The 1992 and the 1996 Syrian-orchestrated parliamentary elections in Lebanon were an unprecedented exercise in fraud on a massive scale. Flagrant violations of the electoral process, such as voter intimidation and ballot and vote rigging, were commonplace. No election in Lebanon will be acceptable under the present circumstances of total Syrian control over Lebanese affairs.

The Council of Lebanese-American Organizations has strongly supported the recent amendment to the foreign operations authorization bill in the 1998 budget that the House voted upon overwhelmingly on June 10, 1997. The amendment calls on the State Department to consider applying to Syria sanctions which are currently enforced against Iran and Libya under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 if the Government of Syria does not eliminate its_dangerous and destabilizing policies in Lebanon and the Middle East.

We all know that nothing fundamental changed in South Africa until sanctions were tightened. We feel that the United States has no business playing "business as usual" with the Syrian regime. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nassif.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nassif appears in the appendix.] Chairman GILMAN. We are being called to the Floor for a vote, but we will start our questioning until the second bell starts. Mr. Rahall.

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This has been an excellent panel. I think we have seen all sides represented.

I want to commend especially you, Terry Anderson, for a very comprehensive insight into the situation. I know Lebanon must stir many emotions for you, the time that you spent there and the fact that you have a Lebanese wife and in light of your return there. I just cannot even imagine how emotional that is for you, considering what you have been through.

Mr. Pipes, you have given a very excellent historical rendition and you certainly are much more of an historian than myself; I looked through your testimony-I really may not have examined it closely enough-but you seem to have ignored the Israeli presence completely in your analysis of the situation. I am sure that you don't and you have a response to my question, but do you equate the presence of Syrian and Israel troops in Lebanon equally or do you give higher preference and status to the presence of Israeli troops in the country of Lebanon than you do Syrian troops?

Mr. PIPES. Thank you for your question, Mr. Rahall.

I didn't bring up the Israeli troops because, as I indicated in the beginning, being a specialist on Syria rather than on Israel, I dealt with the subject I know best.

But to answer your question, I believe there is a fundamental difference between the presence of Syrian troops and Israeli troops. The Israeli Government has repeatedly, and most notably last summer, indicated its desire to leave Lebanon and has tried to find a deal by which it could.

The Prime Minister of Israel said, look, we will leave if you, the Syrian Government, will assure our safety; that there won't be further attacks on northern Israel.

Mr. RAHALL. That was not a unanimous opinion of the Israeli Government. I mean, it caused quite a bit of controversy within the country.

Mr. PIPES. Well, it is called "Lebanon First", and it was a proposal that never got anywhere because the Syrian Government turned it down.

Mr. RAHALL. As well as some Israelis.

Mr. PIPES. The Prime Minister made the offer, and it was quickly and thoroughly rejected by the Syrian authorities who said, in effect, why should we save your skin?

So I see the Israelis basically interested in getting out. I see the Syrians basically interested in staying.

I am the author of a book called Greater Syria, and it is several hundred pages long. The control of Lebanon by the authorities in Damascus is something that has been on the Syrians' minds for decades, and I find it an integral part of the Assad Government's ambitions. So I see the two troops' presence in Lebanon very differently.

The Israeli occupation is, in the first place, small geographically and, in the second place, limited politically; it will be over at some point, without too much concern of ours. The Syrian occupation has the prospect of remaining in place for decades and is far more pernicious.

Mr. RAHALL. At what point do you see the Israeli presence being over?

Mr. PIPES. I see Israelis leaving as soon as they can get assurances that their departure from Lebanese soil will not jeopardize northern Israeli towns. This is something that the Lebanese authorities today are in no position to promise and that the Syrian authorities don't wish to promise.

Mr. RAHALL. But it is the same as the Syrian domination over Lebanon-the alleged Syrian domination over Lebanon. Everybody agrees that that should be the case

Mr. RAHALL [continuing]. That Lebanon should be free and have its own integrity and sovereignty, et cetera; and everybody agrees that the cross-border attacks into Israel should stop. It is a matter of who is going to take the first step. Is that not accurate?

