2

Legal Status

Now, the curious thing is that this occupation is illegal by the Syrian government's own lights. For Damascus has on three occasions concurred with decisions made by other bodies that Syrian troops should leave Lebanon. It first agreed to withdraw the troops in October 1976 as part of the Riyadh-Cairo accords.3 In September 1982, it signed the Fez Declaration that committed it to "start negotiations" with the Lebanese government about "an end to the mission of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon [i.e., the Syria troops]."4

In October 1989, to win Lebanese Christian support for a revision of the Lebanese government structure (the Ta'if Accord), Asad accepted a provision that Syrian troops would be redeployed from their positions in Beirut to the Bekaa Valley two years after some conditions had been met. Those conditions were all fulfilled in September 1990; but September 1992 came and went without any change. Theodor Hanf, a German scholar of Lebanon, dubs this a "blatant violation" of the Ta'if Agreement. More generally, Binyamin Netanyahu rightly noted some years ago that "in Lebanon the Syrians broke just about every agreement they signed."

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The Current Situation

Syrian control has had many consequences for Lebanon. Earlier the most open of the Arabic-speaking countries, Lebanon boasted decentralized power, real democracy, rule of law, unimpeded movement, a Hong Kong-style free market, independent schools, and an unfettered press.

Now, the central government in Beirut keeps gaining in authority and recent parliaments are, according to Hanf, "the least representative in Lebanese history."8 Syrian operatives function almost entirely outside the rule of law (for example, they routinely make arrests without warrants) leading Human Rights Watch to conclude that "the record of violations in Syrian-controlled Lebanon has been worse than in Syria."9 Syrians police who comes into the country and who goes out. Asad's regime imposes Syrian-style standards on the school curricula, including the requirement that Arabic and Islam be taught. It brings the freewheeling Lebanese economy more in line with that of statist Syria, creates organic links between the two countries (for example, in the electricity grid and in roads), and dumps Syrian goods in Lebanon. As for the press, long the least

Specifically, Damascus agreed to "the withdrawal of armed elements to the places they occupied before April 13, 1975, and to remove all armed manifestations." For the text of the document in English, see Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, The Search for Peace in the Middle East: Documents and Statements, 1967-79 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 33637.

For the text of the declaration in English, see John Norton Moore, ed., The Arab-Israeli Conflict, vol. 4, The Difficult Search for Peace (1975-1988), part 2, pp. 1154-56.

For the text of the accord in English, see Dilip Hiro, Lebanon Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 231-40.

Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation, trans. from German by John Richardson (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 636.

The Star (Amman), 21-26 July 1994.

8 Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon, p. 632.

9 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1991, p. 604.

10 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1991, p. 605.

11 Ziad K. Abdelnour, "Syria's Failed Economic Policy in Lebanon," <http://wlo@wio-usa.org/>.

E

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4

and not just the Christians among them rejects the Syrian occupation. Survey research conducted by Hilal Khashan among 500 Lebanese Sunnis in 1989-90 showed that a mere 3 percent of them favored union with Syria.12 Anecdotal evidence confirms this. As one Lebanese put it two years ago, "Syria is at the top of the hate list in Lebanon today, much more so than Israel. Israel is perceived of only as a military threat while Syria threatens Lebanon's very existence."13

Lebanese opinion might overwhelmingly reject the occupation but, thanks to the Syrian dictator's cleverness, nearly the entire world has acquiesced in his seizure of Lebanon including our own Executive Branch. To the best of my knowledge, the White House and State Department have never condemned the occupation, preferring to see this issue only in the context of Arab-Israeli negotiations. As a State Department official explained to me some time ago, "we constantly urge complete implementation of the Ta'if Accord but it's not a bilateral priority. We've not condemned this [non-implementation] very loudly because it needs to be resolved in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement."14

In contrast, Congress is one of the few governmental bodies in the world to condemn the occupation: you voted unanimously in July 1993 to consider "the Government of Syria in violation of the Taif agreement."15 A second, similar resolution passed the House in June 1995.

