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Soviet Union are superpowers, Japan a nation in the second intermediate zone, and China in the Third World. If we were to apply the currently relevant criteria of internal possession of oil resource and external dependence on oil supply, then the Soviet Union and China are "have" powers, Japan a "have not" power, and the United States somewhere in between.

If we were allowed to make a gross oversimplification, then the longrange objectives of China in the temporal dimension can be summed up as a full realization of the Chinese ideal of "justice" and "equality" which certainly requires a careful explication-throughout the world. Such objectives in the reality of international relations mean, in part, an elevation of the Third World into a central position in the world. As stated earlier, China believes that natural resources in the Third World could be converted into both economic and political powers to achieve such an ultimate objective. The Chinese objective cannot be called imperialistic but it certainly reflects the imperial posture imbedded in the Chinese cultural tradition.

Given the Chinese ideal and the ultimate objective, what are the short-term objectives in international politics? They are to counter the superpower threat to China, to prevent the Third World and particularly its natural resources falling into the hands of superpowers and to develop Chinese industrial strength as an initial and necessary requirement to achieve all other objectives. The new power arrangements which have rapidly evolved during the last 3 years seem to serve those immediate objectives of China quite well.

China realizes its lack of capacity to counter the Soviet military threat, to check Japanese rearmament and to establish Chinese “hegemony in Southeast Asia all single handedly. The emerging SinoAmerican cordiality seems to enable China to kill several birds with one stone, for it deterred the Soviet threat to a certain degree, insured a most deliberate speed for politicization of economic power in Japan and established a possibility for an eventual Sino-American "cohegemony" in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, China might have obtained an American consent to furnish technological assistance for Chinese development, particularly in the field of oil exploration in which the United States far surpasses all other countries in advanced technology.

It is important, however, to remember that a power arrangement like the current Sino-American relationship is viewed by the Chinese not as a permanent structure for peace but as a temporary arrangement to serve the immediate needs. Nothing is permanent for China, for she might have committed herself to a permanent revolution. Irrespective of whatever "understanding" exists between China and other powers, one can confidently expect a redoubled Chinese effort to expand its ideal and influence in resource-rich countries of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, perhaps in that order.

As the emerging Sino-American cordiality began to occupy the central stage in the process of restructuring the world politics, the Soviet Union found itself in a politically defensive position. Such a turn of events seems somewhat strange, for the inauguration of the politics of resource control and the sudden explosion of the energy crisis should have greatly enhanced the relative power position of the

Soviet Union which after all is perhaps the only industrialized country with abundant natural resources. Leaving aside the task of explaining such Soviet lapses, we can safely predict that it is a matter of time before the Soviet Union will take a more offensive position in the context of the politics of resource control.

What would be the basic Soviet objectives in the new context of world politics? The Soviet Union will try to maintain a constant and maximum pressure on China, patiently awaiting the Chinese power structure to crack down from internal upheaval. At the same time. the Soviet Union could not-in fact there is no choice-abandon the burden of being a player in the superpower game and has to endeavor to improve and maintain its power in relation to the United States. Faced with the unpromising possibility of confronting both the United States and China, the Soviets might have opted for shifting the character of Soviet-American relationship from one of military rivalry to an accommodation in resource politics. The wheat deal, the natural gas deal, and the Brezhnev visit to the United States seem to reflect such a tendency. The Soviets will try desperately to block a development of a Sino-American "co-hegemony" in Southeast Asia, and the Soviet call for an Asian collective security system is a case in point.

When the Soviet leaders contemplate their offensive moves, perhaps feeling that offense is the best defense, the resource-rich East Asia and the Middle East will be considered the chief battlegrounds to launch such offensives. It is interesting to note that the Soviet positions in East Asia and the Middle East differ greatly from one another. In East Asia, the Soviet Union has virtually nothing to lose and therefore can afford to be adventurous. We shall not be surprised if the Soviet Union were to make any number of imaginative and startling moves in East Asia, including, for example, a proposal for a Soviet-Japanese alliance.

In the Middle East, however, the Soviet Union has substantial investments and therefore much to lose if, for example, China, which has nothing to lose in the region, begins to make a serious effort to intervene. Under the circumstances, a search for a working agreement with the United States to protect the superpower interests in the Middle East is quite possible, and in that event you may rest assured to hear a loud Chinese protest against a "shameful collusion between the imperialistic superpowers."

In the case of Japan, the primary objective today is not to gain the status of a great political power but to maintain its status as a super economic power. But to achieve that obiective in the context of the politics of resource control is difficult indeed.

