Note. "These two classes, taxes so-called, and 'duties, imposts, and excises,' apparently embrace all forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitution. There is no

occasion to attempt to confine the words 'duties, imposts, and excises' to the limits of precise definition. We think that they were used comprehensively to cover customs and exise duties imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture, and sale of certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occupations, and the like. Taxes of this sort have been repeatedly sustained by this court, and distinguished from direct taxes under the Constitution." Thomas v. United States (1904) 192 U. S. 363, 48 L. ed. 481, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305, sustaining the validity of the stamp tax on the transfer of corporate stock under the Federal war revenue act of 1898. See also McCray v. United States (1904) 195 U. S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, sustaining the act of Congress of 1886, as amended in 1902, imposing a tax on oleomargarine under specified conditions.

2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

Note. "The power to 'borrow money on the credit of the United States' is the power to raise money for the public use on a pledge of the public credit, and may be exercised to meet either present or anticipated expenses and liabilities of the government. It includes the power to issue, in return for the money borrowed, the obligations of the United States in any appropriate form, of stocks, bonds, bills, or notes. Congress has authority to issue these obligations in a form adapted to circulation from hand to hand in the ordinary transactions of commerce and business. In order to promote and facilitate such circulation, to adapt them to use as currency, and to make them more current in the market, it may provide for their redemption in coin or bills, and may make them receivable in payment of debts to the government." Legal Tender Case (1884) 110 U. S. 444, 28 L. ed. 213, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122.

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;

Note.-The power of Congress to regulate commerce was considered by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23, where Chief Justice Marshall, among other things, said: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercouse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce' to comprehend navigation. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it." The power is to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power applies not only to commerce with foreign nations, but among the several states and with the Indian tribes. See also State Tonnage Tax Cases (Cox v. Lott) (1870) 12 Wall. 214, 20 L. ed. 373.

Numerous questions relating to the exercise of this power by Congress have been considered by the courts, involving almost every conceivable aspect of the subject. The decisions maintain the power to its fullest extent, declare that Congress may prescribe the subjects on which the power is to act, and may prescribe detailed regulations concerning the application of the power, even if these regulations reach into an individual state and create new situations, or affect existing situations there. It is a very comprehensive power when applied within its proper sphere; namely, to commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, or with Indian tribes.

4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

Note. The power of naturalization is to confer citizenship, and not the power to take it away. United States v.

Wong Kim Ark (1898) 169 U. S. 703, 42 L. ed. 910, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456. But see the expatriation law of 1907, which is given at length in a subsequent part of this book (post, 210), and which has created a presumption that a residence for a prescribed time and under specified conditions by a naturalized citizen in his native country, or in any other foreign country, shall be deemed an abandonment of his American citizenship.

As to the naturalization of Indians, see Boyd v. Nebraska (1892) 143 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 109, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, which contains several references to legislation and judicial decisions on this subject.

Bankruptcy. This power is plenary, and general in its application, and Congress possesses unrestricted authority over the entire subject. Re Klein (1843) 1 How. 277, note, 11 L. ed. 130, note; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses (1902) 186 U. S. 187, 46 L. ed. 1119, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857.

5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; and fix the standard of weights and

measures;

Note. "Under the power to coin money and to regulate its value, Congress may (as it did with regard to gold by the act of June 28, 1834, chap. 95, and with regard to silver by the act of February 28, 1878, chap. 20) issue coins of the same denominations as those already current by law, but of less intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less weight of the precious metals, and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real value. A contract to pay a certain sum in money, without any stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be paid, may always be satisfied by payment of that sum in any currency which is lawful money at the place and time at which payment is to be made." Legal Tender Case (1884) 110 U. S. 449, 28 L. ed. 215, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122.

The provision relating to the power to coin money does not contain any implication that nothing but that which is the subject of coinage, nothing but the precious metals, can ever be declared by law to be money, or to have the uses of money. "So far from its containing a lurking prohibition, many have

thought it was intended to confer upon Congress that general power over the currency which has always been an acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized nation than our own,-especially when considered in connection with the other clause, which denies to the states the power to coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." By the Constitution "it was designed to provide the same currency having a uniform equal value in all the states. It was for this reason the power to coin money and regulate its value was conferred upon the Federal government, while the same power, as well as the power to emit bills of credit, was withdrawn from the states. The states can no longer declare what shall be money, or regulate its value. Whatever power there is over the currency is vested in Congress.' Legal Tender Cases (1870) 12 Wall. 457, 544, 20 L. ed. 287, 310, sustaining the legal tender acts, and declaring them valid both as to contracts made before they were passed, and also as to subsequent contracts.

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States; 7. To establish postoffices and postroads;

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

Note. There is no common-law copyright; but, as it exists in the United States, it depends wholly on the legislation of Congress. Banks v. Manchester (1888) 128 Ū. S. 252, 32 L. ed. 428, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36.

"The power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and, as there are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents." McClurg v. Kingsland (1843) 1 How. 206, 11 L. ed. 103.

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme

court;

10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations;

II. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

12. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

13. To provide and maintain a navy;

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

Note. The power expressed in this section was considered in Martin v. Mott (1827) 12 Wheat. 29, 6 L. ed. 540, where Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the Supreme Court, said, among other things, that the power to "repel invasions includes the power to provide against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the necessary and proper means to effectuate the object. One of the best means to repel invasion is to provide the requisite force for action before the invader himself has reached the soil." Construing the act of 1795, which provided that "whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the state or states most convenient to the place of danger or scene of action as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his order for that purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper."—the court said: "The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons."