cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness. against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

NOTE. The provision requiring an indictment by a grand jury as a prerequisite to a trial on a criminal charge does not apply to persons in the military or naval service of the United States, who are at all times subject to the military law; or to persons in the militia so long as they are in such service. The words, "when in actual service in time of war or public danger," apply to the militia only. Johnson v. Sayre (1895) 158 U. S. 114, 39 L. ed. 916, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 773.

Twice in jeopardy. This provision has been the subject of frequent judicial consideration under a great variety of circumstances. Federal decisions and also state decisions should be consulted in a complete study of the subject.

As illustrations of the peculiar situations likely to arise under this provision, it may be noted that in Moore v. Missouri (1895) 159 U. S. 673, 40 L. ed. 301, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179, it was held that a person was not twice put in jeopardy for the same offense because for a second offense his punishment is increased because of a former offense; and in Moore v. Illinois (1852) 14 How. 20, 14 L. ed. 309, that a person who by the same act violates a state law and also a Federal statute may be punished under both, and that he is not thereby put twice in jeopardy.

The provision relating to taking private property for public use involves the policy of eminent domain, under which the state or the nation asserts its superior sovereignty as against the individual. All property is subject to the exercise of this power, and while every individual must in a

proper case surrender his property to the sovereign for a public use, the sovereign must pay for it, and the owner is entitled to a just compensation for the property so taken.

ARTICLE VI.

1. [Accused entitled to speedy and impartial trial.] -In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law; and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Note. The provision relating to trial by jury applies only to cases in the Federal courts. Eilenbecker v. District Court (1890) 134 U. S. 35, 33 L. ed. 803, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424.

The provision that an accused person shall be confronted with the witnesses against him was considered in Mattox v. United States (1895) 156 U. S. 240, 39 L. ed. 410, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, where it was said that "the primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." It was held in this case that this provision is not infringed by permitting the testimony of a witness sworn upon a former trial to be read against the accused, when a copy of the stenographic report

of the former testimony is supported by the oath of the stenographer that it is a correct transcript of his notes and of the testimony of the deceased witness.

ARTICLE VII.

1. [Trial by jury preserved.]-In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reëxamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Note. This section, relating to trial by jury in civil cases, applies only to courts sitting under authority of the United States. Pearson v. Yewdall (1877) 95 U. S. 294, 24 L. ed. 436. It does not apply to trials in equity cases. Shields v. Thomas (1855) 18 How. 262, 15 L. ed. 372.

ARTICLE VIII.

1. [Bail, fines, and punishments to be reasonable.] -Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Note. This amendment is limited to the Federal judiciary, and is not applicable to the states. Ex parte Watkins (1883) 7 Pet. 573, 8 L. ed. 789.

The provision against cruel and unusual punishments is not violated by a statute increasing the punishment for a second offense. McDonald v. Massachusetts (1901) 180 U. S. 311, 45 L. ed. 542, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. For an extended review of authorities on the subject of cruel and unusual punishments, see 35 L.R.A. 561.

ARTICLE IX.

1. [Rights reserved to people.]-The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con

strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Note. This does not apply to the states. Livingston v. Moore (1833) 7 Pet. 551, 8 L. ed. 781.

ARTICLE X.

1. [States reserve certain powers.]-The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people.

Note. This amendment was intended to establish the line of demarkation between powers granted to the general government and powers reserved to the states. In New York v. Miln (1837) II Pet. 102, 139, 9 L. ed. 648, 663, the Supreme Court thus states the rule as to the power and duty of the state: "A state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty, of a state to advance the safety, happiness, and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends, where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its exercise, is not surrendered or restrained in the manner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these the authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive."

ARTICLE XI.

1. [Judicial power limited.]—The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to

any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Note. This amendment was the direct result of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. ed. 440. Chisholm was a citizen of South Carolina, and in 1792 brought an action in the Supreme Court on a money demand against Georgia. Process was served on the governor and attorney general of that state. A remonstrance was filed with the court, on behalf of the state, against the exercise of jurisdiction by the court, and the state did not formally appear in the action. A majority of the court held that such an action could be maintained, and that the state was liable at the suit of a citizen of another state, the decision being based chiefly on the provision in the Federal Constitution, article 3, section 2, clause 1, which, among other things, extended the judicial power of the United States to controversies "between a state and citizens of another state."

Some of the judges took occasion to declare that by operation of the Constitution the United States had become a nation, with sovereign power, as distinguished from the limited powers possessed by the central government under the Articles of Confederation, and that consequently the states, under the clause quoted, had become amenable to the judicial power of the nation. The decision was rendered in February, 1793, directing further proceedings in the action against the state on behalf of the plaintiff; and in February, 1794, a judgment against the state was rendered by default.

Following the first decision, several states protested against the assumption of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, and a resolution was introduced in Congress to amend the Constitution by denying to the Federal courts jurisdiction in actions against a state by citizens of another state. This resolution, which embodied the 11th Amendment, was adopted by the Senate on the 14th of January, 1794, by a vote of 23 to 2, and by the House of Representatives on the 4th of March, by a vote of 81 to none. Some of the states ratified the amendment promptly, but others were slow to act. On the 8th of January, 1798, President John Adams