Frustration from helplessness in charting its own destiny and fear for losing the supply of natural resources have forced Japan to search for new directions in its foreign policy. It has been often said that one cannot make an intelligent comment on Japanese foreign poliev because there is no Japanese foreign policy. The coming of the politics. of resource control may finally force Japan to commit herself to certain policy positions, however risky and uncertain the fortune of such positions may seem to be. The recent decision of Japan in regard to the Arab-Israel conflict reflects such a move from a comfortable passivity to an uneasy activity in Japanese foreign relations.

Japan has a strong tie to the United States, and Japan values it highly. But the replacement of the cold war politics by the resource politics provides Japan a fresh stance to consider its relationship to the continent—that is, the Asian continent. A desire to have an ally or a friend in the continent may slowly grow in the Japanese mind and, given the obvious desire on the part of Japan to see a prolonged conflict or a lack of cooperation between China and the Soviet Union, an urge to seek an alliance with either one of the two continental powers could crystalize in the near future. In a curious way, the crisis mood created by the resource politics may bring together the antiAmerican position of the Japanese left, the nationalistic sentiment of the Japanese right and profit-minded pragmatism of Japanese business and could produce an atmosphere conducive for an alliance with a continental power.

In the realm of pure speculation, a Sino-Soviet rapprochement is often considered most important and probable development in the changing power configurations in East Asia. Without offering arguments either for or against such consideration, we might speculate that a Russo-Japanese alliance has a higher probability than a SinoSoviet rapprochement. China and the Soviet Union are both resourcerich countries and the emergence of the politics of resource control has not seriously altered their power positions in regard to each other and, therefore, the conflict relation between them has not been changed very much. It is Japan whose position has suffered a most drastic change from the resource politics, and any major change in power configurations in East Asia will most likely involve Japan as the pivotal nation.

In conclusion, it might be useful to remind ourselves of the three distinct features of international relations in East Asia, particularly in comparison with those of Europe. East Asia has big powers like China and Japan but without any power system; numerous and complex international relations, but without a system like the European system and intense fervor for nationalism, but without any streak of internationalism. Having neither a tradition of international system nor substantial common elements for unity, the East Asian nations are on the verge of the new and dangerous politics of resource control with no viable means for conflict management or resolution.

We can cite at least three immediate and explosive arenas for politics of resource control in East Asia. First, the conflicting claims of territorial sea and the seabed as well as the ocean floor beyond in the East China Sea; second, the action of the South Vietnamese Government to grant some Western and Japanese oil companies concessions to explore the offshore oil in the South China Sea and the reaction from China (for example, the Paracel incident) and other neighboring nations; and third, the growing importance of free passage through the Strait of Malacca and its effects on the positions of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore-not to mention Japan. We have to keep at least one eve on these danger points as we continue cautious speculations on the emerging patterns of the politics of resource control in East Asia.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HONGKOO LEE, ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, FELLOW IN EAST ASIA LEGAL STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY; AND FORMER FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

I

The coming of the resource crisis and its tremendous impact on international politics might necessitate a reconsideration of our perspectives toward Chinese society in general and its resource policies in particular. We can begin with four general observations.

First, if it were not possible to make an accurate assessment of Chinese strength in any field, then it would be much more sensible to run the risk of an over-estimation than an under-estimation. Estimate of Chinese oil reserves and production is a case in point. It is fustrating indeed to attempt a reasonably accurate assessment of Chinese oil reserves when there exist only scattered pieces of evidence which would hardly warrant such an attempt; and in the midst of uncertainty created by lack of hard evidence, we can be easily tempted to allow an inclination for under-estimation to get hold of our speculation. The lesson we have learned from the unwise under-estimation of the Chinese capability in the fields of nuclear weapons and rocketry should not be discarded in assessing the Chinese strength in resource reserves and development.

Second, the recent oil crisis has underscored the importance of estimating the national strength of any state partly in terms of the degree of "crisis-proof" quality residing in the system; and judged in terms of "crisis-proof" quality, the Chinese system seems to deserve an exceptionally high mark. The high degree of "crisis-proof" quality in the Chinese system may be based on both structural and psychological strength. The capacity to control the needs, to adjust the needs to supplies on the structural level and to maintain a frame of mind geared toward self-sufficiency on the psychological level seems to have jointly contributed to the strength of Chinese system to weather any global economic crisis.

Third, China seems to have developed a keen sense of appreciation for natural resources in general and oil in particular as an extremely important source of political power in international relations. We can, therefore, expect China to continue and accelerate its resource development and to gear its foreign relations with a special emphasis on resource control. The main purpose of this paper is to project future power relations in East Asia on the basis of an assumption for such a new Chinese posture in international politics.

