both within and without-from without the curtailment of trade and so on, and from within the political pressure I have mentioned from all sides. So this would certainly necessitate reassessment of the Japanese position vis-a-vis the United States.

Mr. Nix. Now assuming the failure of Dr. Kissinger, where would the Japanese Government like to turn-to the Soviet Union which has an abundance of power sources, energy sources, or to the Peoples Republic of China which has sources in greater abundance but lack the technical apparatus to put in operation the sources of power? To which country in your view would it be most advantageous for the Japanese Government to seek alliances with?

Mr. LEE. Well, again this is speculation on my part. As far as the immediate prospect is concerned, I don't think either the Soviet Union or China could supply the oil needed by Japan. It would take some time to explore this possibility and to make a working arrangement. Even in the case of the Soviet Union that applies.

My hunch, so to speak, is that the Soviet Union will be the more. likely partner in any future arrangement of Japan than China. Among other reasons, I believe that, on the basis of whatever information I received, which I am not sure how reliable it is, the oil reserve in China is quite substantial and the figures which are given for the total oil reserve in China increase every year.

Still I believe the quantity or the amount of total oil reserve or energy reserve, natural gas included, in the Soviet Union is substantially greater. Also, it is geographically somewhat more feasible for Japan to work out a plan with the Soviet Union than with China.

So if the choices come down to picking one of those two countries, my feeling is that other things being equal, Japan may go for the Soviet Union. However, again may I say that for the immediate future neither country could really supply a sufficient amount of energy resources for Japan. Hence, Japan has to seek a working agreement with the major oil suppliers of today, the Middle Eastern countries. We have seen the frantic Japanese activities during the last 2 or 3 months, and this seems to reinforce my assessment.

Mr. Nix. What do you think the posture of the United States of America would be, what position would its Government take in the event that the Japanese Government turned to the Soviet Union? Mr. LEE. Well, again

Mr. Nix. Pardon me a moment. I am thinking in these terms. What vital interests of the United States of America would be adversely affected if the situation implicit in my question came about?

Mr. LEE. Supposing that if we were to accent a thesis that the United States has been benefited in its competition with the Soviet Union by employing the shield of Japanese economic power and Chinese military power in East Asia, if that thesis has any grain of truth, then the Russo-Japanese working agreement would to a degree jeopardize the U.S. posture. However, my general feeling is that the immediate concern of the Americans seem to be in the context of the politics of resource control the increased importance of China in relation to Japan.

For some time there has been a great deal of speculations to the effect that the next century will be the Japanese century and Japan will be the superpower within the next few years and so on. What hap

pened with the coming of the politics of resource control is, as I stated earlier, the relative position of these countries have to undergo drastic revisions in terms of the crisis in the resource politics; and this new development showed how vulnerable Japan is and how safe the Chinese position is and this is the point the United States fully realizes.

Hence, perhaps in assessing the entire picture in East Asia it is vital to Americans to have the Sino-American relationship continue to grow to a direction of cordiality and not to any hostility. Therefore, perhaps any "loss," if you were to use that term, which may be due to the possibility of growing relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan could be compensated by the equally growing relationship between China and the United States.

Mr. Nix. I thank you, Dr. Lee. It is a pleasure to have you with us. Because of the time we must go to the next witness.

Mr. LEE. Thank you.

Mr. Nix. Our next witness is Lord Michael Lindsay, professor of Far Eastern Studies at American University from 1959 to the present. It is a real pleasure to have you with us. You may begin whenever you wish.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL F. M. LINDSAY, PROFESSOR OF FAR EASTERN STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Mr. LINDSAY. I thought I would follow the procedure of the first witness and just briefly summarize some of the points I put in my statement.

Perhaps I am in a rather unique position, having worked in the Chinese Communist organization during the war against Japan from the end of 1941 to the end of 1945 so in that period I knew quite a lot of the present leaders very well. There are two points I have to make. First, my impression of the leaders as I knew them, they felt real devotion to a cause. I think if we look at the whole history that they didn't really start to get seriously involved in national disputes among the leaders until they had issues which they disagreed about. During the war against Japan we felt there may have been underlying power struggles but everyone had to deal with the Japanese before they could do anything else. I think that during the Marshall mission there may have been some disagreement as to how far you should go in trying to reach a negotiated settlement, but in fact that possibility never materialized.

