913 President Wilson seemed shocked at the idea of our interfering with the domestic concerns of China, that interference had been a fact as early as the first treaty we made with China in 1844. In the imposing upon China of the disabilities of extrality, in the refusal of tariff autonomy, and in all that is involved in most-favored-nation clauses, the United States had been guilty of interference, in line with the other treaty Powers.2 Indeed, in the reopening of Japan the United States had taken the leading part in forcing its nationals upon the unwilling East. Although there was no avowal on the part of Perry of intention to open Japan to the world by force, there is little doubt that such a violent introduction of Japan to international life was among the probabilities. By the Treaty of Kanagawa the United States as definitely left behind its

1 Cf. Inui, The Unsolved Problem of the Pacific, ch. 1.

It should be remembered that American traders had their share in the opium traffic. American vessels had the monopoly of taking Turkish opium to China. In 1839, 1500 of the chests of opium seized by Commissioner Lin were the property of one American firm. When the trade was legalized in 1858 the action had the support of the American plenipotentiary.

own continental seclusion, to find political and commercial expansion in Asiatic waters, as Japan deserted her own policy of an hermetically sealed existence for intercourse with the outer world. The extent to which two worlds, each unknown to the other, differed in civilization and ideals is illustrated not merely in the reports which came from Japan through the pens of Perry and his associates but also in the accounts given by the first Japanese envoys to the United States in 1861. They expressed their amazement over the crudities of a barbarian court and a nation without refinement.1 We are so accustomed to think of the service we rendered Japan in opening her eyes to the advantage of things Western that we have but little reflected over the enlargement of mind and soul which is still possible to America through the sympathetic understanding of things Oriental.

Since the making of treaties with China and Japan, the situation on both sides of the Pacific has become replete with problems as well as with profits. While some of these problems have been to a certain extent disposed of, others are at present in the fruiting or seeding stage. On some of them it is not now necessary to dwell. For instance, the Chinese immigration question has passed the danger point, though the general question should not be regarded as settled on any principle which can ultimately be considered satisfactory. The acquiescence of Chinese in the status assigned them has been a considerable element in the situation, but we cannot assume that this acquiescence will continue if China pulls herself together as a united and powerful state. The question of the use of American capital in China is one which has by no means been settled. The old period of competition has been in a measure superseded by a period of international finance, but it is quite possible that the financial conquest of China by means of a consortium may be feared and resented. The presence of American money in China does condition China's independence

1 See "The First Japanese Embassy to America," H. H. Gowen, Washington Historical Quarterly, Jan. 1925.

in ways which are sufficiently obvious. As Mr. J. V. McMurray1 writes: "The international status of the Chinese Government is determined and conditioned by its business contacts with individual foreign firms or syndicates, scarcely, if at all, less than by its formal treaties with other governments." It is this fact which was President Wilson's excuse for saying that foreign loans may "touch very nearly the administrative independence of China." Though loans are offered presumably for important constructive and reconstructive work which China by herself is unable to carry through, it becomes a grave question, very seriously viewed by certain Chinese statesmen, as to how far a consortium may not involve a foreign supervision of China herself. Mr. McMurray's words are strikingly true: "The way in which foreign capital meets its responsibilities in serving the ends of the new China will, more than any other factor, determine the solution of that greatest of all problems confronting mankind—the relationship that is to exist between the civilizations of the East and of the West."3 Another question which requires to be studied from opposite points of view is that of trade competition in the Orient, and the doctrine of the open door. There are at least three points of view to be kept in mind in considering this question. There is the altruistic point of view, which is so often put forward exclusively the idea that the open door is an American ideal, purely in the interest of China and designed to head off the ambition of imperialistic powers. There is the Japanese point of view, which regards the mainland of Asia as of particular importance to Nippon, by reason of contiguity and as supplying the raw materials necessary for her as an industrial nation. There is also, unquestionably, a kind of American imperialism which considers the Eastern markets especially attractive and is inclined to resent the competition of rivals. All these points

1 Now American Minister to China.

2 See "Problems of Foreign Capital in China," J. V. McMurray, Foreign Affairs, April 1925.

Ibid.

of view are legitimate, up to a certain limit. We need a China protected from those who would monopolize her to their own advantage; we need a Japan whose surplus population finds an outlet into lands adjacent to the Empire; we need also an America which seeks and finds markets across the Pacific. The task of statesmanship is so to reconcile these points of view that these nations, with all others concerned, may not ruin the splendid prospects they now envisage by seeking enrichment through the impoverishment of others.

Much might be said with regard to the questions already touched, but there are two other questions which are of such distinct importance that for the remainder of the chapter we must confine ourselves to them. They are: first, the question of the disposal of the Philippines; secondly, that of a just solution of the immigration question as it affects Orientals.

The Philippine question at present is not really whether the United States should retain or give up the islands. From the beginning of the occupation our avowed policy has been to prepare them for self-government. This is plainly stated in the preamble of the Jones Bill of 1910. The problem now is when and under what conditions we should withdraw, so as to leave the natives of the group free to pursue their independent national life. There have been already several kinds of government paving the way toward greater freedom. On May 1, 1898, Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet and occupied Cavite. On August 13 Manila was captured by General Wesley Merritt. By the Peace of Paris, December 10, 1898, the islands passed into American hands, though the treaty was not confirmed by the Senate till February 6, 1899. There was some disappointment among the Filipinos, under their leader, Aguinaldo, because the islands, bought from Spain for $20,000,000, were not immediately handed over to the revolutionary chief. This, with other misunderstandings, led to the campaign against the rebels, which was only ended by the capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901. Civil government was introduced by a Commission headed by Dr. J. G. Schur