Mr. PIPES. I would draw the distinction, Mr. Rahall, that the Syrian Government hopes to stay in Lebanon. I don't believe the Israeli Government wants to stay there.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rahall, we will recess until the votes are over and continue with your questioning when we come back. The Committee stands in recess.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.

As you recall, Mr. Rahall was in the process of questioning the witness.

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to continue with Mr. Pipes.

I forgot exactly where I was, but anyway, in your testimony you have called for noncompliance or no help to the Friends of Lebanon, using the argument, I guess, that the money ends up not in

the hands of the Lebanese Government but the Syrian Government. Is that accurate?

Mr. PIPES. Yes, it is.

Mr. RAHALL. Would that also then carry over into U.S. Government assistance to Lebanon? Would you not advocate such, using the same fear?

Mr. PIPES. Yes, sir, I would advocate against such aid.

Mr. RAHALL. So I guess then the converse of that is, by punishing Lebanon, we are going to whip them into, what? Kicking the Syrians out? Or whip them into what? What are we trying to do? Mr. PIPES. No, sir, I am not advocating punishing Lebanon. Indeed, in my last paragraph

Mr. RAHALL. Then how do we get assistance to them?

Mr. PIPES [continuing]. I advocate ending the travel ban. I think our government policy should be aimed at fostering the independence of Lebanon again. I do not believe that is helped by recognizing a pseudo-governmental structure. I think it is helped through commerce and private relations, family, cultural, and religious ties. I advocate that the U.S. Government basically avoid the so-called Government of Lebanon, and make it clear to that government, to the residents of the country, to the Syrians, that we do not see this as a legitimate authority.

Mr. RAHALL. So would you advocate maybe going through nongovernmental units?

Mr. PIPES. I would indeed, yes.

Mr. RAHALL. U.S. assistance that way, as we have been doing? Mr. PIPES. I would have far less reservations about that, yes, be it with private organizations, religious organizations, or commercial ones. A whole range of nongovernmental opportunities exist.

Mr. RAHALL. What about continued or increased U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Army?

Mr. PIPES. I would be very wary of that, sir. I think that the army is, in effect, an arm of the Syrian Government.

Mr. RAHALL. Even though they have made tremendous progress, as we heard the State Department testify and numerous objective outsiders testify, that the Lebanese Army has built itself into a professional fighting group today, across sectarian lines, and not as it was in the past?

Mr. PIPES. I am not in a position to judge how the Army is doing on a logistical level or on the level of practical matters, but I would say that, as a fighting force, it is ultimately at the beck and call of the Syrian authorities. They tell the Lebanese authorities who tell the Army what to do. Therefore, we should be very cautious about building it up. The more proficient, efficient, and effective a fighting machine it is, the more problems we may be creating for ourselves in the future.

Mr. RAHALL. Would you agree with the policy of removal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, as the American Task Force for Lebanon advocates?

Mr. PIPES. I would.

Mr. RAHALL. Mr. Nassif, let me ask you a couple questions. First, I am glad you came up to me before the hearings and apologized for your testimony. It is rather harsh and makes some pretty damning statements, and I am not sure it is in the best interests

of all of our goals, which is to see Lebanon free of non-Lebanese forces, to see the Syrians removed from that country, as well as Israelis. Such statements as you make I am not sure lead toward a reasoned resolution and reaching of that goal.

For example, you say the fact of the matter today in Lebanon is that the State itself is the largest mafia in the land.

I take total exception to that statement. I don't care what-and you lay out quite a few alleged facts-what the facts appear to be, to make such a statement in a public arena, about the land of my grandfathers, about the land that I am proud to say is such and is my heritage. I just take total offense at that type of statement. How do you advocate U.S. policy toward Lebanon?

Mr. NASSIF. Let me tell you one example.

Mr. RAHALL. Besides kick the Syrians out.

Mr. NASSIF. Let me tell you one example. Last week the government, the so-called Harawi Government, passed a law to put customs duties on cars from 30 percent to 200 percent. Any car above $25,000, you would pay 100 percent customs duties on it. So automatically the price of cars after that decision will double in price in Lebanon.