Then in the early period of the Chinese People's Republic there was no serious disagreement about reconstruction of the various areas of damaged economy caused by 12 years of war-the war against Japan and then 4 years of civil war. So it is really only in the middle 1950's, I think, that issues came up which they disagreed about.

Then we can trace two main lines. On the one hand, the people who would be prepared to settle down to something, rather like the Soviet with the highly disciplined, well-organized government up top, I think this model was rather like traditional imperial China.

I think the other faction was the people who tried to cling to their revolutionary ideals, who really thought they were going to make some wonderful new society. I think this makes sense of the experi

ment in 1957 of allowing free criticism. If this had revealed basic support for the Communist regime the leader could have got evidence much more quickly about defects they were willing to correct, which would have increased popular support.

A much more genuinely democratic society would have been possible only with the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i and his faction. I think Mao very much exaggerated how much in fact he had popular support. The basic criticism was that the Communists had become a new privileged ruling group-the criticism made by Djilas in Yugoslavia-and at the time Mao was not prepared to accept that.

Then followed the attempt to make the Chinese society a completely new and wonderful society through the communes and the "great leap forward" in 1958. People criticized this and said it was not going to work. In fact this experiment did produce an economic setback of about the same order of magnitude as the one in the United States economy between 1929 and 1932.

Mao, obviously not satisfied with the results of the experiments of 1958, began another attempt to produce the wonderful new society. It is interesting to note in 1967 Mao Tse-tung and his followers were saying very much the same kinds of things the critics had said in 1957, that the party is becoming a new privileged ruling group and you have to break its power if you want to restore powers of control to the masses.

My last visit in the summer of last year, I think it was very clear that the cultural revolution had failed. The party apparatus was on top and having really as much power than before. I felt that certainly in some cultural and social aspects. China was far more depressing than it was in 1954. I mean in 1954 we still saw lots of book stores having material to read. This last summer I got the impression that no one was interested.

It is worth my saving more on this, as my memorandum was written in November. There is speculation, that we are now facing a fresh attempt to renew the cultural revolution. I think I did say in the text something about the radical change in 1967, that you must have the cultural revolution every 7 or 8 years.

I think the other point I have to make is that you can see the reason Mao's experiments have always failed is that they have always been based on the wrong theory. Effective action can only be based on correct theory. If you consider the whole record of the Chinese Government, you can say they have done an extremely good job where Marxist theory has been irrelevant. This was specially clear during the war against Japan because then they had a united front. They had given up their specifically Communist policies, basing their policies on the principles of Sun Yat-sen and by carrying out a sensible reformist policy which was extremely effective.

I think it is interesting that in this period you did find some revolutionary ideas, some very interesting contrasts. I remember in 1944, at Yenan, we saw a performance of a Chinese opera and the hero in it was a man who tried to assassinate the first Chinese emperor. Now in 1973, you then had this great campaign to rehabilitate the memory of this first emperor. In Chinese history he has always been denounced as the man who went in for burning all books, burying scholars alive and using forced labour to build huge palaces. Then

in 1973, you find the Communists praising him for his progressive policies. So I think as between the 1940's and the 1970's you have had a very radical change in the position of the party.

My opinion of the cultural revolution is that it failed because it was based on a completely incorrect diagnosis of the problem. Instead of saying as people had said in Yugoslavia, that there is a danger of a ruling Communist Party degenerating into a privileged ruling group, the Chinese leaders have insisted that what was wrong was a revival of capitalism.

The Chinese refused to admit that the Russian Revolution had started to degenerate under Stalin. People were still saying everything started to go wrong in Russia only after the death of Stalin. Even though the things they now denounce in Russia were much worse under Stalin, they denounce the Russians for exploiting the Russian satellite states. They denounce them for using the secret police against their own population. But they insist on saying that what has gone wrong in the Soviet Union is the restoration of capitalism which is obviously nonsense. So the whole cultural revolution was directed against things which were really irrelevant.

