parties were Hindus of a kind; upon which I suggested that, as a test, he had better ask the opposite party, who appeared in person, what was the name of his god. He did so, and the answer was 'Arugan.' This proved conclusively that the parties were not Hindus, and accordingly I asked the same party what were his çastras. He could not tell me. I then asked him what law he wished to be administered to him. He answered, with complete unconcern, Master's pleasure.' What I did upon that I do not remember, nor does it matter. No doubt, however, I went on to administer the Hindu law in vogue, and without the slightest objection being raised on either side.

The next greatest error I take to be that of imagining that certain speculative treatises, e.g. the Mitākṣarā, believed to be highly admired or respected, and in a sense popular, in certain towns or districts, have the force of codes of law wherever the admiration, or respect, or popularity of or for them is believed, for whatever reason, to exist. I have already protested against this error in several places; but it will be necessary for me to attack it yet again, principally in connection with its pernicious development, the Schools of Law' doctrine, of which (I regret to see) Professor Jolly appears to have become enamoured.

And from this error comes yet another error, of great importance to Brahmans, I mean that of treating nearly all Brahmans, whether Raus or Ayyangārs, or Ayyars, or whatever they may be, as being identi

cal in point of law, just as if such things as kulas and çākhās and caraṇas had never existed, and the Brahmans of South India formed one single happy family. No doubt the Nambūdris are admitted to be outsiders, and to deserve, as such, exceptional treatment. But this exception only proves the rule. I have, perhaps, said enough upon this head in my Prospectus.

It is from these errors, mainly and principally, that (in my humble opinion) have arisen the fifteen false principles that I ventured to expose in my View in the following form, namely :

1. That there exist, or formerly existed, in India certain "Schools of Hindu Law'; and that such schools have authority in certain imaginary parts of India, such as the Karnataka kingdom, the Andhra country, the Draviḍa country, &c., &c.

2. That the so-called 'Hindu law' is applicable to all persons vulgarly styled Hindus,' and to their descendants, however remote, and whether pure or

not pure.

3. That a custom which has never been 'judicially recognised' cannot be permitted to prevail against distinct authority.

4. That a state of union is the normal and proper state of a Hindu family, and therefore non-division should in all cases be presumed until the contrary be proved.

5. That, as to ancestral property, a son, and therefore a grandson, may compel a division against the will of his father or grandfather.

6. That a member of an undivided family can aliene joint ancestral property to the extent of his own share.

7. That self-acquired property' ordinarily is indivisible.

8. That debts incurred by the managing member of a Hindu family should be presumed, in favour of a minor, not to have been incurred for the benefit of the family.

9. That the widow of an undivided coparcener, whether childless or not, has no title to anything but maintenance.

10. That ancient Zamindaris are not divisible because they are of the nature of principalities.'

11. That one, with whose mother the adopter could not legally have married, must not be adopted. 12. That the Aliyasantanada Kattu Kattle is a work of authority on the law of South Kannada.

13. That'survivorship' is a principle upon which the rule of succession in part depends.

14. That a widow can adopt a son with the consent of her husband.

15. That a Hindu family may be at one and the same time divided and undivided.

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In defending these principles, Mr. Innes has thought proper to assert with regard to each of them that I have averred 'that the High Court of Madras has made the false rule'; and has taken great pains, in several instances, to show that it is not true, that this court first made the rule in question, but some other court or person made it, and the Madras High

Court only adopted it, or if this court did make the rule, the Privy Council has sanctioned it. And any one who reads his letter might very naturally suppose that I had rashly and spitefully imputed to the Madras High Court things of which it was wholly innocent. A glance at my View, however, will show that I have done no more than to impute to the Madras High Court that, habitually, in deciding questions of Hindu law it relies on principles which to me appear to be false. It has been perfectly immaterial to me who first gave shape to any principle, or who (to use Mr. Innes' words) may be especially responsible for any doctrine.' All I have sought to do is to attack, and if possible destroy, certain false principles, by whomsoever invented, promulged, or sanctioned Whenever possible, I have honestly traced the false principle to its source. And in one instance, that of the ' Schools of Law' doctrine, I have actually given the very same history of the principle, that Mr. Innes has himself given for the purpose of proving 'the recklessness of assertion that characterises my work'!

And here I think I may very properly take the opportunity of repudiating, and most emphatically, the idea (which I know has occurred to some) that, in publishing my View and Prospectus, I have thought to lower the Madras High Court in the estimation of the public by treating its decisions with something of derision and contempt. I can honestly say that such thought has been far from me. When I acted as Registrar of that court, some twenty years ago,

its President was that admirable judge, Sir Colley Scotland; and two of the puisne judges were Messrs. Holloway and Collett, than whom it would be difficult anywhere to find more able and trustworthy occupants of the bench. It was at their hands I received the most valuable part of my legal training, and it would be strange indeed if I regarded with feelings other than those of kindliness and sympathy a tribunal to which, through them, I owe so much. Of Mr. Justice Innes, too, I would desire to be understood to speak only in the terms of praise, as being an able, a learned, and a high-minded judge.

But, unfortunately for Hindu law, it has been its peculiar fate to suffer most from the very talents and ability that have been brought to bear upon its administration. Had Jones and Colebrooke not been the giants they were, the errors into which they unavoidably fell would have been comparatively unfruitful in mischief. Had Strange been less strong, his lofty utterances would have done less harm and in these latter days if Scotland and Holloway and others had been less clever, less self-reliant and masterful, the question of Hindu law would not stand now where it does.

It is useless, worse than useless, to hide the unpleasant fact that during the last eighty years or so Indian judges have been trying, like the German painter, to evolve a camel out of their inner consciousness. Only, instead of one artist attempting the feat, scores have had a hand in the picture, one taking the head, another the tail, and others other parts.