Fourth, there is no reason to expect that the basic outlook of China on its place in the world and its relationship with other nations will undergo any drastic change in the near future, notwithstanding the emergence of oil crisis and the politics of resource control. It will be, therefore, highly unlikely that China will opt for a full-scale foreign participation in the development of her resources. The greater the appreciation for the continuity in the Chinese outlook and policy on the part of any foreign party which hopes to participate in Chinese development, we can assume, the better the chance for getting a Chinese recognition for the legitimacy of its hope and an opportunity to actualize it.

II

It might be useful here to consider briefly the nature of the emerging politics of resource control of which the current oil politics is the most prominent example. Natural resources, like military or technological capacity, do obviously influence the behaviour of nations, and any significant change in resource profile of a nation will necessitate a change or adjustment in the policy posture of that nation. If a large number of nations or some powerful nations undergo such changes, then the nature of international politics might accordingly exhibit some noticeable changes.

If industrialization and standard of living are positively correlated to energy consumption, and ever-expanding consumption and ever-increasing production are interlocked in a vicious cycle, then the need for greater energy resource for increased production should arise universally and accelerate rapidlythis may be a fair description of the phenomenon we are witnessing today. Such phenomenon becomes politically important when we additionally accept the fact that the energy resources are distributed unevenly among the nations, the rate of energy consumption among the nations are extremely uneven, and the traditional mode of acquiring external resources through military conquest has become obsolete. In the present world in which most of the highly indus

trialized nations all tend to consume a larger share of world energy than they contribute in terms of domestic production, a proposition like the following by Choueri, Laird and Meadows gains an immediate relevance in the context of the current international politics: "The greater a nation's dependency on external resources, the higher the probability that its interests will ultiinately collide with those of another power."

Politics is a process whose style and direction are determined in part by conscious human choices and decisions. What makes the politics of resource control a distinctly new blend of politics is the emergence of new, and articulated consciousness in all nations toward values of natural resources like oil as a power resource of highest importance. By "power resource" we mean those which could either generate or convert into political power. Emergence of political mechanisms like OPEC to convert power resource like oil to actual power has enhanced a universal appreciation for the potential value of natural

resources.

Be it a newly awakened consciousness as in the case of many developing nations or a sharply reinforced consciousness as in the case of some highly developed nations, the intense consciousness for the values of natural resource in general and oil in particular which is engulfing the world today seems to have forced most political decision-makers to make a sweeping reconsideration of their basic policy assumptions. For example, as the value of natural resources sharply increases, the relative value of military capability as political power resource in international politics seems to decrease gradually. A new crisisconsciousness for natural resources enabled a country like Japan to become acutely aware of her vulnerability which had hitherto been overshadowed by an exuberant confidence in her strength based on economic power. To Japan of today, a military threat from the Soviet Union is far less serious than a threat of oil cut-off from the Middle East. It is indeed a baffling experience for Japan to maintain on one hand a mutual security pact with the United States which presupposes the Soviet Union as a potential enemy and, on the other hand, to go all out to make a joint venture with the Soviet Union to explore the Siberian resources. In such a balling. and confusing context, the value of the American nuclear umbrella may not seem as high as it used to. It is quite obvious that the new politics of resource control will generate a number of new power configurations in international politics.

One more characteristic of the politics of resource control may deserve a brief mention here; that is an evident rise of nationalism or nationalistic trend everywhere and equally apparent decline of internationalism all over the world. Whether or not such a trend constitutes merely an initial reaction to the crisis atmosphere created by the inauguration of the politics of resource control and soon will be overcome by a new and more vigorous internationalism remains to be seen.

III

In China today, unlike most other countries, ideology is still a highly potent and relevant force. Neither policy formations nor policy changes could take place in China without an explicit prescription and justification based on ideological foundation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought. What, then, is the ideological foundation upon which the Chinese position in the politics of resource control stands?

It is the new theory of the intermediate zones which seems to provide an ideological guideline for the new era. Putting the theory in a nutshell-it divides the world into three parts: the two superpowers: the second intermediate zone which is comprised of the advanced industrial nations like Japan and Western Europe; and the first intermediate zone which is essentially the Third World of Afro-Asian and Latin American nations. The historical reality of our time is, according to the theory, that the two superpowers are engaged in both contention and collusion to expand their political and economic dominance over the intermediate zones; therefore, the nations of the world are faced with an urgent task of protecting their independence and interest from the threat of superpower imperialism. An obvious tactical guideline derived from the above propositions on the intermediate zones is a promotion of a broad united front between the nations of the first and second intermediate zones. The practical consequences of adopting the theory is that by identifying itself firmly with the Third World, China is able to maintain its revolutionary stance and, at the same time, by cooperating with Japan and Western Europe, China can strengthen its hands against the two superpowers, more particularly against the Soviet Union.

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