If I may make a comparison. Say you had people who perfectly seriously realized that a country has a very serious public health problem but who insisted that that the way to deal with it was to have a campaign against witchcraft. They then find that widespread disease is still going on, and conclude that they must have a more thorough campaign against witches. My guess as to what is happening is probably this kind of process among Mao and his followers. They see that the cultural revolution in 1967 didn't produce its desired results the masses still have no real voice in things, the party group controls everything. They want to do something about this but refuse to admit that the cause of trouble is not capitalism but defects in communism. They have now introduced the influence of Confucianism as another explanation for the failure of their ideal society to develop.

I was in Pittsburgh the other day and met someone who suggested a reasonable hypothesis that Mao Tse-tung might feel that his previous opponents had been influenced by the long tradition in Chinese history of Confucian principles. It was the duty of the high official to take a stand against an official policy which he felt was hurting the people. This fits P'eng Te-huai's opposition to Mao Tse-tung in 1959. Liu Shao-ch'i was very strongly influenced by Confucian ideas. Foreign scholars traced Confucian influences in his writings long before he was purged.

Lin Piao was a graduate of the Wham Poa Officers Training School and people have described him as continuing to show the traditional respect for Chiang Kai-shek who was commandant of the school. I heard of other revolutionary leaders retaining some of these Confucian virtues. So I think Mao, having failed on previous occasions, may fairly recognize Chinese society has this lingering of Confucianism. Also, this would fit in with Mao Tse-tung identifying himself with Chin Shih Huang Ti who unified China, tried to wipe out all knowledge of the past, and tried to make the people completely rely on him. His officials conducted extremely large-scale programs of reconstruction and also built themselves huge, extravagant palaces and built a Great Wall.

I am still not clear just what this present revolution was directed against. I would speculate that it may be directed against Chou En-lai who has built up rather moderate, sensible policies. Basically I think he is a sensible person who probably, if he was left to himself, would not take the ideology too seriously, particularly in foreign offices.

A few months ago there was an indication of this when a group from the Japanese Socialist Party visiting Peking were completely shocked when Chou En-lai said.

When you get home, you ought to press for the continuation of the mutual security treaty with the United States and you ought to press for the building up of the Japanese defense force.

Which were exactly the things the Chinese Communists had opposed most vigorously on ideological grounds in the past. Chou Enlai would be thinking in terms of power politics, saying, We had this great rivalry with the Soviet Union, so a stronger Japan would be useful to us. Being prepared in a sense to let ideology drop in order to get sensible national interest objectives.

I think that this is unpopular with the radical group backing Mao on the revolution. I think this has some relevance for the whole problem of the U.S. policy. What this does show is that you have a very strong element of instability in China. It is probable that given any revolutionary ideology a revolutionary move might easily develop.

You could see both in 1957 and 1967 that, as soon as it became possible for ordinary people to come out and criticize the party apparatus, there seemed to be an immense enthusiasm for joining in, for everybody to attack the apparatus. When there is a general enthusiasm for attacking officials as soon as controls are released, this does make the Chinese situation potentially pretty unstable. I think it is pretty risky to base policy upon the assumption that the pragmatic people are going to stay in power.

If you look at the course of Chinese history over the last 30 years or so and you find a series of huge fluctuations between periods of moderate and reasonable policy and periods of intransigent and doctrinaire policy. After the extremely intransigent foreign policy of the Cultural Revolution there was a swing towards reasonableness from 1970 on but I think the Americans can be criticized for failing to raise some of the fundamental issues which could show how far the Chinese swing to reasonableness would go.

During the last Kissinger visit to Peking you had the Foreign Minister saying, "I hope there will be a steadily growing friendship and better understanding between the Chinese and the American people." This was a very nice sentiment but it seems to me that someone on the American side should have asked. "How do you really expect this friendship and understanding with you making it seem so extremely difficult for the Chinese and American peoples to have any contacts?" This is the real question.

If you found that a Chinese Government was really prepared to allow contacts between the Chinese and American peoples; particularly if you had a Chinese Government which was prepared to repudiate Stalin, than I think you would have some reason to say, yes, these people are committed to a rational policy which has a good chance of continuing. So long as they insist that all the evils in China come from the remnants of capitalism and as long as they insist on producing