Every minister went and told his own people secretly, you know, like a day or two or 1 week before the decision, to go and buy cars. This is the kind of Lebanon we have today. If you read the newspapers, every day in Lebanon, you have hundreds of examples. It is sad. Lebanon never had this kind of corruption in its history.

Mr. RAHALL. Where is that money going? How do you know that? How can you say it is corruption?

Mr. NASSIF. Everybody is accusing everybody. The head of the Parliament is saying this is unacceptable, for the people to go and buy the cars.

Mr. RAHALL. I am not going to defend every action of the Lebanese Government. I have problems with it as well. There are many governments today that you can perhaps find instances about which you can make such statements, taking it totally out of context. I think the decisions they made perhaps are not decisions I would make if I were in that same place.

But I don't think we can make such broad statements, painting with a broad brush, if we are really serious about trying to get them back on the right track. I think a more reasoned approach would be the method to follow.

Do you advocate the U.S. Government trying to help the Lebanese Government, or how do you advocate us getting aid to Lebanon?

Mr. NASSIF. We always testified before the Appropriations Committee and asked that money should be increased to Lebanon, but money should go through private assistance organizations and through the education institutions, like AUB or other educational institutions, nothing to go through the Lebanese Government. Mr. RAHALL. So you are supportive of continued funding? Mr. NASSIF. Of course.

Mr. RAHALL. Increased aid for AUB and LAU and the institutions of higher learning.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rahall.

Mr. LaHood.

Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank all of the panel members for their leadership over the number of years that you have been involved in these issues, and for being here today.

I had the occasion to see your documentary, Mr. Anderson. I thought it was just superb. It is very well done, and I think really it highlights for Americans who are confused about what is happening in Lebanon some of the more significant things that are happening there. And I guess PBS will try and air that later on this year; is that right?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir, they will air it this summer.

My only regret about it is, it was far too short to cover a very complicated and interesting country.

Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Pipes, what leads you to believe that the Lebanese Army is controlled by Syria?

Mr. PIPES. Well, sir, I see the Lebanese Government making decisions only that meet with the approval of the Syrian Government, and I see the Lebanese Armed Forces under the control of the Lebanese Government. So, one removed, it is under the Syrian Government.

Mr. LAHOOD. Who do you think General Lahoud takes his orders from, the President or the Prime Minister?

Mr. PIPES. General Lahoud is not in the Lebanese Army, so he does not take orders from either of them.

Mr. LAHOOD. Who do you believe is running the country of Lebanon, the President or the Prime Minister or the Parliament or the Speaker of the House or President Assad, or who?

Mr. PIPES. Well, roughly the 90 percent of Lebanon that is north of the very southernmost part is, in my estimation, ultimately under control of the Syrian Government. It has various vehicles for that control, including the Government of Lebanon, but I think the key decisions are made in Damascus-not for that little part in the south, but for the rest of the country.

Mr. LAHOOD. So you are saying that President Assad is really running Lebanon, in your opinion?

Mr. PIPES. If I might use an analogy, the government of, say, Czechoslovakia or Poland, had certain areas of autonomy. Not every decision was made in Moscow, but, roughly speaking, all the important decisions were made in Moscow, and the less consequential ones or the more routine ones, the more automatic ones, were made in Prague or Warsaw.

I would say similarly the routine decisions, the ones known to create no offense, are made in Beirut or elsewhere in Lebanon, but the key decisions and the guidelines are clearly coming from Da

mascus.

Mr. LAHOOD. Let me ask all of you to comment on this. If, in fact, the State Department lifts the travel restriction, which we all hope that they do, and that Secretary Albright does that, what is the No. 1 problem-set that aside. What is the No. 1 problem or the No. 1, I guess, thing that can really help Lebanon more than anything else, aside from that problem, in terms of rebuilding the country, rebuilding the economy, creating the kind of opportunity, economic opportunities, that I think all of us hope for in terms of jobs and business and so forth?