country are thinking seriously of pulling out. The Monitor quoted an MCI communications official as saying that they are unable to continue providing direct access phone service to the US due to widespread racketeering. Behind all the hype about Lebanon's economic recovery and reconstruction is a carefully orchestrated public relations campaign by the Syrian-controlled Hariri government to obscure the reality of Lebanon's miserable economic and political situation. The occupation regime has only succeeded in raising taxes on an already impoverished Lebanese population. The purchasing power for the average Lebanese has decreased by more than 40% in the last three years. The middle class in the country has all but vanished. The majority of Lebanese now live below the poverty line and in constant fear, while 1.2 million illegal Syrian workers (a number equal to one third of Lebanon's population) transfer an average of 300 million dollars of badly needed currency to Syria each month. Consequently, the Lebanese unemployment rate has been driven up to a record of thirty-five percent. Government projects and contracts are mostly awarded to Syrian-installed officials, their associates or Syrian companies. A large portion of the funds allocated to these contracts end-up in the pockets of corrupt government officials and their Syrian patrons; typically less than half actually goes toward funding of the intended projects. The Wall Street Journal in a front page article on July 19, 1995, quoted Lebanese merchants as complaining that "the layer of Syrian authority that hovers over most transactions has increased their costs. This 'Syrian component' as one calls it, must be factored into everything, from commissions on large publicworks contracts to customs duties." Top Government officials have been afforded their own special pools of public money to dispense as they please without oversight. These huge slush-funds are a major reason Lebanon's public debt has ballooned to more than fourteen billion dollars, compared to only one billion in 1990. Lebanon's budget deficit is currently running at more than fifty percent of government revenues. An incredible 42% of the 1997 budget is being used to service the public debt. The 1992 and the 1996 Syrian-orchestrated parliamentary elections in Lebanon were an unprecedented exercise in fraud on a massive scale. Flagrant violations of the electoral process, such as voter intimidation, and ballot and vote rigging were commonplace. The Council emphasizes that no election in Lebanon will be acceptable under the present circumstances of total Syrian control over Lebanese affairs. The conditions for any free and fair elections are as follows: 1. A complete and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese soil, in compliance with UN resolutions 425 and 520 and in accordance to the standards of international law; 2. The effective disbanding of all military groups, Lebanese or foreign, independent or surrogate, currently in Lebanon, with the exception of the legitimate national armed forces; 3. The formation of an interim government of National Salvation, comprised of leaders of the main political groups who reflect the popular will of the country. Their primary task would be to manage the election process with the assistance and supervision of the international community; 4. The deployment, throughout the country, of UN observers alongside the Lebanese Army to ensure and monitor the election process; 5. The creation of a mechanism by which all displaced persons, refugees and exiles, are allowed to return to their homes and villages without fear of retribution and repression; 6. The occurrence of scheduled parliamentary elections under international supervision in which all Lebanese citizens, resident or exiled, are allowed to participate in the political process as voters or as candidates. Within a predetermined timetable, the newly elected parliament will elect a president who will form a cabinet. Those institutions, namely the Presidency, the Parliament and the Government will begin the process of reconstruction, engage the Lebanese people in debate over the issue of reforms, conduct peace negotiations with Israel and work to settle any outstanding issues with all neighboring countries. The Council has strongly supported the recent amendment to the Foreign Operations Authorization Bill in the 1998 budget that the House voted upon overwhelmingly (410 against 15) on June 10, 1997. The amendment calls on the State Department to consider applying to Syria sanctions which are currently enforced against Iran and Libya under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 if the government of Syria does not eliminate its dangerous and destabilizing policies in Lebanon and the Middle East. We all know that nothing fundamental changed in South Africa until sanctions were tightened. We feel that the United States has no business playing "business as usual" with the Syrian regime. Both the Council and I appreciate the opportunity to express our concerns and suggestions before this Committee. We strongly urge you to consider our suggestions and incorporate them in your decisions and deliberations regarding US policy toward Lebanon. Thank you. Note: Along with this testimony, the Council of Lebanese American Organizations (CLAO) is submitting a number of supporting documents including NGO human rights reports. CLAO requests that this supporting material be included in the record. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST A HUMAN RIGHTS DDLE May 1997 Organizatio $ Bldg. SYRIA/LEBANON AN ALLIANCE BEYOND THE LAW: Vol. 9, No. 3 (E) SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS INTRODUCTION THE METHODOLOGY OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN LEBANON Gabi 'Aql Karam: “Disappeared" in January 1997 Magi 'Aql Karam: “Disappeared" in March 1997 Unacknowledged Detention Abdallah Diab Hussein al-Razayneh: "Disappeared" in 1984 Derar al-Karmi: “Disappeared" in January 1997 Torture in Syrian Custody Coercion to Collaborate with Syrian Intelligence in Lebanon THE FAILURE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO ACT Consequences of the Lack of Legal Remedies in Lebanon The Price of Fear. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS FOR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF THE "DISAPPEARED": WHAT YOU CAN DO APPENDIX A: Excerpt of Human Rights Watch Statement to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights APPENDIX B: Legal Complaint about the Abduction and Unlawful Detention of Gabi 'Aql Karam 3 5 8 9 9 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 16 17 19 20 21 22 24 27 28 33 37 An unknown number of Lebanese citizens and stateless Palestinians are imprisoned in Syria: some of them "disappeared" in Lebanon as long ago as the 1980s. In two cases documented by Human Rights Watch, Palestinian families have learned only recently, through information brought to them by released prisoners, that their loved ones "disappeared" in 1984 and 1987, respectively-may still be alive and in Syrian custody. The problem, unfortunately, not only involves past abuses but also extends to current practice. Lebanese citizens and stateless Palestinians continue to "disappear" in Lebanon, taken into custody there by Syrian security forces and then transferred to and detained in Syria, perpetuating a climate of fear. This report includes detailed information about three "disappearances" that occurred in 1997, between January and March, one that took place in July 1996, and another that dates back to September 1992. The report also includes information about "disappearances" of Palestinian residents of Beirut and Tripoli in 1995 and 1996, and testimony from Lebanese and Palestinians who were "disappeared" at various times between the mid-1970s through late 1993. The seizures of these individuals take place outside the law. As the Beirut Bar Association reported to the U.N. Human Rights Committee in April 1997, "no existing legislation or bilateral treaty allows such conduct." Moreover, victims do not benefit from the protection of the law. There are no effective official government mechanisms-in Lebanon or in Syria- for families to learn of the whereabouts of their relatives and to seek legal remedy. Human Rights Watch has also obtained first-hand testimony indicating that Syrian intelligence forces have detained some Lebanese and held them incommunicado - -in Syrian detention facilities in Lebanon, and in Syria in order to pressure them to collaborate with Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. Syrian troops first entered Lebanon in large numbers in June 1976, the second year of the country's civil war. The Syrian military presence was formalized pursuant to decisions taken at the Arab League summit that was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in October 1976. The summit led to the creation of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) that was to enforce a ceasefire and separate the warring sides. Although the ADF would include small numbers of troops from other Arab states, the bulk of the forces were Syrian and under Syrian military command. Syria's significant interference with Lebanese civil society, including the press, followed, as we described in a 1991 report: Late that year, the Syrian army occupied and closed down seven newspapers and one magazine in Twenty-one years later, an estimated 30,000 Syrian troops remain in Lebanon, as well as an undisclosed number of intelligence officers and other operatives. Syrian intelligence forces are known to maintain detention facilities in at least five locations inside Lebanon: in Tripoli in the north; in west Beirut at the headquarters of Syrian intelligence on Sadat Street, near the Beau Rivage Hotel in the Ramlet al-Baida neighborhood, an area also known 'The term appears in quotation marks "to emphasize that the victim has in reality not simply vanished. The victim's whereabouts and fate, concealed from the outside world, are known by someone. Someone decided what would happen to the victim; someone decided to conceal it." Amnesty International, "Disappearances" and Political Killings (Amsterdam, Amnesty International Dutch Section: 1994), p. 84. 'Middle East Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Middle East), Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime (New Haven and London, Human Rights Watch Books, Yale University Press: 1991), pp. 119-120. Human Rights Watch/Middle East |