U.S. Policy

The U.S. government faces a fundamental choice vis-à-vis Lebanon: whether to accept or contest Syrian domination there.

Work with the government: This means recognizing Rafiq al-Hariri as a real prime minister, accepting the August 1996 elections as legitimate, and acquiescing to rules established by the Syrian regime. Such a policy has the advantage of winning favor in Damascus and perhaps encouraging it in the peace process with Israel. But it disheartens natural allies of the United States in Lebanon and abroad; and it signals the world that while a blatant invasion such as Saddam's into Kuwait is not acceptable, a subtle one such as Asad's into Lebanon is acceptable.

Ignore the government: The alternative is to denounce the Syrian occupation and ignore the governmental pseudo-structure in Beirut. This has the advantage of sticking with our friends and our principles. It raises the danger of backing what is largely a Maronite opposition, and thereby having the U.S. government throw its weight behind a force that has already lost much of the battle.

To my mind, there is really no choice: this government must stand in solidarity with the oppressed and against the oppressors. Just as we supported Estonians and Czechs through their decades of Soviet domination, even when the

12

Hilal Khashan, "The Lebanese State: Lebanese Unity and the Sunni Muslim Position," International Sociology 7 (1992): 93. In contrast, 86 percent favored a unitary state, 10 percent a federal state, and 1 percent chose partition of the country.

Ha'aretz, 19 June 1995. For more examples, see The Los Angeles Times, 16 February 1997.

13

14

15

U.S. Congress Concurrent Resolution 28, 1 July 1993.

Telephone interview with Elizabeth Hopkins, desk officer for Syria, 10 November 1994.

5

prospect of their independence seemed impossibly remote, so we must stand by the Lebanese people in their hour of need. Nor is this only a matter of principle: Baltic leaders all agree on the importance of the U.S. government refusing to accept the Soviet occupation of their countries. One day, I am convinced, Lebanese patriots will similarly thank us for standing with their people even as they faced the seemingly invincible might of the Syrian sword.

Accordingly, I urge you to do all within your power to condemn and repulse the Syrian occupiers. Toward this end, Congress can take several steps.

First, you can use your bully pulpit by sending a direct message to the tyrants in Damascus. I particularly commend to you Rep. Eliot Engel's Amendment to H.R. 1986 concerning "Sanctions against Syria,"16 which passed by a vote of 410 to 15 on June 10. The Asad regime takes close note of such resolutions.

Second, you can pressure the Executive branch to show some spine. In 1994, for example, you had a critical role in assuring that functionaries did not take Syria off the terrorism and narcotics lists.

Third, Congress can close the "national interest" loopholes that permit the Executive branch to waive regulations, and which it seems to do disproportionately for Damascus. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Crime earlier this month, it came out that in 1996 Syria received $226 million in U.S. exports, $81 million of which was in controlled commodities.17 This must not continue.

Finally, I urge you to turn away "Friends of Lebanon" appeals for money and appropriate no funds for that country, on the assumption that any funds that go there will ultimately end up in Mr. Asad's pocket.

A final point, concerning the travel ban that has been in effect against American nationals traveling to Lebanon since 1987: this made sense a decade ago, when Americans were frequently abducted in Lebanon. But it now serves no purpose. If it's meant to protect Americans from trouble, the need is passed. If it's meant to signal disapproval of the Syrian occupation, there are many more effective ways to do so. I hope you will press the Clinton administration to repeal the travel ban and thereby let American citizens exercise their right to free

movement.

16

17

Unless the government of Syria eliminates "its dangerous and destabilizing policies," the resolution urges the president to apply to Syria the same sanctions as those already in force against Iran and Libya since 1996.

Hillary Mann, "Sudanese and Syrian Involvement in International Terrorism," testimony to the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, 10 June 1997.

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